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ABSTRACT OF THESIS /Submitted 30/4/96)
The thesis seeks to examine contemporary separatism in Scotland and Northern Italy,
set within the European Union (EU). It asks to what extent these examples can be
said to adhere to traditional theories of nationalism. It poses the question of how
much labels such as 'nationalist' and 'federalist' can tell us of contemporary parties,
given the context which an integrating Europe provides. The thesis aims to flesh out
the paradox of concurrent pressure on Europe's established states from above and
below, by examining sub-national movements in the supranational EU context.
The explicit focus of the thesis is a comparison of the Scottish National Party (SNP)
and the Italian Northern League. These parties were chosen because they have not
before been compared in such detail. They provide a good yardstick of the separatist
spectrum, the former being perceived to be committed to an independent Scottish
state, the latter to an autonomous, federal Italian North. The thesis situates both
parties within a general analysis of old and new theories of nationalism and discusses
the relevance of these within the contemporary EU. The thesis then examines the
histories of both the Italian and British 'nation-states' and the emergence of both
parties as electoral forces within these. The argument is made that, within the EU's
supranational auspices, any differences in headline constitutional aim between the
SNP and the League start to blur. Further analysis of the parties' policy
pronouncements, voter profiles and activists' attitudes point to a more complex
dynamic than terms such as 'nationalist' or 'federalist' can capture. Neither party has
a fixed constitutional end but rather reacts to the prevailing political circumstances
with ideological fluidity, so that neither can be said to seek a definitively nationalist
or federalist solution. Both parties, however, seek to be part of the emerging,
integrated European Union.
The thesis argues that at least some of the confusion concerning the nature of the
SNP and the League stems from an over-stretching of terms. For instance
'nationalism' encompasses many very different strands and movements within its
lexicon. The thesis examines a potential solution to the terminological problem
posed, which comes through the concept of 'post-nationalism'. This term is of
particular relevance in contemporary Europe, where there are concurrent attacks
from both above and below the traditional 'nation-state' level. It is used as a starting-
point for discussion rather than a definitive statement on terminology.
The thesis examines the argument that the European Union represents an
unprecedented environment for the contemporary autonomist movements within it.
The possibility is raised that full-scale independence, meaning the control of all
economic, social and political levers of power, is a thing of the past in late twentieth
century Europe. This prognosis seems to be confirmed by the favourable attitude
toward European integration traced in both the League and the SNP. Instead,
contemporary autonomy movements are driven by issues of accountability and
democracy as the bargains and trade-offs which created and sustained the historic
'nation-states' increasingly break down. With on-going European integration, any
success in the constitutional projects of the SNP or the Northern League will create
autonomous units which immediately give away many powers to European
institutions. The thesis argues that this phenomenon represents something novel in
nationalist and federalist terms and needs to be recognised and studied as a paradox.
It concludes that nationalism and federalism have been altered dramatically within
the European Union, to the extent that a change in terminology may be the best
method by which to capture the change in the aim and content of late twentieth





1.1 Outline of Topic
Nationalism, regionalism, federalism, independence and devolution are all prominent
concepts in the contemporary political lexicon. They are the terms which make up
the new political vocabulary being employed to explain the post-1989 world. They
are held up as explanatory beacons but there is as yet little agreement as to what they
are illuminating - whether the world is moving beyond the traditional nation-state or
is hurtling back toward the worst excesses of nationalist prejudice. Is the economic
power held by international financial markets making the nation-state truly
redundant or instead causing a flight back toward smaller autonomous units? Can a
people who express a national identity ever be truly satisfied with only a form of
autonomy within another, perhaps supranational, state? It is questions such as these
which dominate the view for the student of nationalism in the 1990s.
This study aims to be ambitious. It seeks to help answer at least some of the above
questions by studying two Western European variants of the 'autonomist'
phenomenon, namely Scotland and Northern Italy. Autonomy will be the term used
to encompass the diverse nationalist, federalist and devolutionist aspirations of the
players involved. The central aim of the study will be to establish how similar or
different the projects of the Scottish National Party and the Italian Northern League
are and from this to move toward a definition of nationalism which is based not on
the nineteenth century creation of nation-states but rather addresses the European
reality of the late twentieth century. Indeed developments within the life-span of this
thesis have shown that both parties lie within the auspices of nationalism on all but
the narrowest of definitions. The task here is to illuminate the content and context of
the late twentieth century European Union variant of this phenomenon.
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Many similarities exist between Scotland and Northern Italy. Both areas have
substantial electoral forces gathered beneath the banner (or banners in the Scottish
case) of autonomy through political parties which try to harness the identities of
these voters to their specific cause. Both have seen an incremental breakdown in the
faith placed in the centralised state to solve localised problems. Both the SNP and the
Northern League have used the renewed European integration of the 1980s to couch
their appeal for autonomy in terms of European Union subsidiarity1. However, in
seeking to learn more about nationalism in general the differences between these two
areas will prove equally instructive. On the one hand is the meandering history of
Scottish nationalism which after 250 years of 'negotiated compromise'2 within the
British state, acquired an overtly political form in the late 1960s with the SNP by-
election success in Hamilton and has remained a force since then.3 On the other is
the Northern League which grew spectacularly from its origins as an ethno-cultural
movement in the north-eastern Veneto region in 1979 to become the largest party in
the Italian Chamber of Deputies after the March 1994 general election and the
crucial player in bringing down Silvio Berlusconi's governing coalition in December
1994. Contrary to most expectations the League emerged from the 1996 elections as
the largest party in the Italian North with its vote-share above 10% for the first time
and significantly increased from both the 1992 and 1994 elections.4 The former
3 In this thesis subsidiarity will be taken to mean the principle of governing units being
those most suited to the issue involved, as discussed in the preamble to the "Treaty on
European Union" in which the then twelve member states "Resolved to continue the process
of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken
as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity." See
Commission of the European Communities (1992) p.4.
2 A phrase coined by Lindsay Paterson in 'Ane end to ane auld sang - Sovereignty and the
Renegotiation of the Union' L. Paterson (1991) pp.104-122.
3 The SNP had briefly held the neighbouring Motherwell seat when they broke the war¬
time party truce to fight a by-election in 1945, but the seat won by then leader, Robert
Mclntyre, was lost at the general election later that same year - see T. Gallagher (1991)
"Nationalism in the Nineties" p.9.
4 In the 1996 election, the League ran candidates in all regions north of Lazio which is where
Rome is situated, however there is a clear dividing line between the Northern regions -
Piedmont, Lombardy, Trentino Alto-Adige, the Veneto, Friuli Venezia-Giulia and Liguria
where the League's vote was well into double figures and the central regions of Tuscany,
8
claims to mobilise a Scottish identity which has been developed, debated and refined
over almost three hundred years of Union, whilst the latter has re-invoked identities
thought to be buried in the Middle Ages. If these diverse circumstances can
precipitate similar political solutions then a comparison of the two should yield some
insight into contemporary autonomist sentiment.
However the comparison will not only look at the macro level of the political parties,
indeed the contention will be that to truly understand this contemporary phenomenon
we must gain as much knowledge as possible about the sociological make-up of the
movements and the relevant identities of those who adhere to them, for as Eric
Hobsbawm makes clear in the introduction to his study of nationalism, nations are:
"...dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be
understood unless analysed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions,
hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people.."5
Nationalist aspiration can thus be seen as a dialogue between those above - the
political classes - and those below - the population. This study will attempt to relate
the two by looking at the manner in which identities and interests are used by the two
parties concerned to maximise their appeal within the complex matrix of voting
which every elector employs. It will focus specifically on the way in which political
parties can use national identities to increase their own legitimacy, a process which
Martin Clark believes can be extended to a general law which he calls the
'Metternich principle', thus:
"..regions will always remain mere 'geographical expressions' unless the
elites within them can harness popular disaffection to pseudo-nationalist
sentiment."6
Umbria and the Marche where it has a verymarginal presence polling 1 or 2% of the vote,
whilst in between these two it reached 7.2% in Emilia-Romagna. The national figure then is
misleading to the extent that it spreads the League's votes across all twenty Italian regions,
whereas depending on which regions one includes its share of the vote rises to between 15
and 25%. A map of Italy's regions is included as Appendix II to help any reader unfamiliar
with Italy's internal geography.
5 E.J.Hobsbawm (1992) "Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 - Programme. Myth. Reality"
p.10.
6 M. Clark (1975)' Italy : Regionalism & Bureaucratic Reform' from J. Cornford (ed.) "The
Failure of the State" p.77 Footnote.
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The extent to which such identities are successfully mobilised by the modern
autonomy parties under consideration will be one of the central questions of the
thesis.
The study may seem to come along after the 'nation-state' horse has bolted the
theoretical stable to those who concur with the extensive literature on the decline of
the nation-state as a relevant unit in the international polity, the theories of
globalisation, supra-nationalism and post-nationalism being just three amongst those
which will be discussed in Chapter Two. However, in the study of politics one must
be constrained by societal, and not merely theoretical, realities. Thus it is not enough
merely to posit the economic and security dimensions of inter-national co-operation
as proof of the declining significance of the autonomous nation or region. Instead
one must explore the apparently paradoxical tendencies of growing super-
nationalism and concurrent intra-national autonomism. One must seek to explain
why as the European Union continues to widen and deepen, albeit, in its traditional
sporadic fashion, several of its member states are simultaneously seeing their
governing unity undergo fierce internal challenge. This thesis will argue that the two
processes are interconnected, indeed the backdrop of the European Union is crucial
in understanding the Scottish National Party and the Northern League and it will be
argued that its presence has greatly influenced the content of their respective brands
of autonomism.
In this light, nationalism and regionalism remain very potent forces and millions of
people give great personal salience to their identity and crave control over devolved
political institutions. In the 1996 elections the League received the preference vote of
just under four million voters in the PR part of the Italian ballot whilst in 1992 the
SNP took 21.5 % of the Scottish vote or over 500,000 ballots were cast for them
under a system in which they had realistic chances of victory in only a small number
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of seats. These voters may then feel that their 'official' nation-state is increasingly
powerless in the global village, especially in the European Union which through its
various treaty obligations demands much surrender of sovereignty as the price of
membership. However there is a large question over the compatibility of sub- and
supra-national tendencies, namely that newly victorious nationalists are unlikely to
wish to give up all their hard-won powers immediately. Once achieved the desire for
autonomy, then, is still a powerful force for many both above and below and Michael
Ignatieff has summed up the misplaced analysis of those who proclaim it dead :
"With blithe lightness of mind, we assumed that the world was moving
irrevocably beyond nationalism, beyond tribalism, beyond the provincial
confines of the identities inscribed in our passports, towards a global market
culture which was to be our new home. In retrospect we were whistling in
the dark. The repressed has returned, and its name is nationalism."7
This is a proclamation which stands in contrast to the opinion of Eric Hobsbawm
who sees the ideology of nationalism as increasingly irrelevant in the economic
vacuum which nation-states inhabit in the contemporary global economy, although
both could be said to be reactionary in different ways. Francis Fukuyama went so far
as to famously proclaim 'the end of history' in the sense that the ideological battles
of the twentieth century had been won by liberal democracy, with nationalism
relegated to a side issue.8 However such views appear to forget Hobsbawm's dictum
quoted above, for they omit to bring in the feelings of those creating the nation from
below. Nowhere is this more clear than in Hobsbawm's analysis of Quebec.
He sees the nationalism which has emerged in the French-speaking Canadian
province as parochial in the extreme. It puts up weak barriers to irresistible global
7 M.Ignatieff (1993a) "Blood and Belonging - Tourneys into the New Nationalism" p.2.
8 F.Fukuyama (1989) 'The End of History' in which he says (p.15) "While they may
constitute a source of conflict for liberal societies, this conflict does not arise from liberalism
itself so much as from the fact that the liberalism in question is incomplete. Certainly a great
deal of the world's ethnic and nationalist tension can be explained in terms of peoples who
are forced to live in unrepresentative political systems that they have not chosen.".
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trends hiding behind the barrier of French language and so avoids the globalisation
of the international polity. It is, in short, a misguided project which he sums up thus:
"..the stance of Quebec nationalism is that of a people in headlong retreat
before historical forces which threaten to overwhelm it; a movement whose
advances are viewed in terms of political weakness rather than as success."9
However Ignatieff who spent a month travelling around the province where he grew
up as an Anglophone presents a very different analysis of the Quebec situation, more
rooted in empirical observations. Far from retreat, many Quebecois see their national
project as a step forward. The business elite which broadly backs the Parti Quebecois
at the provincial level and overwhelmingly voted for its sister organisation, the Bloc
Quebecois, in the 1993 federal election, sees nationhood as both conferring identity
and completing the economic emancipation of Quebec, begun in the post-war boom
period. Ignatieff identifies the sense that where Quebeckers used to view Quebec as
their nation and Canada as their state, the province's 'Quiet Revolution' has
conferred a sense of being able to make it on their own both economically and
politically. Much of the impetus to follow economic with political emancipation
stems from the perceived failure of Canada as a viable unit of government, as
McRoberts & Postgate make clear:
"For many Quebecois, however, adoption of the goal of sovereignty seems to
have sprung less from attraction to the institutions of sovereignty
themselves than from dissatisfaction with the status quo, whether that was
the functioning of the federal system or the particular policies adopted by
Ottawa."10
This anti-centre attitude is one which finds much resonance amongst contemporary
Scots and Northern Italians, as Chapter Four will make clear through electoral and
poll data from the last two decades.
This digression on Quebec is instructive as it illustrates the danger of not examining
the empirical reality of a given nation or region within a nation before making one's
judgements. Thus Hobsbawm whilst citing his allegiance to Ernest Gellner's much
9 E.J.Hobsbawm (1992) op. cit. p.171.
10 K. McRoberts & D. Postgate (1988) "Quebec : Social Change & Political Crisis" p.261.
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quoted definition of nationalism, that: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle
which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent."11 should also
have remembered Benedict Anderson's concept of the 'imagined community'12
which posits that since we can never know the strangers who make up a nation with
us, we imagine what we have in common and through these shared imaginings all the
strangers become citizens of the given 'national' community. It is clear that with the
Bloc Quebecois the official opposition in Ottawa after the 1993 federal elections that
the imaginings of many ordinary citizens still conceive of Quebec as a nation and
they find political congruence with a party prepared to push this demand - above and
below then are coalescing. To dismiss Quebec nationalism as somehow a weak
response to globalisation appears not only hasty but very dismissive of Gellner's
definition of congruence between the political and national unit. Hobsbawm's
argument would say that with super-national economic structures, such as the North
American Free-Trade Association (NAFTA), now in place any autonomist
movement will be debilitated. However, in the first federal election after the free-
trade agreement, Quebec signalled a strong desire to manage its own affairs within
this trading bloc. The crucial questions to be answered are whether the developments
in Scotland and Northern Italy mirror those of Quebec and if so, whether they can be
said to represent a new kind of autonomous nationalism which moves beyond the
traditional definitions of the nation-state.
1.2 Overview of Chapters
These questions will be addressed through a variety of methods over the ensuing
chapters, which will combine a theoretical discussion with empirical evidence. The
next chapter will examine in detail the established theories of nationalism in the
11 E.Gellner (1983) "Nations and Nationalism" p.l.
12 B. Anderson (1983) "Imagined Communities - Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism".
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context of current evidence of their breakdown, especially as regards the European
Union. It will argue that a national identity is not a static variable against which
economic and social factors are played out. Rather identity is a dynamic process
which can shift dramatically over time and within individuals. It will also examine
the apparent difficulties of comparing the 'nation' of Scotland against the 'region' of
the North of Italy (termed by the League as Padania and since 1995 referred to as the
NordNazione or 'North-nation'13.) by arguing that all 'nation-states' are to an extent
mythologized and invented. Paterson's idea of 'constant negotiation' is a much more
historically accurate one than any hegemonic, static conception. Indeed the fluidity
of the terminology has been graphically illustrated within the time-span of this PhD
thesis from 1993 to 1996 with the League's shift from a strong form of federalism to
an explicit secessionist platform in the 1996 elections. Chapter Three will continue
the development of these themes through an in-depth historical analysis of the
supposedly unitary British and Italian states. The myths of a homogeneous nation-
state will be deconstructed, through highlighting the limited nature of the elites in
both countries who embraced unity and the concurrent lack of impact on most of the
population in the pre-industrial society of Great Britain in 1707 and the largely
agrarian Italy of the 1860s. Analysis will be made of the extent to which both
London and Rome (capital of the unified Italy from 1870) positively sought to
reinforce their national unity and negatively 'absorbed' any perceived threats. The
underlying contention of these two chapters will be that the concept of the 'nation-
state' is a useful hegemon for theorists but that their reality is most often much more
heterogeneous. Chapter Four will further this argument by analysing the emergence
1995 saw an explicit flirtation with independence by the League with the concept of 'the
Nation of the North' or 'NordNazione' as it sought to re-establish a distinctive identity and to
break away from its failure to force Rome to make federalist concessions; as the Secretary of
the Lombard League was quoted as saying in October 1995 "We have seen that the path to
federalism which goes through the Roman parliament is closed to us, the other which carries
us on to the Nation of the North lies ahead." [La Repubblica. 10/10/95] p.13. This departure
was made more tangible by the successful campaign on a secessionist platform during the
1996 general election.
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of the Scottish National Party and the Italian Northern League as symptoms of this
lack of hegemony.
Chapters Five and Six will then test these contentions by looking in detail at the
Scottish National Party and the Northern League over the last two decades, aiming to
provide a profile of each party's voters, sympathisers and activists. This will involve
the marrying of quantitative electoral and survey data with a limited set of qualitative
interviews with party activists in both countries. These interviews will aim to create
a snapshot of the attitudes of those who are actually carrying the autonomy message
to the electorate - the party cadre who are the vital hinge between the above and
below of any political party. They will be used to gauge issues of identity, motive for
activism, agreement or disagreement with party leadership and more generally
attitudes to centralisation, economics, and the European dimension which both
parties profess. Interviews with activists were preferred to those with the party
hierarchy whom it was felt were more likely to repeat the party line and generally
display less candour because of their responsibilities.
The final two chapters will consist of a synthesis of the various strands of analysis in
Chapter Seven, followed by the thesis' conclusion in Chapter Eight. These chapters
will attempt to show that the contemporary phenomena of supranationalism and sub-
national autonomism are interrelated processes tied to the decline of the traditional
nation-state as a legitimate unit of government. Within the European Union context,
the old theoretical divisions between regions and nations are becoming less and less
relevant as we approach the millennium. The real issue is now accountability in
government and identities are being used as one means to achieving that end.
Whether they will trump other competing identities and which aspects of them come
to the fore depends still on the specific circumstances but they can be taken as
emblematic of a new political discourse which no longer sits comfortably in the old
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immutable theories. The thesis hopes to help in the ongoing process of understanding
these new forms of nationalism by addressing them as they are, and not how we
might expect them to be from the textbooks.
1.3 Research Design
The research design employed seeks to provide evidence for the contentions raised
by a combination of quantitative secondary data sources and qualitative interviews
with activists as outlined above. The interviews are not sufficient in number to stand
alone but their contents contain many comments which will be used to back up
assertions and statements to be made in the different chapters of the thesis and most
explicitly in Chapter Six as part of an analysis of the parties in question. The
interviews conducted comprised the most important primary research of the thesis
and as such provide an important part of the overall project as the commentary in
Appendix I makes clear.
It is useful to situate the interviews in an overall research design framework:
"Research design is the point at which questions raised in theoretical or
policy debates are converted into operational research projects and research
programmes which will provide answers to these questions."14
The key questions to be answered by the research design proposed here are whether
the autonomist movements in the European Union of the late twentieth century are
qualitatively different from previous such manifestations and how similar or different
the projects of the SNP and the League are. The thesis contends that the traditional
theories of nationalism no longer possess explanatory power in analysing the two
cases to be closely considered, those of Scotland and Northern Italy. Indeed it will
argue that both the Scottish National Party and the Northern League can be best
understood as reactions to the type of centralising nation-states which were the
14 C. Hakim (1987) "Research Design - Strategies and Choices in the Design of Social
Research" Preface p.xi.
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cornerstone of traditional nationalism. Neither of these movements fits well into the
traditional left-right ideological spectrum. Nor are their electorates sociologically
homogeneous. Thus it will be argued that these contemporary nationalisms can be
best understood as heterogeneous movements rather than hegemonic ideological
parties, an analysis which draws on the work of the Italian sociologist, Alberto
Melucci:
"The ethno-national question must be seen as containing a plurality
ofmeanings that cannot be reduced to a single core. It contains ethnic
identity, which is a weapon of revenge against centuries of discrimination
and new forms of exploitation; it serves as an instrument for applying
pressure in the political market and it is a response to needs for personal
and collective identity in highly complex societies."15
Melucci terms these three different strands the historical-cultural, the political-
instrumental and the psycho-social. The approach adopted will be to devise methods
of gauging how much evidence is present for these different aspects both above and
below, namely how obvious are the parties' uses of history and its perceived
injustices, the pragmatic harnessing of identity to the party and the sense of
belonging instilled and played on by the parties. The thesis aims to identify and
quantify these different factors, for only by providing evidence for all three levels
will the hypothesis which will be developed of complex, 'post'-national movements
gain validity. How best can the different elements be operationalised?
The historical part of the research will rely on secondary readings supplemented by
the available data on identities. It will be argued that in both Scotland and Northern
Italy there is a distinctive 'identity' which plays a substantial role in the rhetoric of
both the Scottish National Party and the Northern League but which remains within
the context of long-established, dual identities. There have been several
measurements of Scottish/British dual identity and use will be made of these data
sources, along with the substantial literature on Scotland's history in the Union. As
A. Melucci (1989) "Nomads of the Present - Social Movements and Individual Needs in
Contemporary Society" p.90 Emphasis added.
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for Italy with its shorter unified period and more recent emergence of the leagues,
more reliance will have to be placed on secondary, historical evidence, although
some more explicit quantitative data has been located and an explicit identity
question was carried out amongst the activists interviewed, albeit on a very limited
basis. It will be argued that due to the lack of substantial religious or linguistic
(although dialect can be said to play a role in both) differences, that the historical-
cultural strand of these two modern movements is less important in Scotland or
Northern Italy than it is say in Quebec or Catalonia, both of which are often cited as
similar cases, but it remains a powerful mobilising factor in both areas.
The party-political side of the research design focuses on the 'above' element,
looking at the electoral manifestations of the claimed novel phenomenon.
Concentration, then, must be on the differences which may be drawn between these
and more, traditional nationalist expressions. Much use will be made of the
substantial poll data available on the sociological make-up of both parties' cohorts of
supporters - the evidence comes from 'below'. The vital components which I will
seek to elucidate here are : from which other parties voters have defected, how
disaffected they feel with the traditional nation-state and how much importance
they attach to the 'identity/autonomy' element of the League and the SNP.
Another important element in gauging the extent of new nationalist politics is the
position of the parties as held up by its practitioners. This will be analysed by a close
analysis of both parties' literature and pamphlets since the 1980s with a particular
emphasis on the anti-centralist strands of this rhetoric. Study will be made of the
electoral rationale behind any substantive changes in policy stance, for example the
SNP's replacement of 'Free Scotland Now' to its 'Independence in Europe' stance and
the League's shift from a 'Republic of the North' to three 'macroregions', and current
move to full-scale independence.
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The political nature of identity politics will be examined with use being made of the
available sociological data on party support. Electoral motivations will be analysed
and the degree of fit into various models of voting behaviour will be assessed. To
supplement these investigations I will use the twenty-eight interviews conducted
with activists, who provide the vital link between the above and below for any
political party. Without a cadre of committed voters who become willing to work for
the party and give freely of their time to promote its message, it is dubious that any
beyond marginal, electoral success can be achieved. Time and resources limited the
number of interviews I was able to conduct but even with my small sample size,
there is much richness and they very definitely provide a snapshot of party sentiment
as of the middle months of 1995. The Scottish side of this fieldwork was conducted
around the Central Belt region largely for reasons of self-selection but given the
concentration of parliamentary seats in this area and the competition between the
SNP and the Labour Party in most of the urban constituencies, this is an important
area to look at. It is a cause of regret that I got no reply from the more rural
constituencies which provide another strong source of SNP support. On the Italian
side, my research centred around Lombardy and the Veneto the electoral heartland of
the Northern League and before that the birthplace of the Lombard and Venetian
Leagues in areas strong with former subcultural identity votes, both Christian
Democrat and Socialist.
Prior to the interviews, it seemed that it would be difficult to obtain a degree of
consistency when using two different languages. I decided that to maximise the
reliability of interviews conducted in English and Italian it was salient to use highly
structured interviews in which the questions were virtually straight translations. I
was aware, however, that too structured an approach could create artificial answers
simply from the expectations created by my questions. Thus in the end the interviews
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were semi-structured, I had a list of questions which were identical in both languages
and these formed the core of the process, but if the interviewee said something which
was worth pursuing I was prepared to follow this line and then return to the
structured interview - an approach which I believe has provided for comparison
between the two sets of data without constraining its content to an unacceptable
degree.
The interviews were used in the research as a supplement to the statistical data
gleaned from opinion polls and election surveys. This data provides the 'social
situation'16 of those to be interviewed and together with the party literature and
secondary analysis proposed provides the 'broader programme'17 of research.
However given the hypothesis to be tested by this empirical research and the
investigation of both the 'above' and 'below' of contemporary autonomist politics,
such interviews provide an important qualitative element, as Kirk and Miller point
out:
"Even when the quantitative reliability of survey research is essential to the
research goal, the additional perspective of qualitative research is useful as a
rule for assuring validity."18
The small numbers involved mean that the respondents cannot be taken as
representative even though I exerted as much care as possible in their selection, but
the evidence elucidated from these interviews will increase the validity of any
conclusions reached by more quantitative methods. People's self-definitions of social
situations and movements are important, if incomplete, explanatory tools of the
social process under analysis, as Hakim says:
"The question 'why' often cannot be asked, or answered, directly and may
involve a variety of circumstantial and contextual factors creating links
between, or choices between, apparently unrelated matters. Whether one is
seeking explanations at the social-structural level, or at the level of
individual choices and life styles, qualitative research can be extremely
valuable for identifying patterns of associations between factors on the
16 R. G. Burgess (1984) "In The Field" p. 102.
17 Ibid.
18 J. Kirk & M.L.Miller (1986) "Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research" p. 29.
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ground, as compared with abstract correlations obtained from the analysis of
large scale surveys and aggregate data."19
Thus the answers obtained in the interviews provide an important control mechanism
for any hypotheses made from the other strands of analysis. This qualitative analysis
will be used as a supplement to the other forms of analysis undertaken. However the
issue of quantitative analysis is by no means uncomplicated itself with considerable
differences in the evolution and electoral environments of the Northern League and
the Scottish National Party. A specific problem was caused by the differences in the
data-sets available on the two, particularly regarding questions of personal identity
amongst the electorate. Put simply, there has not yet been enough research on the
phenomenon of the Leagues, although the data which was located provided a rich
source of evidence. It is hoped that this PhD will contribute to a body of comparative
research on this party.
It should be stressed that this quantitative analysis does not stand alone as the
empirical evidence for my hypothesis. It is part of an integrated research design
precisely because of the type of problem which may arise and cripple a uni-
dimensional methodology. Coupled as it is with qualitative interviews and literature
analysis, the quantitative research proposed will form a large part of the evidence for
the hypothesis proffered. All three strands of analysis are inter-related in a
triangulated structure and one example of the cross-checks is the use of a linear-
identity scale in the interviews where the interviewee was asked to place his or
herself on a line which will have Scottish and British at its ends in the first case and
Northern and Italian in the second. I then asked the respondents to explain the place
they marked and after the interviews can measure the distance from the relevant end-
point and so gain some further information on a linear scale on dual identities
19 C. Hakim (1987) op. cit. p.28.
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already analysed in the more traditional question form. It is hoped that the research
design employed, with the checks and balances outlined, provides an appropriate
mechanism for exploring the thesis' contentions.
1.4 Comparative Issues & Controversies
The most important consideration implicit in the foregoing discussion of possible
problems is the issue of comparison and control. The initial reaction of many people
to the proposed comparative research is that the areas chosen are more different than
similar. Many perceive the Northern League as a right-wing baronial revolt which
aims to rid the prosperous North of the albatross of the Mezzogiorno. Much has been
made of the elements of anti-Southern and anti-immigrant rhetoric in some of its
propaganda to brand the party as far-right and group it with the French 'Front
Nationale', German Republican Party or the British National Party.. The Scottish
National Party is in contrast often portrayed as a reaction to Scotland's junior role in
the British Union, and while Hechter's 'internal colonialism' model has been largely
discredited by the economic facts, Scotland is still portrayed to be a victim of South-
East centricity and dominance. Moreover the SNP is most often portrayed as a leftist
party seeking considerable social re-distribution. There has also been a general
academic and journalistic pigeon-holing of the SNP as 'nationalist' and the League
as 'federalist' with the concomitant assumption that they are therefore too
constitutionally and ideologically diverse to be compared.
This study will contend that these interpretations are overly narrow. They are the
product of thinking which seeks to place every political party at a specific point on
the left-right spectrum and which wants to categorise all parties as belonging to a
particular family of political ideology. The proposed research does not set out with
any such a priori assumptions, rather it will treat both the League and SNP as
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heterogeneous, complex movements which may or may not fit the 'conventional
wisdom' expounded above.
In this light the Northern League could also be portrayed as a progressive party in
terms of its attitude to Europe - it wants power transferred from the nation-state to
the regions under Brussels auspices. In the 1994 election campaign the League's
leader, Umberto Bossi, was very deliberate to distance himself from the authoritarian
centralism of the 'National Alliance' (formerly the neo-fascist MSI)20. Latterly Bossi
drove a wedge between the League and the Forza Italia movement of Silvio
Berlusconi who Bossi has characterised as simply the Christian Democrats in
disguise. In the aftermath of the 1996 election much has been made of the League's
possible bargain with the centre-left 'Olive Tree' alliance of Romano Prodi, hardly
the action of a rabid right-wing, xenophobic party. The study will seek to show that
the League is no simplistic right-wing, protest party and that its followers have been
drawn from all social and political segments, drawing on such studies as that
conducted into the Lombard League by Renato Mannheimer and his colleagues.21
Likewise the SNP should not be viewed too simplistically for whilst its current
leadership have couched their message in centre-left terms, their membership and
electorate is by no means solidly aligned behind this pole and there have been
considerably divergent platforms in the past, which could well resurface in an
autonomous Scotland.
Another issue which will be discussed at length at the outset of the thesis is the
regionalism versus nationalism controversy, for it could be contended that the SNP
and the League are manifestations of very different types of sentiment,
20 When asked if he would rather push Fini (leader of the National Alliance) or Occhetto
(leader of the former communist Party of Democratic Socialism) off an unspecified tower, he
uncategorically replied the former and he refused to sit at the same table as him during their
nine-month joint membership of the 'pole of liberty' [La Repubblica, 10/3/94]p. 9.
21 R. Mannheimer (1991) "La Lega Lombarda".
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notwithstanding the shift by the League toward secession in the 1996 Italian election
campaign already outlined. However the argument to be proposed here will be that
the external conditions and internal dynamics of late twentieth century movements
which seek autonomy for a defined territory are such that the similarities between the
two are greater than the differences. This discussion will prefigure the hypothesis to
be developed concerning qualitative differences in contemporary nationalism
becoming blurred. It will be argued that the perceived differences in constitutional
end are not very clear-cut as shown by analyses of the parties' declared aims, the
desires of the electorate and the wishes of their activists.
There will be no a priori assumptions made as to where on any given political
spectrum the two parties stand. Rather taking the hypothesis that both are signs of
movements of contemporary autonomist sentiment, as many points of comparison as
possible will be used to test this theorem. Of course some decisions do have to be
made by the researcher, as Melucci points out, "Obviously, the choice of
observations and images to be fed back cannot be entirely neutral; out of necessity it
involves some subjective criteria."22 However by using both qualitative and
quantitative approaches and by explicitly seeking to measure the degree of mesh
between 'above' and 'below' it is hoped that the comparison to be undertaken will
yield the maximum possible validity through the 'control-oriented' approach
outlined. A final word should be included on the issue of the narrowness of the
overall study. In an ideal environment I would seek to include other examples of
contemporary autonomist sentiment such as Quebec, Catalonia or Euskadi in the
comparison to be undertaken. However the doctorate must be framed within the
context of constraints imposed by time and resources, and as such including a third
or fourth region with a different language and location would be too ambitious,
though this is not to say that future work in this realm should not be undertaken.
22 A. Melucci (1989) op. cit. p.250.
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1.5 Aim of Thesis
This study seeks to compare the two areas under consideration by setting out to
assess realistically the similarities and the differences between the emergence of the
League in Italy and the expansion of the Scottish National Party and the concomitant
embracing of devolution in Scotland by the Labour and Liberal parties. The study
will be conducted in the glare of realism, a realism which recognises the large
differences between the recent Conservative hegemony in the United Kingdom and
the breathtaking volatility of Italian politics.23 It is a realism which explores beneath
the surface of the 'nationalist' SNP and the 'federalist' Northern League, looking at
the gradualist/fundamentalist split in the SNP in the context of a strongly neo-
nationalist dominant party and also considers the split in the League which
Berlusconi's fall brought between pro- and anti- Forza Italia factions (the latter of
which has dominated and risen phoenix-like in the 1996 election on the wings of
secession); a realism which considers the constraints placed on the League by its
elevation after 1992 to a position of potential and the actual governing responsibility
and the difficulties faced by the SNP in playing the Westminster game too closely
such as their voting with the government on an issue regarding representation in the
EU Committee of the Regions in March 1993. The contention to be probed and
tested is that the similarities outweigh the differences and that by studying the two
areas at the same time, we can learn much about what nationalism means within the
auspices of the contemporary Europe. The conclusion will aim toward a definition of
this phenomenon, marrying the sub- and supra-national developments and making
comprehensible any connection between the two.
23 After the January 1995 dissolution of the formerly fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI)
through its absorption within Gianfranco Fini's National Alliance (AN), no party which
fought the 1987 European election or 1989 general election remains united under the same
name, although several survive as splinter groups (such as a rump MSI) or having been co-
opted by another organisation, such as the Lombard League being swallowed up by the
Northern League umbrella.
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The research will be informed throughout by the idea that there is never one
definitive explanation of different nationalisms and national identities, because quite
simply these can mean many different things to different people at the same time and
in the same imagined 'nation'. It rejects the premise that there are definitive types of
autonomism which sees nationalism as clearly segmented from regionalism and
federalism, preferring the idea of different aspects of a single phenomenon. As such,
the research design must be aimed at creating a bag of explanatory tools which allow
us to understand better all the different aspects of modern autonomism rather than
the monolithic approach employed by commentators such as Eric Hobsbawm who
seek to homogenise all nationalisms for their own explanatory purposes, for
example: "What I am saying is that, in spite of its evident prominence, nationalism is
historically less important...It is at most a complicating factor."24 This sweeping type
of view, as pointed out earlier in this Introduction, ignores the very sentiments of
those below which Hobsbawm himself highlighted as an important factor in building
nationalism. His analysis is overly tied to the terms of the traditional nation-state, the
aim here is to address the empirical realities of the late twentieth century and for the
Northern League and the Scottish National Party that reality means the novel context
of an integrating Europe.
This study has to advance beyond such orthodoxy if it is to capture the reality of
contemporary autonomisms, and their connection with the crisis of the traditional
nation-state. The proposed methodology will look concurrently at the above and
below of autonomy politics, while bearing in mind Brand's rider, that:
"..there is no certainty that electors support parties because of their
programmes. In any case, humans extract from events and statements
meanings which are relevant to themselves. These meanings may have little
to do with the intentions of those responsible for the events and
statements."25
24 E.J. Hobsbawm (1992) op. cit. p.191.
25 J. Brand et. al. (1992) "Third Parties and the British System : The Nature of the SNP'
pp.2-3.
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There comes a point, however, when to understand adherence to any political
movement we have to assume some concurrence between individuals' beliefs and the
positions proffered by a particular party. It is the contention of this author that all
human beings seek belonging and to reconcile their own self-conceptions and values
with the need to belong to a community, even if this imagined community is never
entirely static. In the context of the breakdown of the 'catch-all' parties of the right
and left and the crisis of legitimacy present in many European nation-states, this
study seeks to discover, if and why the sentiments of territory, ethnicity and
community provide the best way out.
This sense of belonging and identity and the degree to which they are electorally
acted upon are the crucial variables to be measured in the proposed research. It is
hoped that by marrying empirical quantitative and qualitative data to the substantial
literature on both movements that a better understanding of the forces driving the
Scottish National Party and the Italian Northern League will be gained, and that the
conclusions thus reached shed some light on the shadows currently surrounding
much of contemporary autonomist sentiment in an integrating Europe.
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CHAPTER TWO
OLD AND NEW THEORIES -
TRADITIONAL NATIONALISM IN A MODERN CONTEXT
2.1 The Context of the European Union
The Scottish National Party and the Italian Northern League are far from identical
parties. Certainly for the first half of the 1990s the former could be characterised as
seeking independence from the other parts of the United Kingdom and envisaging
Scotland as a small but stable European nation on the Scandinavian model, with
seats at the United Nations and membership of the European Union. The latter
wanted to replace the Rome-centric Italian polity with devolved macro-regions in
which only monetary policy, coin and note issue and security matters would be left at
the centre. Its favourite models are those of the prosperous German Lander within
the European Union or autonomous Swiss cantons for the more Euro-sceptical
activists, though as reported in Chapter One, the 1996 election saw the League
assume a position much closer to that of the SNP with a secessionist platform.
Indeed within these large canvasses it will be argued that much of the detail is
similar : the broad strokes of rhetoric may differ but the overall intent does not vary
greatly. While the SNP has a prominent dichotomy between those who want to pass
straight to independence ('the fundamentalists') and those who see a devolved
Scottish assembly as a precursor to full-blown independence ('the gradualists'),26 the
Northern League itself has endured considerable internal strife over the extent of the
demands made by the party ranging from a full-scale Northern Republic to a
26 Though the leadership of Alex Salmond has seen this rift bridged to an extent
unimaginable a few years ago, as highlighted by the ease with which Salmond's 'stepping
stone' policy was adopted at 1995's SNP conference, summed up by IainMacWhirter (1995)
in his article 'Doomsday Two : the Return of Forsyth': "Despite forecasts of splits and
divisions, the remarkable thing about this year's SNP conference was how quiescent the
fundamentalist faction was. There was scarcely amurmur at the party adopting a strategy
that would have been dismissed as unionist defeatism only a few years ago." (p.26).
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federalising stance and back to talk again of secession because federalism has not
been delivered by the Roman centre. Indeed with the breakaway of the faction led by
former interior minister Roberto Maroni in January 1995, following the resignation
of chief intellectual, Gianfranco Miglio, in April 199427, the SNP's internal
arguments look inconsequential. The question which this chapter will answer is to
what extent do the similarities and differences between the parties matter?
This will be tackled by a thorough review of the literature on nationalism and
identity, asking to what extent one or both examples can be said to hold true to the
generalisations developed there. Given the geographic situation and pro-European
orientation of both movements, this discussion must take place in the context of the
European Union. This organisation provides an exceptional backdrop to any modern
European autonomist movement, because never before in the story of nation-building
or nationalist projects has there been such a supra-national organisation in which the
sovereignty and integrity of their traditional goal - the nation-state - has been
compromised before the achievement of that aim. Previously, nationalist movements
in Europe aimed for maximalist powers within their own borders; in fact that was
part of the very definition of the nation-state. But in the current context any new-
bom nation which becomes a member of the European Union will immediately yield
much of its sovereign power. It has no option as to which organisation it adheres to
(unless it follows the example of Norway or Switzerland which is neither party's
policy), as Jacques Delors, the retired President of the European Commission makes
perfectly clear in his book on France's relationship within Europe : "The EC has
become the one and only reference point for the sharing of sovereignty by great
27 Maroni broke away because he felt the League had been too quick to desert the
government of Silvio Berlusconi;Miglio for quite the opposite reason, namely that the
League's politicians were too quick to cavort with the Roman establishment when they
should have been concentrating on gaining autonomy in the North. He sums his reasons up
in his anti-Bossi pamphlet G. Miglio (1994) "Io. Bossi e la Lega - Diario Segreto dei Miei
Ouattro Anni sul Carroccio".
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nations."28 There is substantial disagreement as to the future course of the EU as
evidenced by the different positions of national governments in the negotiations
surrounding the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). But the fact is that the
European Union already demands a considerable portion of the traditional powers of
a nation-state, especially in the legal and economic spheres and to change this
context there would have to be a reversal of the incremental processes of the last
forty years which seems a highly unlikely development.29 The stand-off between the
British government and Europe over the BSE crisis in British beef has illustrated the
degree of intermeshing on both agricultural and trade matters with Britain's farmers
dependent on decisions in Brussels not London for any lifting of the world-wide
export ban
Thus although there is much current disagreement as to the pace and nature of future
European integration, it seems that at least a core group of nations will press ahead
with further integration of currency and defence. Both the SNP and the Northern
League are very keen for such developments to occur30 and as such the
distinctiveness in their visions begins to blur. An independent Scotland, with no opt-
outs to the Treaty of European Union would have fiscal and social policy autonomy
but would lose control over its monetary policy, currency and defence (a solution
which is analogous to a devolved parliament in the UK). An autonomous North of
Italy would have some fiscal and social policy freedom in an Italy which would have
28 j. Delors & Clisthene (1992) "Our Europe - The Community and National Development"
Preface p.vii.
29 This can be backed up by reference to the primacy of European law over national law
through the subservience ofmember-states' national judiciaries to the rule of the European
Court of Justice. It is also supported by the widespread pro-European stance of businesses,
large and small, even in the more sceptical member-states, evidenced by a MORI survey of
business confidence which revealed only 12% of Scottish firms opposed unequivocally to the
idea of a single European currency, quoted in [The Scotsman. 7/11/95] p.20.
30 See SNP publication (1992b) 'Scotland - A European Nation - The Case for Independent
ScottishMembership of the European Community' or (1993a) 'Independence in Europe'
produced by SNP Research Department. For the League see (1994a) 'II Programma della
Lega Nord' published before the election of March 1994 or (1993) 'II Bossi - Pensiero 1979-
1993' pp.54-56 on United States of Europe.
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lost to federal Brussels the powers previously reserved to its Roman centre. This
begs the question of how different the aims of both movements are. Although their
headline policy goals of outright nationalism and devolved federalism seemed to
differ greatly, the reality of the different autonomies demanded by the SNP and the
Northern League in a European Union context appear much more similar. When one
delves below the surface and looks at the activists' views there is much crossover of
view, such as the enduring support for home rule amongst many SNP supporters
which data analysis will highlight31 in later chapters. Likewise amongst SNP voters
there exists a substantial minority who express devolution as their preferred
constitutional option and a small minority who favour the status quo.32
One is thus confronted with the central question which this thesis aims to explore :
the nature of autonomist sentiment in 1990s Europe with its supranational
institutions and dynamics unprecedented in the history of nation-states. This chapter
will seek to ask whether the differences between the SNP and the Northern League
are more cosmetic than real; whether if both were to achieve their stated goals the
result would in fact be more similar than different and thus whether especially in the
31 "..one thing probably with the SNP with me is I do wish that the parties in Scotland
would work together more, I don't really like the kind of antagonism because for me I sort of
see the common enemy as the Tories and you know I just want to fight that, so I don't really
like the in-fighting with Labour really, probably because I'm quite left-wing really and I
have got sympathies with Labour and their point of view...if we had had devolution things
would have been quite different in Scotland.". A quote from an SNP activist which can be
compared with the league activist's "I would like to see complete independence, I want to
separate, I don't want any discussion of a nation with the rest of Italy, I just want to be in the
North of Italy and I'd be very happy, these are my true feelings....I do not want anything to
do with them in the sense of a unitary state, it's another part of the country." The picture
being built up is one where it is more difficult to dismiss one as a simple nationalist
movement and one as a simple regionalist grouping, as Chapter Six will aim to show.
32 In the Scottish Election Survey of 1992, out of 188 SNP voters, 57% favoured
independence, 39% devolution and 4% no change which doesn't represent a particularly
large shift from the October 1974 Scottish Election Survey figures which saw 48% favouring
independence, 42% devolution and 11% the status quo amongst a survey group of 225 SNP
voters. Thus despite the shift from stand-alone independence to statehood within the
European Union only a little over half of SNP voters share its headline goal. However it
should be added that the same 1992 survey shows 20% of Labour voters preferring
independence, so the picture is a confused one - see Brand et. al. (1994a) 'Will Scotland
Come to the Aid of the Party?' in A. Heath et. al. "Labour's Last Chance?" p. 221 Table 12.4 .
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context of the European Union the existing theories of nationalism and regionalism
fail to explain current developments. Through close examination of the Scottish and
Northern Italian examples, it is hoped that progress can be made toward
understanding contemporary demands for autonomy from territories within existing
states, amidst concurrent moves to supranational integration. The aim is to move
toward definitions of nationalism, regionalism and autonomy which fit the
developing reality of an integrated, supranational Europe.
2.2 The Traditional Theories
These questions can only be properly addressed when one has a thorough grasp of
the various existing theories of nationalism and the backbone of this chapter will be a
discussion of these theories with the focus being on their relevance to the 1990s and
beyond. From the outset it is important to be aware of the complexity involved -
simplistic, hegemonic theories should be treated with suspicion for there is no
obvious empirical example of a simplistic, hegemonic nation-state. The largest
danger of viewing nationalism in this traditional hegemonic manner is the conclusion
that all variants of the phenomenon are pushed into the same analytical category -
linguistic, cultural, territorial or religious being four such paradigms. As expounded
in the introduction Alberto Melucci posits that in its contemporary form nationalism
contains at least three major elements : the historical-cultural, the political-
instrumental and the psycho-social. His analysis, which seeks to understand
contemporary nationalism more as a social movement than as an ideology, is a long
distance from the works which have dominated academic curriculi on nationalism -
for instance those by Kedourie, Gellner and Hobsbawm33. Whilst all three of these
works are valuable in understanding the emergence and ultimate ascendancy of the
33 E. Kedourie (1993) "Nationalism" E. Gellner (1993) op. cit. and E.J. Hobsbawm (1992) op.
cit..
32
'nation-state' as societies moved from the agrarian to the industrial stage of history,
all struggle to give a convincing account of the contemporary resurgence of the
phenomenon. This failure stems from the tendency toward a monolithic
interpretation of nationalism in each of the authors' explanations.
Elie Kedourie is unambiguous that nationalism is an ideology in the manner of
liberalism or socialism, stemming from Enlightenment thinking on the freedom of
the self then projected as self-determination onto the collectivity of a nation. For
Ernest Gellner nationalism was the gel necessary to bind multiplying and urbanising
populations to the nation-states which emerged during the birth-pangs of
industrialisation and was achieved by the creation of 'national' languages through
education and 'national' culture through the spread of print capitalism. For the
Marxist Eric Hobsbawm in his early work on nationalism34, it represented a 'false
consciousness' readily imposed on the masses by elites keen to obtain their loyalty
and so subvert their 'real' class consciousness. All of the accounts contain much
explanation for the emergence of nationalism in the early industrial age. Yet none of
these interpretations possess adequate explanatory power for the modern world,
because of their overly simple equation of nationalism with nation-state building, as
James Kellas pointed out in a criticism specifically aimed at Gellner's theory but
which is applicable to all:
"Nationalist behaviour in its contemporary form is hardly explained in this
theory. It deals with the reasons why industrialising states adopted a
national form in order to prosper, and the nationalism which was associated
with that...Contemporary nationalisms have arisen in long-industrialised
countries which Gellner might have called nation-states. Something new
seems to have happened outside Gellner's theory"35
34 In defence of Hobsbawm he has adopted a much more realistic acceptance of
contemporary nationalism in his recent history of the current century E.J. Hobsbawm (1995)
"Age of Extremes - The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991".
35 j G. Kellas (1991) "The Politics of Nationalism & Ethnicity" pp.43-44.
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The change from the pre-industrial to the industrial age cannot be simplistically
equated with the change from the industrial to the post-industrial. In the former,
nationalism emerged on the relatively clean slate of an atomised, agrarian societal
ordering but in the latter case nationalism has been present for over two hundred
years and so is intertwined with contemporary developments in societies which are
now very complex daily interactions ofmillions of people. In short, many of today's
autonomists are attempting to unravel the achievements of yesterday's nationalists.
The SNP and the Northern League are reactions to the failures of the nation-building
projects conducted along the lines of Gellner's theory. Hobsbawm in 'Age of
Extremes' highlights one of the complicating factors as the dearth of available
models, thus:
"As the transnational economy established its grip over the world, it
undermined a major, and since 1945, virtually universal, institution : the
territorial nation-state, since such a state could no longer control more than a
diminishing part of its affairs...Paradoxically, but perhaps not surprisingly,
this weakening of the nation-state went with a new fashion for cutting up the
old territorial nation-states into what claimed to be smaller, new ones,
mostly based on the demand of some group to ethnic-linguistic monopoly..
The development was paradoxical, since it was perfectly plain that the new
mini-nation-states, suffered from precisely the same drawbacks as the older
ones, only, being smaller, more so. It was less surprising than it seemed,
simply because the only actual state model available in the late twentieth
century, was that of the bounded territory with its own autonomous
institutions - in short the nation-state model of the Age of Revolution."36
Contemporary European nationalism, however, encounters this paradox against the
different backdrop of pan-European integration already outlined and the thesis will
explore how much the context of the EU allows new types of small-scale nationalism
to arise within such an interdependent scenario. Much of the confusion stems from
the use of the same 'nationalist' label for a whole variety of different movements and
sentiments. Nationalism is the generic term used to describe both the forging of the
dominant states of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the movements to
break away from the strictures of these states or their empires in the twentieth
century. Yet the differences between these aspects of nationalism are, at least, as
36 E.J. Hobsbawm (1995) op. cit. pp.424-425.
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large as their continuities, a distinction which has already been highlighted by
commentators such as Nairn who used the term 'neo-nationalism' to try and capture
the significant changes in the content of the term in its British application.37
The largest problem with the analyses cited is their refusal to move from the
equation of nationalism with nation-state building and absolute control of all the
institutions and levers of power. This is an outdated analysis when many of the new
manifestations of nationalism stem precisely from the break-down of legitimacy
which these traditional nation-states have undergone in the latter half of the twentieth
century. Hobsbawm's point about the nation-state being the only available model is a
key one here and to the extent that new institutions and forms of government are still
sought, nationalism may still be applied. However it is the contention of this thesis
that a large difference exists because these new institutions may not necessarily be
sovereign. In the context of the EU, movements like those to be studied are rather
attempts to make sense of the modern dilemmas which see the traditional nation-
state attacked concurrently by supranational and sub-national forces.
2.3 Beyond the Constraints of 'Nationalism'
Nationalism is then a problematic description of modern movements precisely
because it carries with it so much historical baggage and so fails to capture the
complexities and subtleties now present. Moreover, a definitive nationalism is never
present in any individual but will rather ebb and flow over time, as one identity
amongst many competing for primacy. Nor can national or regional identity be
simplistically related to voting for a nationalist or regionalist party. Evidence for this
is provided by the poll data on the dual identities of Scottish citizens which has
revealed there is no simple equation between favouring independence and voting
37 T. Nairn (1977) "The Break-up of Britain Crisis and Neo-Nationalism".
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SNP,38 whilst in the Italian context there is an even less clear link between affinity
to a specific region and acting politically upon this identity.39 With such shifting
identities Melucci's view of contemporary nationalism as a complex social
movement rather than a monolithic political party or ideology seems to possess much
more utility in explaining social reality. Difficulty remains in grasping the role that
traditional nationalism has played in emptying itself of analytic value, as McCrone
says:
"The irony is that nationalism is probably the grave-digger of the
conventional nation-state with its commitment to 'a world of sovereign,
self-reliant nation-states claiming the right to assert themselves and pursue
their essential national interests by taking recourse to force' (Mommsen). In
its classical form nationalism is pursuing precisely those political structures
which are rapidly falling into disuse. As such, nationalism is probably
destined to consume its own offspring. In this sense, these are post-
nationalist times." (my italics) 40
Here then is a potential solution to the redundancy of using nationalism as the
generic term for political manifestations separated by centuries of nation-building
and nation-fraying. 'Post'-nationalism seems to capture the spirit of the times for the
autonomist, federalist and separatist movements that are opposed to centralised state
control and in this sense are successors to, or 'post' the traditional nation-state,
which has represented the epitome of traditional nationalism. Thus, in an era when
the model of one nation/one state coincidence is the exception rather than the rule,
'post'-nationalism would seem to allow the theoretical capture of the disintegration
in the overlap of nation, state and civil society. This term is not simply proffered as a
neat conceptual way of hiving off present-day nationalisms from their historical
antecedents, rather it is contended that these contemporary nationalisms are
38 J. Brand et. al. (1992) op. cit. - see the regression analysis cited on p.10 with comment that
"Support for constitutional change, which had helped distinguish SNP voters from all other
voters, failed to do so when Labour voters were compared with SNP voters." (p.8) - thus
when SNP and Labour supporters are isolated in terms of their identity there is no
statistically significant difference in the 1992 Scottish Election Survey.
39 See I. Diamanti (1993) "La Lega - Geografia. Storia e Sociologia di un Nuovo Soggetto
Politico" Chapter 6, pp.87-110.
4(3 D. McCrone (1992) "Understanding Scotland - The Sociology of a Stateless Nation" p.219.
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theoretically different from those which powered the building of the old nation-
states, especially those present within a supranational context. They are best
understood in terms of reactions to this traditional nationalism, so conceptual
differentiation should help not hinder analysis. This thesis will argue that to a certain
degree both the SNP and the Northern League are best understood in 'posf-
nationalist terms.
2.4 The Effects of Globalisation
That the traditional model of nationalism no longer fits the global reality has been
argued by many recent commentators. Isaiah Berlin in his 1991 essay on the rise of
nationalism - 'The Bent Twig' - uses a tree metaphor where the nation-state was for
long the dominant trunk bending and sometimes breaking the branches and twigs of
sub-national units, but now with the attack on the traditional nation-state the
potential energy of such bent twigs is unleashed, giving rise to a different kind of
nationalism:
"This kind of nationalism is, perhaps, as much a form of social or class
resistance as of purely national self-assertion, creating a mood in which men
prefer to be ordered about by members of their own faith or nation or
class."41
Here one gets the idea of such nationalism being a form of seeking accountability
more than a hegemonic ideology, but before this concept is used to move toward a
plausible theory of post-nationalism, evidence must be provided for the contention
that the nation-state of conventional nationalism is indeed under siege and that a
concomitant to this is the rise of more localised autonomy movements. Taking a
definition ofmodernity from Giddens that sees it as inherently globalising such that:
"Globalisation can...be defined as the intensification of world-wide social
relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a
dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse
direction from the very distanciated relations that shape them...The
I. Berlin (1991) "The Crooked Timber of Humanity" p.251.
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development of globalised social relations serves to diminish some aspects
of nationalist feelings linked to nation-states but may be causally involved
with the intensifying ofmore localised national sentiments."42
Vitally the processes of modernity which include changes in the structure of the
international economy, the scope of technology (especially in transport and
communication) and the end of the Cold War need not be seen as mono-causal. This
complexity allows the superficially contradictory forces of tribalism and globalism to
be seen as different reactions to the same phenomenon of modernity. The changes in
the nature of capitalism which technological advance and market deregulation have
brought changes to the relationship between citizens and the classically constructed
nation-states, which have left the latter very much on the defensive as the rhetoric of
Euro-sceptic Conservatives in the 1995 Conservative Party leadership election made
clear.43 The basic problem is that citizens hold governments responsible for
economic developments outwith their control and so seek solutions which involve
more local, devolved control, as Horsman & Marshall spell out:
"Citizens will tend to think more closely - again - about their own
communities (variously defined) seeking local political reflections of their
concerns, even as the economies in which they are consumers move ever
closer toward global integration."44
The processes of globalisation have affected the traditional nation-state in three main
spheres - economic, military and cultural - and it is no coincidence that these are
three of the areas most often highlighted in traditional theories of nation-building.
Specifically the state has lost considerable economic autonomy through the growth
of multinational conglomerates with their cross-border, international search for
economies of scale and global optimisation. Concurrently the revolution in
communications has made international capital transactions instantaneous and so
42 A. Giddens (1991) "The Consequences of Modernity" pp.64-65.
43 The rhetoric of challenger John Redwood centred on rolling back the EU until it was a
Customs Union and was carried on at the October 1995 Conservative Party conference by
Michael Portillo in a speech which raised European bogeymen which Brussels has never
even proposed - see 'Bagehot' column in [The Economist. 14th - 20th October 1995] p.46.
44 M. Horsman & A. Marshall (1994) "After the Nation-State : Citizens. Tribalism & the
New World Disorder" p.xv.
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eroded much of the monetary autonomy once enjoyed and the days of national
economic planning are now long gone (as evidenced by the international nature of
the 1987 stock exchange crash or the collapse of the London-based Barings Bank
due to excessive derivatives trading by one employee in Singapore). International
markets determine commodity prices, interest rates and the availability of finance at
the whim of speculators and world stock exchanges are largely liberalised allowing
cross-border quotation. The era of the nation-state providing a dominant internal
market and external protective shield has long gone.
In military terms the growth of two superpowers after the Second World War meant
that all other states became dependent for their national security on international
alliances. Security is now most often defined in collective rather than national terms,
regardless of the possession of nuclear capabilities, since the discovery of the atom
bomb paradoxically meant that the nation-state could no longer guarantee absolute
safety. Although possession of a nuclear capability does still imbue much global
bargaining power and is sought by many states, from France to Iraq, the likelihood of
using such national power remains very limited.
The telecommunications revolution has seen the emergence of a mass, homogenised
global culture, largely revolving around the USA. These changes have occurred
within a context of burgeoning international institutions - the United Nations (UN),
the European Union (EU), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - and a larger role for international law
sometimes constitutionally enshrined, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Such huge changes have led David Beetham to comment that: "There is an
increasingly serious question mark over the ability of the sovereign nation-state to
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protect the economic welfare, the physical security and the cultural identity of its
inhabitants."45
Indeed the very idea of the sovereign nation-state is one which it is becoming
increasingly difficult to sustain, particularly for nations within the European Union
substantial sovereignty has been given up to pan-European institutions.46 As
Hobsbawm sums up the 'short twentieth century':
"By the end of the century the nation-state was on the defensive against a
world economy it could not control; against the institutions it had
constructed to remedy his own international weakness, such as the EU;
against its financial incapacity to maintain the services to its citizens so
comfortably undertaken a few decades ago; against its real incapacity to
maintain what, by its own criteria, was its major function : the maintenance
of public law and order. The very fact that, during the era of its rise, the
state had taken over and centralized so many functions, and set itself such
ambitious standards of public order and control, made its inability to
maintain them doubly painful." 47
Nowhere is this defensive clearer than in the field of European law where an
unprecedented pooling of sovereignty has occurred under the provisions of the
Treaty of Rome and later treaties which through the doctrines of direct effect and
supremacy have for the first time in international history created "the ability to
bypass the nation-state's formal autonomy and exclusivity in both adopting policy
and legislation as well as dealing directly with the citizen."48 Furthermore the
decision by the European Court in October 1995 to uphold a British individual's
complaint against the discrepancy of prescription charges between men and women
and order immediate equalisation shows how far a national polity can be penetrated
by the doctrine of direct effect, in an area which might appear to fall under the social
policy opt-out negotiated as part of the Maastricht Treaty. Thus European law goes
further than canon law and public international law had previously advanced in
45 D. Beetham (1984 ) 'The Future of the Nation-State' in G. McLennan et. al. "The Idea of
the Modern State" p.219.
46 This much was admitted by the Foreign Secretary, Home, at the time of Britain's first
application to the then EEC as quoted by Allan Massie in "The Scotsman' [27/6/95] p.13.
47 EJ. Hobsbawm (1995) op. cit. pp.576-577.
48 J. Weiler (1981) "The Community System : The Dual Character of Supranationalism' p.46.
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having entrenched treaty rights over state law (with no provision for their reversal).
Unlike the nineteenth century which saw the zenith of the doctrine of the unitary
state, the late twentieth century legal solution to the onset of modernity has been to
seek methods of dividing and sharing sovereignty, and as Neil MacCormick
observes:
"..it is clear that absolute or unitary sovereignty in the internal sense is
entirely absent from the legal and political setting of the EC. Neither
politically or legally is any member state in possession of ultimate power
over its own internal affairs...the states are no longer fully sovereign states
externally, nor can any of their internal organs be considered to enjoy
internal sovereignty under the law; nor have they unimpeded political
sovereignty." 49
The most common definition of this post-Cold War world is a post-imperialist one -
what this thesis will seek to explore is to what extent it can also be said to be a
'post'-national one. Post-imperial implies that since the collapse of the physical and
psychological Berlin Walls in 1989 the world has lacked an imperial overlord or
overlords, who define interests in every crevice of the globe and will act to defend
such interests (as previously were enshrined in the Truman and Brezhnev Doctrines).
The main line of dissent against this view would be to cite the USA - the self-
proclaimed 'victor' of the Cold War - as an imperial power. However such a line of
argument is difficult to sustain for except in the remarkable and, probably
unrepeatable, coalescing of circumstances in the Gulf War, the US has had no clearly
defined military interests in the world's troublespots, most notably Bosnia and
Somalia, as one would expect from a 'great power'50. Though the US did try to
police them it met with little success. The Asian-Pacific Economic Conference
(APEC) held in Seattle in 1994 was a clear signal of the USA's continued focus on
economic over military security, a process began in the 1980s with the formation of
the NAFTA bloc with Canada and Mexico. Clinton's presidency, it seems, marks a
49 N. MacCormick (1995a) 'Sovereignty -Myth & Reality' pp.9-10.
5° p. Kennedy (1987) in his "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" sees the contemporary
USA as suffering from the classic guns versus butter dichotomy which assuages all 'great
powers' as their military overstretch leads to domestic economic problems.
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USA which is turning inwards rather than imperial, particularly after the Republican
victories of November 1994 giving control of both houses to self-proclaimed
isolationist majorities, though Clintonites would claim that peace is now sought by
negotiation rather than force. This is not to claim that the USA is not the most
dominant country in the 1990s and probably will be into the next century. However
in stark contrast to its messianic approach to foreign affairs during the Cold War in
which the Monroe Doctrine was applied on a global level, the USA has now turned
much more toward its own continent and its Pacific Rim, a recognition of a world
economy which is becoming increasingly dependent on trade blocs over individual
nations, as Kennedy sums up in his analysis of the USA as a contemporary 'great
power':
"The tests before the United States as it heads toward the twenty-first century
are certainly daunting, perhaps especially in the economic sphere; but the
nation's resources remain considerable, if they can be properly organised,
and if there is a judicious recognition of both the limitations and the
opportunities of American power."51
With several competing poles of economic and military power, combined with the
USA's more isolationist stance, the contemporary global polity can be accurately
labelled post-imperial, although the USA does represent an unequal competitor in
many particular sectors.
David Held has summed up the implications of this section's discussion for the
sovereignty of the nation-state with the conclusion that it :"..has to be conceived
today as already divided among a number of agencies - national, international and
transnational - and limited by the very nature of this plurality."52 The traditional
nation-state then is proving ill-adapted to a globalised world in the late twentieth
century and with its limits being graphically displayed many are, as has been seen,
imploding, adding sub-national strain to Held's plurality of agencies. However to talk
of nationalism filling this vacuum, without acknowledging the fundamental change
51 Ibid, pp.534-535.
52 D. Held (1988) 'Farewell to the Nation-State' p.16.
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in its content, creates a very misleading scenario, which Zygmunt Bauman ironically
highlights in his discussion of a possible global order:
"The genuine chances of a 'global culture' depends not so much on the
cultural offer but by the unchanged needs of identity-building. These needs,
if anything, tend to be more acute still...in the wake of the ever more evident
bankruptcy of nation states in their past role of producers and suppliers of
ultimate identity." 53
It is in the furnishing of such identity needs that contemporary autonomist parties can
be seen to be part of the same processes as those which have borne globalisation.
2.5 Towards Tost'-Nationalism
What though of the other concept referred to above alongside globalisation, namely
'post'-nationalism? It is a concept bome out of the globalisation of the international
economy and, to an extent, the international polity described. The motors of these
movements have been the pace of twentieth century technological change and the
advent of an international community which possesses active transnational
institutions, rather than simply resting on a precarious balance of power system.
By the former is meant the huge changes in national economies which have been
augmented by the advent of the computer and telecommunications revolutions of the
last two decades, changes captured well by Robert Reich:
"We are living through a transformation that will rearrange the politics and
economics of the coming century. There will be no national products or
technologies, no national corporations, no national industries. There will no
longer be national economies, at least as we have come to understand that
concept. All that will remain rooted within national borders are the people
who comprise a nation. Each nation's primary assets will be its citizens'
skills and insights. Each nation's primary political task will be to cope with
the centrifugal forces of the global economy which tear at the ties binding
citizens together...As borders become ever more meaningless in economic
terms, those citizens best positioned to thrive in the world market are
tempted to slip the bonds of national allegiance."54
53 Z. Bauman (1992a) 'Soil, Blood and Identity' p.692.
54 R. B. Reich (1991) "The Work of Nations - Preparing Ourselves For 21st Century
Capitalism" p.3.
43
By the latter is understood the growth of both governmental and non-governmental
organisations since the Second World War55. In contrast to any previous epoch we
live in one in which most economic flows are international and in which some
governance has been internationalised. Indeed such is the flow of international
currencies across borders that many domestic governmental choices are now
determined by the markets.56 Since the demise of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange
rate system in the 1970s and the liberalisation of financial markets through the
1980s, international flows of capital have soared. The defence of a weak currency
against which speculation is occurring requires the use of interest rates - traditionally
an instrument of domestic economic management. In the European Union the
constraints are even more explicit through the convergence criteria for monetary
union laid down in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union.57 From these
developments in the international economy and polity the theories of
internationalism, supranationalism and 'post'-nationalism have emerged focusing on
the increasing inability of traditional nation-states to deal with the demands of
populations facing economic and political uncertainty as a direct consequence of the
changes taking place. Indeed nation-states find themselves paradoxically with less
and less power to begin to answer some of the new demands being made on them by
international and supranational developments. It is in this sense we can be said to be
moving toward a 'post'-national world.
However, it is a term which one must use very warily for although the classical
nation-state may be in economic and administrative decline, there has been a parallel
55 "The number of intergovernmental international organisations grew from 123 in 1951
through 280 in 1972 to 365 in 1984; the number of international non-governmental
organisations from 832 through 2,173 in 1972, more than doubling to 4,165 in the next twelve
years. Probably the only functioning 'national economy' of the late twentieth century is the
Japanese." Hobsbawm (1992) op.cit. p.181.
56 The value of financial transactions was 25 times higher than that of real trade in the EC in
the mid-1980s - see J. Delors (1992) op.cit. pp.12-13.
57 See Commission of the European Communities (1992) op. cit. p.41 Article 109j.
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increase in the importance of nationalism in political identity terms. Coinciding
with the emergence of what Inglehart has termed 'post-industrial' politics58 in the
1970s one sees the emergence of significant autonomy parties in Quebec, Catalonia
and Scotland, a rise highlighted thus by David McCrone:
"...ethnicity did not wither but revived as a source of identity to meet new
emergent needs...The resurgence of local and ethnic nationalisms came to be
seen not as in direct contradiction to increasing globalisation of
economic, political and cultural power, but as part of the process itself."59
It is this relationship, which on the surface appears paradoxical, which lies at the
heart of this study. In seeking to understand why the response to the crisis of the
nation-state has been to seek smaller nation-states or, at least, autonomous regional
units, one must ask whether the new variants are substantially different to what
exists. The answer to this question will stem from analysis of the real world
experiences of Scotland and Northern Italy. Thus the study does not ignore the
reality of modern autonomy movements simply to fit in with neat theories about
economic globalisation. To gain a true understanding of the complex subject of
'post'-nationalism one must look at what is happening within existing European
nation-states. There will be no bland assertion that the nation-state is dead; it is not
and it remains the starting point of this research as the central unit in the current
international order, indeed some commentators such as Alan Milward have argued
that the European Community has allowed the survival of the European nation-
state.60 Michael Mann goes further than this to argue that to become preoccupied
with a corner of Europe misses the bulk of what is happening to nation-states in the
global picture. Mann argues that whilst nation-states may be losing some of their
traditional military and economic powers, they are gaining new powers of regulation
in both the private sphere (such as the family) and the public realm (as with the
58 R. Inglehart (1977) "The Silent Revolution - Changing Values and Political Styles Among
Western Publics".
59 D.McCrone (1992) op.cit. p. 10.
60 See A. S. Milward (1993) "The Frontier of National Sovereignty - History & Theory 1945-
1992".
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environment).61 Any new theories or ideas have their reference point in the national
unit, if only because of the dearth of models available as Hobsbawm has pointed out,
and Ignatieff warns of the dangers of simply rejecting the nation-state thus: "If
patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel...so post-nationalism and its
accompanying disdain for the nationalist emotions of others, may be the last refuge
of the cosmopolitan."62 A key question, however, is to what extent the definition of
this national unit is shifting and to what extent any shifts negate traditional
definitions of nationalism and nation-statehood.
Moving toward a 'post'-national theory will involve much analysis of just how far
the nation-state can be said to have decayed and any new theory will still contain
many elements of the old. It is not an either/or situation in which a clear dichotomy
exists between the old and the new, rather a process in which the abilities of the
nation-state and the meaning of sovereignty have changed. Theories should also
reflect these changes. Underlying the analysis of 'post'-nationalism must be the
question of whether the new ethnicities are just another strand of protest politics or a
manifestation of a far more fundamental and permanent political identity, namely a
new content for nationalism. Are they merely short-term rhetorical devices fitted to
contemporary political constraints, or are they more long-term, novel forms of
identity embracing the regional, national and the supranational concurrently?
The crux of the 'post'-nationalist case lies in the writings of the likes of Melucci and
Bauman mentioned above - that human beings still possess the same needs for
identity and over two hundred years of historical baggage has placed the search for
this identity in national terms, despite the global pleas of a Bauman or a Vaclav
Havel. Thus 'post'-nationalism will share many features with traditional nationalism,
61 M. Mann (1993) 'Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents : Diversifying,
Developing, Not Dying'.
62 M.Ignatieff (1993a) op. cit. p.ll.
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especially in the conduits by which it bestows identity, but there are crucial
differences in the environment in which it emerges as the previous discussion has
made clear and these condition the contents of the concept. 'Post'-nationalism is an
even more complex phenomenon than nationalism since it involves a response to the
latter and a concurrent reaction to the complicated needs of complex industrial
societies. As discussed earlier the dominant model available for all breakaway
movements is the traditional nationalist model, but this thesis will contend that both
the external and internal parameters of this model have shifted, and whether or not
these are explicitly recognised through the use of a new term, such as 'post'-
nationalism, it is important that these changes in context and content are elucidated.
Put simply, whilst the traditional role of the nation-state has been attacked on the
economic, military, cultural and geo-political level, these attacks have been
wounding rather than fatal. Moreover there still seems to be a role for national
identity in terms of furnishing belonging, as suggested by the numbers choosing to
identify themselves as Scottish over British, Catalan over Spanish, Quebecois over
Canadian and so on.63 Such moves represent a search for roots but they do not
represent an attempt to build a hegemonic nation-state. What emerges, when and if
these movements are successful will be very different and far more constrained than
the traditional nineteenth century nation-state but, somewhat paradoxically, will still
be referred to as a 'nation', because this is the term that history and habit have
inscribed in the political lexicon. If the Bosnian crisis or Nigeria's flouting of the
Commonwealth and the wider international community over the Ogoniland situation
have shown anything it is that nation-states are still and will remain the unit of geo¬
political currency. No-one is about to start talking of 'post'-nations but the argument
63 Evidence of the first two can be sourced in Luis Moreno's comparative work between
Scotland and Catalonia - L. Moreno (1988) 'Scotland and Catalonia : The Path to Home Rule'
pp.166-181; whilst for the third identity difference asserted here one need look no further
than the October 1995 referendum on Quebec's future within the Canadian federation which
left opinion in the province split right down the middle.
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which will be made by this thesis is that many of the nations which populate the
globe in the next century will be fundamentally altered from their historical
predecessors; they will share the same terminology, but differ greatly in their internal
form and external powers. The role of the state in sustaining nationalism, which
became crucial as its role and scope grew in early and mid twentieth century is now
on the retreat and in the absence of international political institutions' ability64 to
carry out a similar role many areas are witnessing a political inward turn, concurrent
to an economic outward turn. For instance Keating argues that the NAFTA context
for Quebec grants it a similar backdrop to the autonomist movements in regions of
the EU, commenting that "..as Quebec has become economically and socially more
like the rest of Canada its identity has strengthened."65
The tentative use of the concept of 'post'-nationalism in this thesis is intended not to
add to the intellectual confusion which often surrounds studies of nationalism, but
rather to signpost the shift in content which it will argue has occurred and to begin
therefore to unpick the wreckage of theories which have tended to homogenise all
nationalisms at any epoch and in any place under one theory. An attempt will be
made to contrast the situation of a specific form of nationalism, that of late twentieth
century Western Europe in nation-states with considerable supranational
commitments and with the dominant theories of nationalism which have centred
around traditional nation-state building.
It is the fusion of the structural changes from above and the identity needs from
below which this thesis seeks to deconstruct and so understand better the dominant
64 After investigating evidence for the development of a European political identity Ernst
Haas concludes that "None of the data at our disposal can clearly tell us whether a European
identity is replacing the nation-state as the focus of individual loyalty..there seems to be a
weakened sense of nationhood, but it has not been translated into a strengthened sense of
Europeaness." E.Haas (1990) "The Limits of Liberal Nationalism in Western Europe' in
B.Crawford & P. Schulze (ed.) "The New Europe Asserts Itself" p.343.
M. Keating (1995) 'Canada & Quebec : Two Nationalisms in the Global Age' p.20.
48
forms of future European politics. Before outlining how the task of constructing a
theory of 'post'-nationalism and belonging will be attempted, it is useful to
summarise what is understood by a 'modem complex society'.
2.6 Defining Modern Complexity
The term 'modern complexity' is used by Alberto Melucci in his book "Nomads of
the Present" in which he seeks to rethink the conventional interpretation of social
movements as metaphysical actors which views collective action as a unified
empirical entity. Instead Melucci looks at the new forms which such collective action
has taken over the last few decades, citing civil rights, feminist, peace, ecology and
nationalist movements and highlighting the novel forms of support and structure
which many of these movements have. Melucci attacks the structural, resource
mobilisation and political exchange theories of social movements, which whilst
acknowledging changes, remain too holistic in their approach. For him such
movements are fragile, heterogeneous and shifting social constructions, which
cannot be explained in sweeping generalisations. He is concerned by the lack of
analysis on how collective action actually takes place - a product of over-
concentration on structural or ideological analysis: "But neither tells us anything
about how people come together and construct something called a movement."66
The collective action of modern societies is not comparable with historical
movements which were more clearly based on one factor such as religion or class.
Indeed Melucci contends that people may be in the same modern social movement
for different reasons and that this plurality of levels stems from the complexity of
modern societies. This complexity is a product of the growth of the size of the state
from the 'laissez-faire' elites of the eighteenth century to the monolithic, all-
66 A. Melucci (1989) op. cit. p.198.
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controlling bureaucracies of modern nation-states. It is in resistance to this modern-
state building that Melucci centres his analysis of social movements which,
therefore, cannot be treated as independent of the construct ofmodernity. Thus these
movements are a part of the global information age, primarily acting as signs of
individual concerns, which then organise collectively and are conscious of their
relation to the global picture, through the linking of campaigns across borders (as
with Greenpeace) or through the aspiration of emulating a different model (such as
post-materialism).
Why though do individuals who now have unparalleled opportunities for material
comfort (travel, leisure, communications) still seek 'membership' of such
movements? Here Melucci turns to the universal human need for identity - the desire
to relate and belong with other individuals in some sort of community, a desire
which for Smith will always have a core ethnic base:
"Apart...from the question of attitudes to the masses and their inclusion in the
community, it is clear that modern nations and nationalism have only
extended and deepened the meanings and scope of older ethnic concepts and
structures. Nationalism has certainly universalized these structures and
ideas, but modern 'civic' nations have not in practice really transcended
ethnicity or ethnic sentiments"67.
In the agrarian age this need for 'membership' was less problematic to fulfil with
populations tending to be born and to die in specific locales with widespread
migration not the norm and where the community was often fortified by specific
local dialects. The age of industrialisation saw some of these norms challenged
through extensive urbanisation and the establishment of the bureaucratic language as
the national tongue. However traditional nationalism provided a powerful mass
medium for the required, new larger-scale identities which were buoyed by the
increasing wealth of these industrial societies.
67 A. D. Smith (1988) "The Ethnic Origins of Nations" p.216.
50
The present age differs from these previous epochs as both post-material and post-
industrial. The former implies that the general population is now materially sated for
the first time in history and the latter, that certainly for the countries of Western
Europe and North America, the process of industrialism has now passed its zenith.
Indeed many have embarked on an era of deindustrialisation with an ongoing transfer
from secondary to tertiary economic sectors. Concurrent to these developments
global migration has increased greatly, and the multi-ethnic societies which such
migration has fostered have been supplemented by the post-war explosion of mass
tourism and entrenched by the recent rise of mass media. For Melucci:
"The pace of social change, the plurality ofmemberships, and the abundance
of possibilities and messages thrust upon the individual all serve to weaken
the traditional points of reference - church, party, race, class - on which
identity is based. A 'homelessness' of personal identity is created, such that
the individual must build and rebuild constantly his or her 'home' in the face
of changing situations and events." 68
We can begin to structure a theory of 'post'-nationalism around these ideas. The
autonomist movements currently visible within many traditional nation-states are one
of the new channels through which individual identity can find a 'home'. They share
this aspect with traditional nationalism but their emergence has been caused by the
bankruptcy of the very nation-states which this nationalism constructed. In this sense
they both continue and break with historical nationalism. It is this dualism which
threatens to create analytic confusion. Whilst the identities proffered will have roots
in the past, they also represent a break from this past and cannot therefore be seen in
the manner of a holistic schism in modern societies. Therefore they are more
complex than Anthony Smith's ethnocentric approach would imply such that
"nations and ethnic communities are the natural units of history."69 Rather the
movements are complex, meaning different things to different people and playing at
least the three roles outlined in the quote from Melucci in the Introduction : the
historical-cultural need which furnishes roots and so provides a path to identity; the
68 A. Melucci (1989) op. cit. p.109.
69 A. D. Smith (1988) op. cit. p. 12.
instrumental-political which sees these movements as moving against some of the
structural contradictions of complex societies; and the psycho-social which means
that they can provide individuals with that vital sense of belonging to something
outwith mere consumerism. 'Post'-nationalism is not a monolithic force and it can
only be understood by looking at its complexity and different aspects.
2.7 Constrained Imaginings
A further useful theoretical tool is found in Benedict Anderson's concept of the
'imagined community'. While analysing the emergence of the traditional nation-
states, Anderson provides an explanation which is far more enduring and malleable
than other works already mentioned. His starting point is to see nations as 'cultural
artefacts' which arouse very deep attachments, but they can and do change over time.
Such malleability is central to Anderson's schema, thus: "..once created, they became
'modular', capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness,
to a great variety of social terrains,"70
This then stands in stark contrast to Kedourie's ideological view of nationalism as 'a
doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century'71 or Gellner's
claim that "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the
political and national unit should be congruent"72 . For Anderson these explanations
are too 'doctrine' or 'principle' laden and they lack the fluidity over time which his
more complex cultural definition allows, dependent on context as Kellas makes
clear:
"The context in which nationalism flourishes is determined by a complex
interaction of political, economic and cultural developments in history.
While the ideology of nationalism has spread throughout the world, the
differing contexts of time and place have given nationalism and ethnicity
70 B. Anderson (1983) op. cit. p. 14.
71 E. Kedourie (1993) op. cit. p.l.
72 E. Gellner (1983) op. cit. p.l.
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differing political forms."73
The theories discussed explain nationalism as a once-and-for-all process which
becomes impermeable, whereas Anderson's definition of the nation more closely
approximates to Ernest Renan's famous 'daily plebiscite'74, namely that the nation is:
"..an imagined political community - and imagined both as inherently limited and
sovereign."75
There are four elements within this definition worth highlighting. The nation is
'imagined' because even in the smallest nation one will never know most of the
other members and this term is chosen to contrast specifically with Gellner's
'invention', which explains perhaps the 'above' intellectual elite level but says little
of those 'below' who are also part of the community which had to be imagined as
face-to-face contact was impossible. It is 'limited' since even the largest nation has
finite, if elastic boundaries. It is 'sovereign' since each nation seeks its freedom in
the sovereign state - a seat at the European table or a flag in the UN General
Assembly being the ultimate symbol. Finally the nation is a 'community' because
regardless of actual inequality, it is imagined as a deep, horizontal comradeship, a
fraternity which sees its members willingly die for its preservation.
In 'post'-nationalist terms, these features retain their salience but with different
emphases and different building-blocks. The nation is most definitely still 'imagined'
and often exists only as a possibility. But it is not 'imaginary', rather it is a potential
realm, to which those disaffected with their traditional nation-states aspire. It is, as it
were, a promised land whose limits may be defined civically, ethnically or
territorially depending on how citizenship is conceived. These new 'nations' still seek
73 J. G. Kellas (1991) op. cit. p. 6.
74 E. Renan (1990) 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?' La Sorbonne, Paris, 1882 quoted in H. Bhabha
(ed) "Nations and Narrative" p.19 "A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor,
a daily plebiscite.".
75 B. Anderson (1983) op. cit. p. 15.
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sovereignty in the legalistic sense but recognise that it would be a greatly constrained
sovereignty and whilst they would still have international boundaries these
demarcations are less important than accountability and democratic control, certainly
in the European context, to the nation-seekers. Finally the horizontal bonds offered
by the 'imagined community' are very important in terms of fulfilling the identity
needs ofmany individuals increasingly stripped of their traditional bonds.
The nations which thus emerge from 'post'-nationalism will still be 'imagined
communities' but their 'daily plebiscite' will be conducted on different issues. This
change of emphasis reflects their genesis as products of the previous nationalist
project. Their external environment is more complex and they themselves refract
more diverse demands from below, hence the need to view these modern
manifestations more as social movements than ideological monoliths. 'Post'-
nationalism, much more than its predecessor, deals with the realpolitik of 'low' not
'high' concerns and its primary cause is the lack of accountability present in the
nation-states created by the first phase of nationalism, captured thus by McCrone:
"The broad and diffuse, the 'non-political', appeal of nationalism seems to
make it a movement of the twenty-first rather than the nineteenth century.
Its commitment to the post-materialist values of autonomy, authenticity
and accountability place ' post-nationalism' firmly in the future not the
past."76
2.8 The Civic/Ethnic Dichotomy
One of the fundamental distinctions most often drawn in the literature on nationalism
is that between 'ethnic' nationalism and 'civic' nationalism.77 The terms used to
describe this dichotomy vary but for many commentators it has formed the
fundamental building block in their analysis of nationalism. Amongst the first was
Hans Kohn who saw the difference in terms ofWestern and Eastern nationalism:
76 D. McCrone (1992) op. cit. p.221.
77 See J.Hall (1993) 'Nationalisms : Classified & Explained' pp.1-28.
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"While the formation of national characters has gone on through many
centuries, the crystallization has taken place in the age of nationalism. In the
Western world, ...the rise of nationalism was a predominantly political
occurrence; it was preceded by the formation of the future national
state...Outside the Western world , in Central and Eastern Europe and in
Asia, nationalism arose not only later, but also generally at a more backward
stage of social and political development; the frontiers of an existing state
and of a rising nationality rarely coincided; nationalism, there, grew in
protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern - not primarily
to transform it into a people's state, but to redraw the political boundaries in
conformity with ethnographic demands."78
This split was taken up by John Plamenatz in his 'Two types of nationalism'79 and
he sees Eastern nationalism as essentially a reaction to the colonisation and
imperialism of the Western nations and as such it is both imitative and competitive.
However such a stark dichotomy between east and west becomes more difficult to
sustain as many established nation-states have come under threat themselves and as
imperialism has withered as a world system. The idea of fundamental differences
has also been portrayed, however, as stemming from the different demands which
nationalists make, with the key distinction being between the civil and the ethnic
axes. Thus Clifford Geertz differentiates between civil (or civic) and primordial (or
ethnic) stimuli, such that ; "Civil discontent finds its natural outlet in the seizing,
legally or illegally, of the state apparatus. Primordial discontent strives more deeply
and is satisfied less easily."80 This civic and ethnic divergence is also employed by
Michael Ignatieff to explain the differences he encountered whilst journeying in six
different nationalist areas.81
This dichotomy differentiates who is given access to the 'imagined community'. In
the case of the civic variant, the nation encompasses all those who regardless of race,
creed, gender, language or ethnicity give consent to the imagined nation's laws and
78 H. Kohn (1945) 'The Idea of Nationalism' in J. Hutchison & A. D. Smith (ed.) (1994)
"Nationalism" pp.163-164.
79 J. Plamenatz (1976) 'Two Types of Nationalism' in E. Kamenka (ed.) "The Nature &
Evolution of an Idea" pp.23-36.
80 C. Geertz (1963) 'The Integrative Revolution : Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in
the New States' in J. Hutchison & A. D. Smith (1994) op. cit. p. 32.
81 M. Ignatieff (1993a) op. cit. pp.3-6.
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norms. It is civic since it creates a community of equals and democratic since
sovereignty is vested in all the people who undertake the Hobbesian social contract.
In contrast ethnic nationalism says that it is the people / nation (from the German
word 'volk') who create the state and as such unity comes not from equal rights but
from pre-existing ethnic characteristics such as language, religion, customs and
traditions. However the contention that these two are distinct forms of nationalism
needlessly mirrors the restrictive approach of the theorists already mentioned. It is
more useful to view civic and ethnic strands of nationalist or regionalist feeling as
differential aspects of a single phenomenon, rather than fundamental distinctions.
Aspects of both strands are present in many contemporary autonomy movements and
there can be conflict between the two - the dilemma which Settler Watch poses for
the SNP and the split between the populist Bossi and his ethnicist, intellectual
godfather, Gianfranco Miglio, being the most salient examples in the current context.
In terms of the current project, civic nationalism has the greater relevance, for no
west European society in the late twentieth century is mono-ethnic. However the
realities of intermarriage and immigration have not stopped the attempt to create
nations based on exclusionary ethnicity with the killing of boyhood neighbours
because they happen to be of a different ethnic group, or to occupy the wrong strips
of land. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have shown that
ethnicity can still possess a dominant, destructive character in the appropriate
circumstances. Nor can Western Europe rest back on contented civic laurels, for the
definition of citizenship enshrined in the German constitution is based not on a civic
conception of citizenship but on German ethnicity. France's moves toward zero
immigration display the rise of an ethnic aspect in the French definition of national
identity, mirrored in British and Italian government moves to tighten their
immigration laws in 1995. That such immigration issues are crucial to definitions of
nationhood is demonstrated by Rogers Brubaker in his comparative study of French
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and German attitudes to citizenship, concluding that above and below coalesce in the
nation-state primarily through citizenry which satisfies the need for belonging : "The
nation-state is not only, or primarily, an ethnodemographic phenomenon, or a set of
institutional arrangements. It is also, crucially, a way of thinking about and
appraising political and social membership." 82
This study will explore the ethnic aspects present in both Scottish and Northern
Italian self-conceptions, both of which manifest in 'anti-Southerner' sentiments.
Civic nationalism may be the ideal where individuals can reconcile their right to
shape their own lives with their need to belong to a community in the late twentieth
century world but the ethnic aspect persists and continues to lurk in the post-Cold
War international polity and may in fact be mobilised by international developments.
The type of sentiment based on 'soil, blood and identity' to use Bauman's phrase is
never far away on the fringes of even the most civic-minded nationalist or regionalist
groups. The thesis also seeks to explore how far the sense of belonging formerly
granted by the traditional nation-states may have broken down, and to what extent
these have been based on civic or ethnic stimuli, for as Brubaker, whilst adding the
rider that it may take years to occur, claims :
"..national citizenship may be eroded by the development of forms of
supranational and sub-national citizenship. In the post-national Europe of
the future, the decisive instances of belonging, the decisive sites of
citizenship, might be Europe as a whole on the one hand and individual
regions and municipalities on the other." 83
2.9 Nation versus Region
One final conceptual area must be examined before the thesis turns to an
examination of the chosen parties. It is the question of different terminologies. How
close are the concepts of nationalism and regionalism? This question inspires much
82 R. Brubaker (1992) "Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany" p. 189.
83 Ibid. p.187.
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controversy for plainly there is a difference in demanding national independence and
promoting regional rights, although Hugh Seton-Watson famously bridged the divide
by describing regionalism as 'unsatisfied nationalism'84' in other words yet to create
a nation-state for the region in question. Indeed the SNP draws substantially on the
complaint that Scotland the nation has been treated just as any British region since
the Act of Union in 1707, though the recent historical evidence points to a very
differentiated treatment under the single Westminster parliament.85 The Northern
League, from January 1992, sought the creation of three macro-regions of the North,
Centre and South which would be imbued with all bar the powers of defence,
policing, foreign policy and money-issue which would be left in Roman hands until
transferred to Brussels and Frankfurt.86 However as mentioned earlier the League
has in 1995 moved back toward a more militant secessionist stance as its frustration
with the lack of change achievable in Rome has grown. Such policy shifts, taken
together with the SNP's flirtation with devolution as a stepping stone which could
last for fifty years according to one of the party's MPs Margaret Ewing in her speech
to the 1995 SNP party conference, serves to further blur the boundaries between the
goals of the two parties. Superficially it may seem that to talk of comparisons
between the two movements is mistaken since the former wants complete
independence from its unitary state whereas the latter has in the main demanded only
substantial devolution. However this study will seek to show that there are
substantial grounds for comparison between the SNP and the Northern League, or in
other words, prove that any differences between the two are more rhetorical than
real.
84 H. Seton-Watson (1971) 'Unsatisfied Nationalism' pp.3-14.
85 L. Paterson argues that Scotland was 'de facto' as autonomous as many independent
European nations through the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century - see L.
Paterson (1994) "The Autonomy of Modern Scotland".
86 Lega Nord (1994a) op. cit.
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The basis for comparison does not stem from the rhetorical stance of the parties.
What they desire are different outcomes in the political crisis facing their respective
states. However the argument developed thus far suggests that the reality of these
two cosmetically different solutions would not be greatly different and indeed
theorists such as Donald Horowitz have argued that there is much blurring of borders
between the two concepts, thus:
"The often tactical nature of demands, their elasticity, even fickleness, the
willingness of independence movements to settle for much less than
statehood, and the occasional interest of secessionists in capturing the whole
state if that proves possible - all of these argue for an inclusive conception
of separatism and secession, terms I shall therefore use interchangeably.
Such a conception should embrace movements seeking a separate region
within an existing state, as well as those seeking a separate and independent
state."87
This lack of qualitative difference between nation and region is especially true in the
context of a widening and deepening European Union. Both the SNP and the
Northern League campaign vigorously in favour of the European Union, for it is seen
as the ideal conduit through which to bypass their respective national-states. The
goal for both is a Europe drawing on the concept of subsidiarity to proclaim that
government should be conducted at that level which gives the best efficiency and
accountability to those governed.88 Under subsidiarity the division between region
and nation could become institutionally blurred with possible, future legislative areas
including both nations (such as Luxembourg, Denmark and for those favouring
complete independence, Scotland) and regions (Northern Italy, Bavaria and for
devolutionists, Scotland). The distinction between the two matters little for the
envisioned federal European future, although much of the institutional design of that
future has still to be decided and will form the fulcrum of debate over the next
87 D. Horowitz (1985) 'Ethnic Groups in Conflict' in J. Hutchison & A. D. Smith (1994) op.
cit. p.263.
88 See SNP pamphlet (1993a) op. cit. p.12 "Subsidiarity will generate decision-making at the
Scottish level only when Scotland achieves independent Member State status within the
Community" and Lega Nord (1993) op. cit. p.56 where Bossi calls for "the growth of federal
institutions based on the principle of subsidiarity.".
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decade - no state will go down without a rearguard action. Moreover, both parties are
attempting to mobilise support for their programmes by the same method, namely by
highlighting the importance of a distinct community of interests through a distinct
identity as a means of achieving better government and more prosperity. Whether
this identity is defined in national or regional terms matters little to the actual
mobilisation process, as Delors spells out:
"A look ahead enables us, in fact, to define, for the future three great centres
of economic and social dynamism : the Community, the Nation and the
Region. On the balance between these three centres of decision will depend
the vitality of the European whole."89
2.10 'National* Contexts
At this stage it is worth considering briefly the types of identity and conceptions
found in the differing Italian and British political contexts, an analysis which will be
substantially expanded in Chapter Three. In the United Kingdom since the 1970s the
SNP has faced competition from a devolutionist Labour Party, which now in the
1990s seems more committed at the British, national level than at any previous stage
to a substantial devolving of power from the Westminster centre (perfectly fitting
Nairn's 'neo-nationalist' mantle discussed earlier). Moreover the data of opinion
polls and election surveys on identity and voting behaviour shows that a substantial
number of those who declare their nationality Scottish only or Scottish more than
British vote for non-SNP parties, predominantly the Labour Party, as is made very
clear in Table 2.1 overleaf calculated from information from the Scottish Election
Survey of 1992:
89 J. Delors (1992) op. cit. p.155.
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Table 2.1 National Identity and Vote 199290
Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat SNP
% % % %
Scottish not British 9 19 8 36
More Scottish 25 46 48 44
than British
Equally Scottish 51 32 36 18
and British
British more than/ 15 3 8 2
not Scottish
N 209 296 87 192
There is no clear-cut correlation between the SNP and national identity and nor can
that party be seen as co-terminous with national identity, with a surprising
percentage of Conservative supporters feeling at least as Scottish as British, or more
so. Instead the relationship is far more subtle and complex, involving different levels
from the familial to the international. T.C. Smout tries to conceptualize these as a set
of concentric circles, across which any individual's identity cuts with the emphases
dependent on gender, class, occupation, race, language, religion and leisure. Whilst
the model may be attacked since it assumes an inherent complementarity of rings, it
serves a useful purpose in illustrating the current point, namely that the Scottish
identity is a complex one, summed up thus:
"..Scottish identity is embedded in a group of other identities between the
family and the supranational, which include a British identity that doesn't
conflict but rather co-exists with the Scottish identity; and...many other
identities intersect with the territorially-based concentric loyalties, some of
which have little effect on them, others of which have a substantial effect,
usually along the lines of emphasising that loyalty to ring four is different
from loyalty to ring five."91
Ring four here represents the Scottish nation and ring five the British state. The
overlap between these two helps to explain much of the complexity of the Scottish
identity, and the lack of simplistic equation between the SNP and nationalism. The
90 This table is recalculated from Table 12.3 which gives Identity by Vote from J. Brand et.al.
op. cit. (1994a) p.220 - expressing the table this way round still makes the point about the
complexity of the relationship between national identity and voting without allowing the
size of the Labour vote to skew the figures.
91 T.C.Smout (1994) 'Perspectives on the Scottish Identity' p.107.
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SNP seeks to re-marry rings four and five, but many Scots would be happy with a
solution which grants Scotland autonomous regional powers within the supranational
rings six and seven.92
Meanwhile the Northern League operates in a simpler scenario. The largest
difference is that it does not face mainstream competition to its federalising or
separatist goal equivalent to the Labour Party, although such is the fluidity of
modern Italian politics that this cannot be ruled out. However the very fact that the
Northern League is itself an alliance of smaller regional leagues is evidence for the
existence of differing layers of identity. Within, say, the Venetian section of the
Northern League, which retains its distinctive dialect name, Liga Veneta, there is a
substantial loyalty to the region and beyond that to individual towns or rural area, the
commune and paese. 93 Thus if one were to construct Smout-like concentric circles
for the Northern Italian they would begin with the family, move through town, local
area, region, nation, state, and like the Scottish model finish with the newer
supranational identities of the modem age. As Bossi has spelt out: "European man,
as the best sociology has noted, experiences a plurality of belongings : to the family,
to the local community, to the city, to the region, to the nation or to an ethnie, to a
professional or cultural group and so on."94
For some Venetians and Lombards the region is the nation, though for most some
sort of Italian identity will be present, although more than half of the League activists
92 This is admitted by many activists, thus: "if we're talking about an independent Scotland
then yes I think obviously the nature of the EU basket of powers diminishes the degree of
autonomy that independence represents and even the fact that the SNP is now talking
positively about support for a common monetary policy is a big step away from the notion
that the advantages of full independence were gaining control of these economic levers to
use more effectively in the Scottish context.".
93 "Italy is not an absolute from the historical and cultural point of view, it was always
divided, Italy has existed as Italy for little over a hundred years and we have been
Venetians, we have been Veronese for many years, for centuries, so I feel Northern very
securely, Italian less so because Italianness is not.. -1 am not a patriot.".
94 Lega Nord op. cit (1993) p.56.
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interviewed saw themselves as exclusively Northern. Thus Italians can be seen to
possess a similar type of complex identity and in this context it is interesting to
consider the effect of the regional reforms of the 1970s, for in providing an
alternative source of government to the corrupt centre, these directly elected
assemblies, have provided a very clear point of reference for those pushing for
regionalisation. As Putnam et. al. conclude in their book investigating the continuity
of civic norms as a precondition of good government across centuries of Italian
history:
"Over the last two decades Italy has moved significantly toward the
decentralised end of that dimension (centralisation/federalism), not only in
formal terms, but also in terms of practical politics and policy making...The
logic of decentralisation has become self-sustaining."95
This theme is one which will be taken up and considered in Chapter Three.
Scotland and Northern Italy then both possess a complex matrix of identities which
now operate within a novel European institutional context which itself bestows a
nascent supranational identity. The above discussion should make clear that neither
of these identities is a simple clear-cut matter. Amongst both groups there are large
differences in where the emphasis is laid and there is no reason why any particular
individual's identity should be set in stone - it can shift over time. Indeed both the
SNP and the Northern League actively attempt to achieve just such a shift by making
national or regional identity the primary political consideration of citizens. The
European Union is a boon to such partisan manoeuvre for it makes any change less
clear-cut - the choice is not a stark either/or alternative which opponents can attack
as a shot in the dark, but rather a move to more autonomy within an established
supranational organisation, with many comparative examples available to help the
arguments. In identity terms too the supranational and sub-national elements can
serve as substitutes for previous loyalty to the centralised state, the process which so
95 R. Putnam et al. (1993a) "Making Democracy Work - Civic Traditions in Modern Italy"
p.47.
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worries Conservative Euro-Sceptics, well captured by Touraine's phrase "the de¬
nationalisation of European countries".96
Thus it seems that both in terms of what they seek to achieve and the methods
employed to reach these ends, that Scotland and Northern Italy are valid subjects for
comparison and as such the distinction between regionalism and nationalism is one
which should not mire the study in a conceptual bog. It is hoped that terminological
marriage can be made by describing both as manifestations of autonomist sentiment
which seems preferable to the more cumbersome regionalist/nationalist label. This is
not a cheap trick to enable comparison to be made and the differences between the
two will be discussed, but they will also not be exaggerated simply because the
players involved may have used a different vocabulary. As the discussion above
shows much of the rhetorical difference can be seen to stem from the different
historical and contemporary political contexts of the two areas, which Chapter Three
will trace out in all its implications. The real political situation then must inform any
such study, not inflexible political jargon. Luis Moreno has shown the worth of
comparing the 'nation' of Scotland with the Spanish 'region' of Catalonia (a 'nation'
to many Catalans) which he sums up thus:
"It is simplistic to believe that historical events and processes can operate in
the same way and with the same results in different countries but, having
said that, Scotland and Catalonia have so many features in common that it
would also be unrealistic to deny beforehand a similar result in their
respective paths to home rule."9'
This study will employ the same type of realistic outlook on the lessons to be drawn
from comparing the 'nominal' nation of Scotland with the 'nominal' region of
Northern Italy, for there is a strong case to be made that the distinction between these
two descriptions is increasingly blurred in the modern world. Modern autonomy
movements should be seen as part of a reaction to the crisis of modernity.
96 A. Touraine (1994) 'European Countries in a Post-National Era' in C.Rootes & H.Davis
(ed) "A New Europe? Social Change & Political Transformation" p.13.
L. Moreno (1988) op. cit. p.180.
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2.11 Summary
The argument so far has run that the contemporary manifestations of autonomy face
an entirely different context to those in previous epochs. A central contention has
been that the differences in the modern era between nation and region are not as
great as the older hegemonic theories of nationalism would propose since the nation-
state is losing a considerable amount of its previous power. This is particularly the
case for those European areas aspiring to greater autonomy in the future, since their
autonomy is already conditional on the rules of membership to the Union and its
institutions. To capture these differences conceptually the term 'post'-nationalism
has been applied and it implies a Europe which is neither a community of nations nor
regions solely, but both at the same time. The important question in the future
becomes not so much whether a particular area constitutes a nation or region but
rather how much control, democracy and accountability that community has under
the Union's stated principle of subsidiarity, as David McCrone puts it:
"...the regions of Europe which matter are those which have some levers of
democratic accountability - like Catalonia, Lombardy, Bavaria. These are
presently content to maximise their political powers within existing state
structures, until such time as they outgrow them. Simply having formal
statehood may not matter very much. After all, these regions seem to carry
greater economic and even political clout than the likes of Ireland, and
possibly Denmark, and certainly Greece and Portugal."98
The key to influence in the 1990's Europe is not nation-statehood but economic and
political autonomy. The contention of this chapter is that Scotland and Northern Italy
are searching for similar types of autonomy albeit in different ways which shows that
they form valid objects of comparison with more similarities than differences.
Undoubtedly the two areas under consideration have quite divergent electoral
contexts. On the one hand the Northern League faces a clean slate through the
collapse of the parties which had dominated the First Republic and the lack of any
significant rival with a similar autonomy appeal - a function of the League bringing
98 D. McCrone (1994b) 'Rhetorics of Regionalism' p.4.
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together different smaller movements. On the other the SNP is mired in a four-party
system where the dominant Labour Party is its chief rival in terms of seeking
autonomy from a stagnant centre. The challenges facing the two party-political
manifestations of autonomist identity are very different but it will be a contention of
this study that the methods employed by both are not so divergent. After the 1996
elections the Northern League cannot be seen as simply a flash, protest party - it has
a readily identifiable core constituency and geographical area - and similarly the SNP
has long since ceased to be viewed in such a fashion". Both however face similar
problems in wresting power away from the centre, because they suffer from being
seen to play the traditional political game at the discredited centre, for instance the
criticisms levelled at the League in government or at the SNP for voting with the
government over EU Committee of the Regions representation.
Despite the headline differences between the two parties, this chapter contends that
these can be explained largely by the differing electoral contexts which they find
themselves in - a contention to be explored by the rest of the thesis. When one delves
more deeply into the reasons for their recent successes, one is drawn back time and
again to questions of accountability, democracy and autonomy. Both movements are
now operating in an EU context in which the boundaries between region and nation
are blurring, as McCrone makes clear:
"..we confront the region as surrogate nation. Europe is littered with such
examples, and many more in embryo. We may have rough and ready
conceptual divisions between nation and region, but the claim to be in
Benedict Anderson's phrase an 'imagined community' can be conjured up
without too much cultural trouble."1®
Neither the SNP nor the Northern League can be said to seek a traditional nation-
state - the former seeks independence within an integrated Europe, the latter a
" Indeed at the last election SNP voters from 1987 were just as likely to re-vote for that
party as Conservative and Labour partisans (indicating a growing sense of 'belonging'),
causing Brand et.al. to conclude that :"...if they were protesting, they did so twice with an
interval of almost five years. Even if it were a protest vote the first time, it seems to have
become an habitual sentiment." See Brand et. al. (1992) op. cit. p.15.
D. McCrone (1994b) op. cit. p.5.
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strongly autonomous region within the same body or perhaps a form of secession.
Both are reactions to the failure of two, traditional nation-states. It is the contention
of this chapter that the SNP and the League have more similarities than differences,
and lead us toward an understanding of contemporary autonomist sentiment in the
supranational, and perhaps 'post'-national European Union. The next chapter will
begin the explicit comparative analysis of the two areas by looking at the historical





A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH AND ITALIAN 'NATION-STATES'
3.1 Questioning the 'nation-state'
The discussion thus far has contained a tacit assumption, evidenced by figures on the
growth of the international political and economic community, that the traditional
nation-state is losing power in the macro, global context. But what is the evidence
for this proposition at the level of the nation-state? This chapter will attempt to
provide a thorough history of the unitary states created in 1707 in Great Britain and
1861 in Italy.101 It will argue that neither Great Britain nor Italy - which both
emerged as unitary states binding previously differentiated peoples to a centralised
legislature and then employed nationalism in their efforts to bind the populations to
the states thus created - fully succeeded in their nationalising projects. Neither ever
approached the homogeneous, paradigmatic nation-state which some of the literature
outlined in Chapter Two would have as the norm. Instead both had considerable
internal differences and multiple identities continued to exist. This is not to claim
that there were not periods in which the British and Italian elements of these
identities were dominant, but it will be argued that they never totally eclipsed other
national and regional identities.
The argument of the chapter will be that outwith this explanatory historical context it
is difficult to understand the emergence of strong autonomy movements in both
Scotland and Northern Italy over the last two or three decades. The identities now
101 Most commentators date the creating moment of the Italian nation as 1861 from the
symbolic handshake at Teano, just north of Naples, on October 25th between Piedmont
monarch Victor Emmanuel and Giuseppe Garibaldi at which the latter handed over the
South. However it was not geographically complete in its modem form until the addition of
the Veneto in 1866 was followed by that of Rome in 1870 at which point the latter
supplanted Florence as the new state's capital.
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mobilised politically toward the goal of autonomy could not simply have been
imposed from scratch. Rather they re-invigorated latent sub-official levels of
belonging which had remained in the complex matrix of identities which many
Northern Italians and Scots have held through the histories of their respective nation-
states. What then is the respective evidence for these contentions?
3.2 The 'Forging* of Britain
Linda Colley argues in her history of the first 130 years of the British state - "Britons
- Forging the Nation" - that the chief forces employed in creating a British national
identity were war, religion and Empire. The century-long conflict with the Catholic
superpower France, allowed calls of loyalty to be made to the dominant
Protestantism of the British population with the French portrayed as a backward
power seeking to rob Britain of its progress, a threat mirrored in the internal spectre
of Jacobitism, as Colley says:
"All of these major wars, then, challenged the political and/or religious
foundations upon which Great Britain was based, and threatened its internal
security and its commercial and colonial power. Consequently, its rulers
were obliged, over and over again, to mobilise not just the consent, but
increasingly the active co-operation of large numbers of Britons in order to
repel this re-current danger from without." 102
Here then is the emergence of the British 'island mentality', which built on England's
pre-1707 rivalries beyond the actual islands on which England, Scotland, Wales and
Ireland were situated and to which recourse has often been taken in time of war over
the intervening three centuries. This use of the threat of the 'Other' is a classic
building-block of traditional nationalism.
Supplementing the above militaristic Protestantism were the economic opportunities
afforded by the Union. Indeed the Scottish elite's motivation for Union has most
often been portrayed as an economic one, for with the disaster of the Darien
102 p. Colley (1992) "Britons - Forging the Nation"p.4.
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scheme103 still fresh in their minds, the wider markets and greater military security
of being part of the then world's largest economic power, proved an irresistible lure.
The economic benefits for Scotland were not immediately apparent but when they
did come, later in the eighteenth century, they were considerable. Scotland joined the
elite of the world industrial and commercial system. Contrary to the 1970s
revisionism of Hechter, Scotland was no 'internal colony'104 of England whose
development occurred by invitation. Rather she was a vibrant partner in colonisation
with prominent Scottish officials from Canada to India. Indeed Colley cites the mid-
eighteenth century John Wilkes-led 'Little England' movement as evidence of the
considerable resentment towards Scots perceived to be 'on the make' in London and
further afield adding importantly that: "..the real significance of Wilkite complaints
that Scots were invading the British polity to an unprecedented extent is, quite
simply, that they were true."105
Such assimilation, however, is by no means the full story. Firstly for the vast
majority of Scots, the Union of 1707 had very little discernible impact on their lives,
with its concentration on the 'high' spheres of commerce and warfare. It was only by
an incremental process that Britishness began to attain some meaning with the
development of shared institutions such as the monarchy106, the fighting of joint,
Protestant wars and vitally the growing extension of the state into the 'low' sphere
through the nineteenth century (with the Poor Law, Factory Acts, the start of
minimal education). In this latter sense, the British State was in Tom Nairn's phrase
'pre-modern', for it did not immediately seek to align state, nation and civil society.
103 por a fuu explanation at this failed attempt at colonial expansion see 'The Darien
Venture' entry in J.& J. Keay (ed.) (1994) "The Collins Encyclopaedia of Scotland" p.219.
104 M. Hechter (1975) "Internal Colonialism - The Celtic Fringe in British National
Development".
105 L. Colley (1992) op. cit. p.117.
106 Edinburgh's New Town streets were named after the House of Hanover, shortly after
Walter Scott had persuaded George IV to parade in Edinburgh in a kilt and pink tights in
1822, the first visit since the Union of a reigning monarch, commemorated by a statue in
George Street - see D. McCrone (1992) op. cit., p.182.
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Indeed he argues that today, with its lack of constitutional or institutional reform
over the intervening three centuries and its continuing central apex of the Crown :
"..what is being conserved is a pre-modern collectivity whose essential
features all look back to the early-modern and the patrician - not forward to
mass democracy and popular sovereignty."107
Within this unreformed context the appeal of the nationalising project outlined by
Colley could only have partial and episodic success. The very public dissent to the
new British state posed by Jacobitism was an early sign of the type of dissent carried
on by those who argued in favour of the French Revolution. However to confirm the
complexity of identities argued for in Chapter Two there were many 'Britons' ready
to make the ultimate sacrifice and lay down their lives for the new British 'nation-
state' even from very early stages, as the wars of the eighteenth century testify to.
This seeming contradiction can be theoretically captured by again applying the
concept of dual identity - feelings of Scottishness, Welshness, Irishness and to a
lesser extent Englishness can co-exist with those of Britishness. Nairn has argued
that the Great Britain which emerged after 1707 was more a 'state-nation' than a
'nation-state' and this term seems to capture well the chronology of its development.
The British state pre-dated the most rapid developments of industrialisation and print
capitalism - two vital components in the evolution of nationalist impulse - and as
such it would never be a 'modern' nation-state where the imagined nation coincided
with clearly demarcated geographical limits (although arguably there are very few
examples of such smooth contiguity from any epoch of history). The British variant
has always been conditioned by the dualities of these initial decades and the limits of
the appeal of Britishness is demarcated thus by Bernard Crick:
"'British' is a political and legal concept best applied to the institutions of the
UK state, to common citizenship and common political arrangements. It is
not a cultural term, nor does it correspond to any real sense of nation."108
107 T. Nairn (1994) "The Enchanted Glass : Britain and Its Monarchy" p. 155.
108 B. Crick (1991) 'The English & The British' in Crick (ed.) "National Identities - The
Constitution of the UK" p.97.
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His article argues that English national identity was stunted as a consequence of
England's territorial and numerical superiority, for many "to be British is simply to
be English"109, but this was not the case in the smaller parts of the British Union
where dual identities remained. Indeed Crick argues that much of the reason for this
difference was the integrative effect which 'anti-Englishness' had in the three
peripheral areas. Englishness was further retarded by the century or so in which
imperialism was substituted for it and it is the resultant conceptual confusion
between Englishness and Britishness which Nairn caricatures through his use of the
term 'Ukania' to suggest how random a process the naming of a nation-state can
appear to be to those who don't share the dominant identity. Crick argues that the
end of Empire caused more problems for England than the other parts of the UK
because they had nothing to fall back on due to the underdeveloped concept of
Englishness.
The structure of the British state was crucial in allowing such dual identities to grow
and not wither in the peripheral areas. Scotland enjoyed large-scale institutional
autonomy from the outset of the supposedly unitary state - a state which at the
beginning of the eighteenth century was very minimal in its functions anyway.
Scotland's civil society remained largely intact after the Act of Union and manifested
in the 'trinity' of autonomous institutions - the law, the church and the education
system. Moreover, as the scope and capacities of the centralised state became
increasingly enmeshed in the 'low' sphere of politics through the nineteenth century,
control of these issues was not overseen centrally in London but devolved to
Scotland. At first this control was through a series of ad hoc boards (poor law, health
and the like), but was then centralised in Edinburgh in 1886 through the setting-up of
the Scottish Office, as a devolutionary reaction to the setting-up of the Scottish
Home Rule Association one year previously. Indeed Lindsay Paterson goes further to
109 Ibid.
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argue that both sides in the argument acted in a 'nationalist' vein - in the sense of
trying to further the interests of Scotland. Whilst proponents argued that a Scottish
Office would get things done more effectively (an early argument for subsidiarity),
opponents such as Lyon Playfair feared that the transfer of power from London
would make Scottish policy too provincial, showing the belief that Scotland could
achieve its full potential only in union, an attitude which is captured in Graeme
Morton's phrase 'unionist-nationalism'110. The important factor of Scotland's
distinctiveness being taken as a given is summed up by Paterson :
"The dispute was not about whether there was a Scottish national interest; it
was about how best to serve it. After the office was established, its
nationalist role grew. It quickly became the focus of all Scottish
campaigning, even in policy areas where it had no formal remit" 111
Such developments can best be analysed in Paterson's schema of 'negotiated
compromise' which highlights the ongoing trade-offs and bargains on sovereignty
issues which have characterised Scotland's history within the Union: "..for a small
nation like Scotland, sovereignty is a negotiated process, not a condition that is
acquired or lost in one cataclysmic event."112
The British nation-state created in 1707 and 'forged' thereafter allowed its 'junior
partner' considerable autonomy; indeed Scotland was used as a paradigm case by
Catalans, Finns and others seeking autonomy in the nineteenth century113. It should
be emphasised though that for most of Britain's history there was no friction between
the two identities on offer - Empire Day celebrations contained both Scottish and
British flags and icons, whilst distinctively Scottish regiments carried on fighting for
the integrity of the British nation. In short, the British state, never as centralised as
many which followed it in the zenith of nation-state building, operated very
110 G. Morton (1993) "Unionist-Nationalism : The Historical Construction of Scottish
National Identity, Edinburgh 1830-1860" [PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh].
111 L. Paterson(1994) op. cit. p. 62.
112 L. Paterson (1991) op. cit. p.104.
133 L. Paterson (1994) op. cit. pp. 92-97.
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successfully. There were outbursts of home-rule sentiment in Scotland but these were
met by concessions such as the setting up of the Scottish Office as highlighted above
or more recently such institutions as the Scottish Development Agency or the various
industrial 'presents' granted by post-war Secretaries of State (Ravenscraig, Linwood,
Invergordon). This limited autonomy served to placate short-term demands for
increased sovereignty. Vitally the concessions won allowed Scottish identity to be
institutionally situated in what Kellas describes as a 'political system'114; the policy
networks surrounding Scottish political institutions have been important in giving
political voice to what otherwise may have remained a more cultural, folkloristic
entity. This is particularly important given the decline of the import of the Church
through secularisation, and to a lesser extent Scottish legal distinctiveness under
European law. It is these distinctive institutions which helped Scotland make good its
language deficit, that is, the lack of a linguistic divide between Scotland and
England other than local dialect, indeed:
"What makes Scotland unique in Europe is the combination of a strong
historical consciousness of separate identity with a complete disinterest in
the development of a distinctive language."115
However with the onset of modern complex democracies with universal suffrage in
the twentieth century, all nation-states have come under strain to intervene more
often and more deeply in the lives of their citizens. The welfare state, universal
education, national power networks, transportation systems and increased tiers of
government have combined with the Keynesian conception of the state's role in the
direction of economic policy to create renewed need for loyalty to the more
prominent central institutions if they are to have the legitimacy to work effectively.
Paradoxically, these very same trends, have imbued those at sub-national levels with
increased awareness of and frustration at the lack of their ability to answer the
dilemmas which have emerged in the modern world. As Melucci says:
ll4 J. G. Kellas (1989) "The Scottish Political System" p.18.
S. Rokkan & D. Urwin (1985) 'The Survival of Distinctiveness : Sources of Peripheral
Identity' in "Economy. Territory. Identity - The Politics ofWest European Peripheries" p. 89.
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"The process of increasing differentiation and complexity characteristic of
these systems is gradually eliminating the barriers of growth that hindered
the growth of capitalist systems. Yet what is interesting is the simultaneous
growth of a sensed need for roots. This need...is stimulated by the
uncertainty and insecurity which accompanies the increased opportunities
for individualisation fostered by complex systems. The attempt to fend off
insecurity and to preserve and develop memories is most evident in
regionalist or ethno-nationalist movements."116
In the Scottish context where a distinct civil society helped to keep alive the idea of
the 'root' of the Scottish nation on the historical plane, the legitimacy of the
artificially constructed British state has been called into question. This process was
heightened by the explicit appeals made by Mrs. Thatcher's governments to British
nationalism as the conduit for her hegemonic, centralising project characterised by
Gamble as 'the free economy in the strong state'117. As the prior discussion of
Crick's article highlights, many in Scotland have a very stunted conception of British
nationalism and certainly amongst SNP activists whom I interviewed, many simply
equate British and English.118 The British appeal still had some resonance in time of
war, as the Falklands conflict showed, but in the main the invocation of a British
nation-state has probably become increasingly redundant as a tool of mass
mobilisation. The root of this redundancy is historically based through the manner in
which the British state was invented and attenuated, as Colley captures well:
"..if we accept that, historically speaking, most nations have always been
culturally and ethnically diverse, problematic, protean and artificial
constructs that take shape very quickly and come apart just as fast, then we
can plausibly regard Great Britain as an invented nation superimposed, if
only for a while, onto much older alignments and loyalties."119
116 A. Melucci (1989) op.cit. p.212.
117, A. Gamble (1988) "The Free Economy and the Strong State : The Politics of
Thatcherism".
11^ These quotes from SNP activists interviewed illustrate this point:
"I think the British identity, I don't think it means much to people...Britain was invented I
think to try and sort ofmake us feel better about the union and stuff and to try and pretend
that it wasn't a takeover, it was a merger by inventing this new name."
"I don't think there is such a thing as British, you know I think there may have been but it
was a manufactured thing with the Empire and all that and it's over now."
The use of such terms as 'invented' and 'manufactured' very much mirrors Linda Colley's
idea of 'forgery' and highlights an enduring lack of authenticity.
119 L. Colley (1992) op. cit. p.5.
75
The Scottish nationalist movement (wider than its merely electoral variant of the
SNP120) as it has emerged in the last two and a half decades seems far more
explicable on Melucci's type of account, than the more monolithic, historically-based
theories outlined in Chapter Two. It seeks not to build a nation-state through
education, economics and militarism inculcating loyalty, but rather to deconstruct an
ageing 'state-nation'. The gels outlined by Colley of war, anti-Catholicism, Empire
and latterly monarchy have all withered in their import through the development of
international institutions, secularisation, decolonisation and the decline of
monarchical popularity respectively. Moreover with the emergence of mass
democracy it was no longer simply enough to 'absorb'121 the Scottish elite through
wealth and prestige to the central state. The welfare state failed in its attempt to
extend such 'absorption' to the whole populace and thus demands have grown for a
democratic and accountable sovereignty, albeit within the constraints imposed by the
pooling of sovereignty within the European Union, instead of a merely institutional
autonomy. The Scottish national movement in its broad sense seeks a successor, or at
least substantial alteration to the traditional nation-state and can best be described as
a 'post'-national movement as defined in Chapter Two, in that it is reactive to the
process of the 'imagined nation' of Great Britain losing legitimacy. Nowhere have
these developments been more obvious than in the Constitutional Convention which
has seen wide involvement in plans to draw up a blueprint for a Scottish parliament,
including two political parties, trade unions, churches and local government officials,
120 See P. Lynch (1994a) paper on 'The Scottish NationalMovement in the Twentieth
Century - Elite Versus Participatory Strategies'.
121 The concept of 'absorption' is a term borrowed from the Italian political lexicon. It refers
to the subsuming into the machinery of the state by the ruling elite of any potentially
damaging threat to the integrity of that state, summed up by Clark writing about the Liberal
period at the end of the nineteenth century : "the workings of many of the institutions of
liberal Italy can only be understood in terms of the rulers' need to repress, control, or 'absorb'
the 'parallel' institutions of the outsiders and protesters." See M. Clark (1984) "Modern
Italy. 1871-1982' p.69.
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a process which has led to innovation and consensus-building, well captured by one
of the Convention's chief protagonists:
"The process of seeking consensus has not just resulted in compromise; it has
produced innovation. Overall the project has been a classic example of civil
society at work."122
Whilst its explicit focus is the SNP, this thesis cannot make sense of current Scottish
politics without considering this wider 'neo-nationalist' context and an examination
of it will be undertaken later in this chapter.
3.3 Italy - the 'Unmade' Nation
What though of the Italian experience? More explicitly than the British state the
creation of the Italian nation one hundred and fifty-four years later fulfilled many of
the requisites of the traditional theories of nationalism, meeting the credentials
summed up by Zygmunt Bauman:
"Nationalism was, sociologically, an attempt made by modern elites to
recapture the allegiance of the 'masses' produced by early modern
transformations ...In the same way in which the modern state needed
nationalism for authenticity, nationalism needed the coercive powers of the
state to promote the postulated dissolution of communal identities in the
uniform identity of the nation."123
This seems to capture the type of approach which Count Camillo Cavour employed
in unifying the diverse and rapidly modernising city-states, monarchies and republics
of the Italian peninsula midway through the last century. As quoted by Mack Smith
in his study of the Risorgimento, only 2.5% of the population were Italian-speakers
at the time of unification.124 Few, including Cavour himself, had travelled far
outwith their own regions, many of which had long traditions of autonomy and
sovereignty stretching back hundreds of centuries, highlighted in the Putnam book
on democratic traditions discussed in Chapter Two. These divisions were summed up
famously in the Austrian PM, Metternich's, description of Italy as a mere
322 I. Lindsay (1992) 'The Autonomy of Scottish Politics' p. 47.
123 2. Bauman (1992a) op. cit. p.675.
324 p> Mack Smith (1971) "Victor Emmanuel. Cavour and the Risorgimento" p.250.
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'geographical expression'125. Given this initial terrain the Risorgimento appears as an
elite-led nationalist project, in which the kingdom of Piedmont sought to gain a place
at the European top table and in the on-going imperial scramble by unifying Italy.
It was a project which was successful in its goal in a very short period of time, owing
much to the manipulation of the various populist, nationalist movements by Cavour.
The philosopher and theorist Giuseppe Mazzini and the soldier and populist
Giuseppe Garibaldi may have been key figures in respectively creating the
intellectual climate and waging the battles of unification, but it was Cavour who
reaped the benefits. The Piedmont prefecture system was quickly extended nation¬
wide, creating a highly centralist modern state, a Piedmont writ large across the
peninsula, but as Mack Smith cautions:
"The unification of Italy into a single state did not mean the obliteration of
regional differences. Patriotic and regional loyalties continued to co-exist
alongside each other as a fundamental fact of Italian life, and their
coexistence was eventually to receive constitutional recognition in 1947
when regions were given varying degrees of autonomy." 126
Italy's central state was then in no way an expression of a Kantian voluntarist will of
an ethnically pre-aligned people. It was very much led by an opportunistic elite who
wanted the benefits which a nation-state could bestow by the second half of the
twentieth century both internally and externally.
The Risorgimento is held up by theorists as a paradigmatic example of modern,
calculated, political nationalism127. However dual identities were prominent in the
new Italian state and reminiscent of the riots in Edinburgh and Aberdeen over a
century and a half earlier, there was great protest in the Southern cities of Naples and
125 Ibid. p.37 Footnote 1 "Metternich said he coined this famous phrase when arguing with
Lord Palmerston in the summer of 1847, and he added that the same term could also be used
of Germany".
126 Jbid. p.248 The four special statute regions - Valle d'Aosta, Trentino Alto-Adige,
Sardinia & Sicily, had devolved powers from this date followed by Friuli Venezia-Giulia in
1963 and by the fifteen mainland regions eventually in 1970.
122 For example see J. Breuilly (1993) "Nationalism and the State"p.lO.
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Palermo. The specific causes may have differed but such similar events testify to the
far from universal acceptance of the new 'national' order in the two states under
consideration, though it is of note that most Italian protest centred in the South rather
than the North where the League emerged over a century later.
It was this friction in the unification process which Mack Smith holds responsible for
Cavour's choosing a centralist rather than federalist arrangement for the Italian state
(those who argued for federalism, such as Carlo Cattaneo, were marginalised by the
Piedmontese parliament only to be resurrected by the League over a century later,
and so re-enter the academic fray128). Cavour's decision was based on political
expediency rather than ideological belief and stemmed from the need to bind the
population to the newly-created state - a nationalist aim best achieved through
centrally appointed prefects. As quoted by Putnam the unifiers worked under
D'Azeglio's dictum that: "We've made Italy, now we must make the Italians".129
Mack Smith sums up well the need for centralised control:
"The suppression of the proposal to set up the regions was ...due in part to the
very strength of regional feelings and to the realisation that patriotic
sentiment needed time to develop.130
The unification of Italy then was a quintessentially political nationalist project.
However aim and actuality are far from necessary partners in the process of nation-
building and Italy was no exception in facing many subsequent problems.
In this sphere the recent historical study by Christopher Duggan provides interesting
reading with its central thesis of the difficulties which faced Italian rulers in binding
a population whose lives had always centred around local communes and
communities to the new Italian nation, thus:
"Since its creation in 1861, Italy has struggled to develop an effective
political system and a secure sense of national identity. This concise
history... looks in particular at the difficulties Italy has faced during
128 gee volume of Cattaneo's work and commentaries upon it by contemporary figures in
D. Vimercati (ed.) (1991) "Stati Uniti d'ltalia : il Federalismo. le Leghe".
129 R. Putnam et. al. (1993a) op. cit.- 'Fatta VItalia, dobbiamo fare gli italiani" p.18.
D. Mack Smith (1971) op. cit. p. 273.
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the last two centuries in forging a nation state (my italics)."131
Duggan's work then bears a noteworthy resemblance to Linda Colley's survey of
Great Britain. Both assess the attempts to unify diverse peoples into a single nation
in terms of the manifest current failure of the project. In Britain the bonds of war
with France, expanding Empire, anti-Catholicism and economic prosperity have
faded and the substantial de facto devolution of powers from London, which
Paterson argues granted Scotland a sufficient degree of autonomy to stifle any elite-
led nationalist movement has been undercut by the Thatcherite hegemonic project, as
argued in the previous section of this chapter. In Italy meanwhile the strongest
unifying gel came paradoxically as a reaction to the failed fascist nationalist project
of 1922-1943 but the bond of anti-fascism has itself been undermined by the
Christian Democrat penetration of the state and the marginalisation in the First
Republic of the communist subculture. The spectacular collapse of the First Republic
in scandal was, on Duggan's account, merely the nadir of a long downward slide.
The emergence of the Northern League as an enduring product and partial cause of
this decline is symptomatic of severe limitations in the Italian nationalist project as
reflected by the low number of Northerners who stress their 'Italian-ness', for
Duggan:
"Its growth...bore witness to the fact that Italy had yet to find a secure
identity. Talk of greater regional autonomy, federalism and even the
secession of the North from the South, showed that a hundred and
thirty years of unity had failed to produce agreement as to what the
Italian nation was or should be."132
Many amongst the League activists feel loyalty to the North or their region or
perhaps their specific commune rather than the Italian state.133
131 C. Duggan (1994) "A Concise History of Italy" Preface, p.i.
132 Ibid, p.294.
133 Two quotes from League activists back this up :
"Italy has very little meaning for me, it is a geographical expression, it is made up ofmany
little states with their own peculiarities and their own characteristics..it is obvious in our
context after a hundred and thirty years of unity, a unity forced on various states, more or
less willing, there is a certain consciousness of independence and the desire to express
difference in respect to the others has remained..you cannot cancel out a history of more
than a thousand years in the case of the Veneto in just over a hundred years."
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The picture emerging is one of enduring identities at a sub-national level, but as in
the British case it would be ridiculous to sustain that there was no 'imagined
community' of Italy, rather it is argued here that it was never as complete or
hegemonic as much analysis of nationalism would have us believe. Quite simply the
nation-state was never 'made' to the extent that some theories and histories would
argue, and as a consequence the decline in its legitimacy is less hard to explain.
How successful then was the centralising project? How much legitimacy did the
nation-state gain? How much has it retained into the modern age? In geographical
and centralising terms, the unified Italy was very successful, with the addition of
Rome in 1870 bringing the whole peninsula under Victor Emmanuel's jurisdiction.
The Italian state was quickly established both internally through the Piedmont-style
prefectural control and the rapid expansion of Italian as the language of bureaucratic
and educational discourse (a crucial factor in Gellner's schema134, made easier in the
Italian case by the comparatively late stage of print capitalism and more recent
impact of twentieth century communication technologies135) and externally as an
international player and small colonial power, picking up the African scraps left by
France and Britain. Indeed the centrally-appointed prefects were to remain the most
important figure in Italian political life for over a century; as Martin Clark has
observed the administrative tradition of the united Italy has remained 'highly
"I feel identified with the North of Italy, Padanian.".
134 E. Gellner (1983) op. cit. p. 34 "The monopoly of legitimate education is now more
important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence.".
135 This argument is highlighted by B. Anderson (1983) op. cit. in Chapter Three 'The
origins of national consciousness' pp.37-46. Though the entrenched nature of many dialects
and the continued existence of a large peasant population meant that it took the arrival of
the mass electronic media to entrench Italian as a language of national discourse - see
interview with Umberto Eco "The Guardian' [30/9/95] p. 27 in which he says "You must
remember that in Italy in the fifties, the number of Italians who didn't speak Italian but only
local dialect was enormous. Television played an important role. After television, the Sicilian
immigrant who arrived in Turin was able to interact on the basis of a common language.".
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centralist' and they were particularly important as vote-getters at the time of
elections.136
For Mack Smith many of the problems in creating an 'Italian' identity can be traced
back to manner in which unification was conducted which caused many in the South
to see the Piedmontese as simply latest in a long line of invaders, whilst:
"Too many politicians in Turin identified Italian nationality with merely the
enlargement of Piedmont, as shown by imposition of their own laws and
institutions on regions with different traditions about which they knew
little."137
Concurrent to such centralism, however, ran the practice of local 'trasformismo' 138
which while insisting on the presence of the prefect as an overseer, in practice
allowed local elites considerable autonomy in terms of patronage and so allowed the
clientelistic nature of local politics to continue unabated from pre-unification days,
with the prefect effectively co-opted as a member of the localised elite. Such
clientelism was especially prevalent in the traditionally feudal and hierarchical
Mezzogiomo and lasted untouched through the Fascist interlude, before becoming
enshrined in the Christian Democrat (DC) dominance of the First Republic. Did this
centralised system succeed in binding the population to the Italian state?
The answer to this question is more negative than positive - all commentators on
contemporary Italy are agreed on one thing, namely the lack of public trust and
loyalty in the institutions of the central state. Italy has consistently ranked in the
bottom three (with Spain and Greece) in Eurobarometer surveys of public content
136 M. Clark (1975) op. cit. p.44.
137 D. Mack Smith (1994) "Mazzini" p.159.
333 A term with no real English translation other than 'transformism', coined in the 1880's
to describe 'absorption' into the political centre of left and right and carried on in the First
Republic as evidenced in the large number of coalitions bolstered by two or three small
parties, for example in the 'pentapartito' or 'five-party' governments of the Craxi-Andreotti-
Fanfani era - see F. Spotts & T. Weiser (1986) "Italy - A Difficult Democracy" pp.113-115.
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with government139 and since the Second World War, there have been consistent
calls for a decentralisation of government. In 1948 a provision for directly elected
regional governments was written into the republic's constitution and this mandate
was carried out in the four 'special' statute regions - Valle d'Aosta, Trentino Alto-
Adige, Sardinia and Sicily - almost immediately, with Friuli-Venezia Giulia added in
1963. However for the remainder of the regions not deemed to possess clearly
differentiated linguistic or ethnic claims, the setting up of regional governments met
huge political resistance from the DC, fearful of communist (PCI) control of
important central regions and the Roman bureaucracy. Finally in the midst of the
large social upheavals of the late 1960s the regional law was passed (despite a
record-breaking filibuster by conservatives) and the first regional governments were
elected in 1970 - the first blow in a century against the monolithic Italian state.
In the first few years after 1970, these new institutions had very little real autonomy
with Rome despatching party apparatchiks to fill prominent bureaucratic positions
and so preserve clientelistic continuity, rather in the manner of Cavour's prefectural
rule. However the Prime Minister Andreotti was forced to pass Decree No. 616 in
1976 to obtain PCI support for his ailing coalition and with the consequent
unblocking of some of their social and economic leeway, the powers of the regions
began to increase, causing Putnam to observe that :"Over the last two decades the
region has become an authentic, autonomous, and increasingly distinctive arena in
Italian politics."140 In the context of nationalism and 'post'-nationalism under
339 In the second 1992 Eurobarometer survey of satisfaction with the working of democracy
in one's country Italy had slipped to a mere 12%, compared with the next lowest Greece on
36% and Spain on 41%; Denmark topped the survey with 80% satisfaction and the EC
average stood at 45%, which Britain was just above on 48% only 4% above its lowest ever
rating of 44%. The figure equalled Italy's worse showing in 1977, at the height of its terrorist
period, since the question was first asked in 1973 - See Commission of the European
Communities (1994) 'Eurobarometer - Public Opinion in the European Union Trends 1974-
1994' Table B2. 1
3411 R. Putnam et. al. (1993a) op. cit. p.47 - however this general conclusion conceals
substantial de facto differences in the relevance of the regional bodies and in those regions in
which one city dominates such as Turin in Piedmont or Genoa in Liguria, the impact of the
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analysis, these regions have helped provide a concrete base for anti-state feeling by
displaying the limited ability of a corrupt and centralised state to meet the demands
of the most modern regions, namely those in the North. For Putnam and his
colleagues the remarkable differences in the performance of regional governments
between the North and the South since 1970 which they highlight have very deep
historical roots:
"Some regions of Italy are blessed with vibrant networks and norms of civic
engagement, whilst others are cursed with vertically structured politics, a
social life of fragmentation and isolation, and a culture of distrust. These
differences in civic life turn out to play a key role in explaining institutional
success."141
This is an argument which echoes that concerning the differentiation of Scotland's
civil society within the British Union and the claim that the Scottish nation is a more
egalitarian one and a 'principled' society. The creation of the Italian regional
governments in 1970 started to provide a degree of autonomy more akin to that
enjoyed by Scotland from the outset of the Union. This allowed autonomy and
sovereignty to become once more negotiable issues, one hundred and nine years after
the imposition of a highly centralised unitary state. One upshot of the renegotiation
thus started may have been the emergence of those who sought to forge regionalism
into a viable political force, or at the very least there was a coincidence in timing
dependent on the more general factors of modernity which were calling the
centralised state into question as outlined in Chapter Two. Such moves started
modestly with the dialect-centred Venetian League in 1979 but quickly grew into the
more broadly based Lombard League and then the encompassing Northern League
by the start of the 1990s, as Chapter Four will show. The linking thread of these
organisations was their opposition to the traditional Italian nation-state and the
parties which had come to be seen as synonymous with the central state and its
consequent illegitimacy in the affairs of the modern North, especially regarding its




inequitable share of the national tax burden. As such Bossi's League has started to
overcome the inertia imposed by the centralised state by questioning the initial
nation-wide settlement and its modern-day manifestation, reflected in Bossi's
frequent quoting of the federalist thinker, Carlo Cattaneo. The League has started to
overcome Clark's 'Metternich principle' 142, which holds that regional sentiments
must be politicised by elites, if they are to become governing areas, rather than mere
'geographical expressions'.
The elite of the Northern League have proved themselves capable of being such a
conduit in mobilising support behind their plans for a Northern republic, which were
modified to proposals for three highly devolved macro-regions and then further
adjusted to two proposed parliaments in the North at Mantua and in the South at an
undetermined destination, with the parliament in Rome perhaps making up the third
component, or being bypassed completely by independence. The consistent focus of
their rhetoric and propaganda has been Rome as the symbol of the centralised Italian
state and they have discussed at length the failure of the nationalist project to meet
the needs of the peoples of the Italian peninsula. Mirroring Putnam, the League draw
on the history of the North to invoke a less corrupt system of government in a more
horizontal society, as Bocca makes clear :
"It is not that the ignoring of laws in the South comes from an ethnic or racial
factor, given that millions of southern emigrants practice respect for the law,
but it derives from a different culture."143
This is a sentiment widely shared amongst League activists144 and it can be inferred
amongst Northern Italians in general by the large numbers voting for the Northern
442 See Chapter One, Footnote 6.
143 G. Bocca (1990) "La Disunita d'ltalia - Per Venti Milioni di Italiani la Democrazia e in
Coma e l'F.uropa si Allontana" p.23.
144 fhe following two quotes from League supporters interviewed help make this clear:
"For me, they are very different in culture, the North of Italy was influenced by the French,
by the Germans, whilst the South of Italy was influenced by Spaniards, Arabs and Greeks -
really two cultures, they are two nations, they have two different ways of living."
"For me it's a question of culture, I don't identify with a Southern culture at all, because it
seems too different from my region and origins, in terms of liberty to live one's life, the
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League. The evidence of the systemic ignoring of laws across all of Italy is swept
aside as the Machiavellian tactics of survival and the League trumpet the fact that
tangentopoli started in Milan rather than in the South as evidence that only there
could the moral fibre be found to attack the corrupt consensus.145 They seek an
ending to the first Italian republic and hark back to the federalist arguments at the
time of unification. In their quest for a negation of the Italian nationalist project and
its replacement with a far more devolved system within the wider context of a
Europe of the regions, the Northern League is a manifestation of the contemporary
failure of the Italian nationalist project. It is the contention of this thesis that it can be
said to represent a 'post'-nationalist movement, similar to that which can be found in
Scotland.
3.4 One Goal. Two Paths
The advantage of this terminological shift means that one is not tied to solely
national units in a world where their powers are being squeezed from above and
below, as outlined in Chapter Two. Both the Northern League and the Scottish
National Party are committed to a Europe of the regions. Both base much of their
rhetoric and appeal on the bankruptcy of the Italian and British states. Both operate
in a political context where the distinctions between nations and regions are
becoming increasingly blurred. Neither bear more than nominal resemblance to the
nationalist movements of previous centuries, operating in an environment in which
language and education have been long entrenched. Instead they both seek
democratic autonomy to meet the demands of the late twentieth century by moving
beyond the solution offered by their respective nations. In this sense they are both
mode of trade they are different, also inter-personal relationships for example the bigotry
and closure of the South, thus it's very different."
C. Richards (1994) "The New Italians" [Michael Joseph, 1994] see description in Ch. 3
'Cosi fan tutti or Everyone's on the Take'.
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'post'-nationalist movements, or as MacCormick has recently described the concept
as 'new nationalism'146. Whatever the moniker, these parties are certainly different
and the thesis' prime aim is to explain the content of this difference and to start to
explain the reasons for it.
The next chapter will concentrate on an explicit analysis of the Scottish National
Party and the Italian Northern League over the last two decades in order to establish
the grounds for the type of explicit comparison to be undertaken in Chapters Five
and Six. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to provide empirical evidence for
the claim which is being advanced by this thesis about the two areas of the states
under specific consideration, namely that Scotland and Northern Italy are searching
for similar types of autonomy albeit with different methods and so show that they
form valid objects of comparison with more similarities than differences. Put simply
they are following different paths to a similar goal.
3.5 Re-emergent Regions
The Italian nation-state has had ethnic and linguistic differences from its inception
in the Risorgimento of the last century - the legal entity of Italy may have been
created but it was one full of diversity with little Gramscian 'hegemony' between the
elite who had forged unification and the people as Clark sums up:
"In d'Azeglio's famous phrase, the Risorgimento had 'made Italy', but it had
not made Italians. Italian politics always had to be about reconciling, or
containing, deeply engrained social differences and conflicts - of class, of
faith, of ideology, of ethnic or linguistic group, of regional culture and
regional interest."147
However the various duchies and republics which came together in the Risorgimento
do not neatly concur with the regions delineated in the 1970 reform and used as the
146 n. MacCormick (1995b) in his unpublished paper 'Liberalism, Nationalism and the
Post-Sovereign State' p.2.
447 M. Clark (1984) op. cit. p.2.
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basis of mobilisation by the Northern League through its umbrella association of
various regional leagues (Lombardy, Piedmont and the Veneto being the three most
important). Thus while Gallagher is right that :"..historically and culturally a single
Italian people has never existed and to say so is to honestly face up to a division that
has existed for centuries"148 , it is equally true that a single Northern Italian or
Padanian people has never existed either institutionally or even in Anderson's sphere
of the imagination, although there is some degree of joint history and myths in the
area known as the Triveneto, which broadly equates to the modern North-East of the
country. Even if such Northern-ness had existed, the huge migrations which Italy
underwent in the first two decades of the post-second world war era were of such a
scale that it is impossible to talk of distinct historical communities co-opted into the
nation over a century ago retaining their uniqueness, as one could argue of the
Basques in Spain. In a sense then, there appears to be something superficial about the
identity espoused by the Northern League because after centuries of quiescence the
Lombard warrior suddenly arose to awake the North, although leghisti (League
partisans) would argue it was the inevitable consequence of the corrupt First
Republic. This has echoes of the type of argument employed by Putnam et.al. who,
in seeking to explain the huge variance of performance in regions since the 1970
shake-up, invoke the world of 13th century Northern city-states and Southern
kingdoms.149 Both make an appealing impression as a possible explanation but fail
to answer the important, factual question of what happened to the intervening
centuries.
Proponents of Italian regional identity can, however, make an answer to this
argument by pointing to the arguments which surrounded the choice of a centralised
state at the time of the Risorgimento, specifically the arguments for a federalist
148 J Gallagher (1992b) 'Rome at Bay : The Challenge of the Northern League to the Italian
State' p. 481.
149 R.Putnam et.al. (1993a) op.cit. pp.121-137.
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solution proffered by Cattaneo, and from then to the struggles through monarchy,
fascism and institutionalised clientelism. Only with the removal of the international
cleavage at the end of the 1980s did regional identity have space to blossom in the
Italian political system; previously it seems there just weren't enough votes up for
grabs, for any regional proclivities were subsumed in 'il voto di appartenenza' - the
vote of belonging - in the subcultural North and 'il voto di scambio' - the vote of
exchange - in the clientelistic South.150 Dwayne Woods portrays the end of the Cold
War as combining with the economic development of the North and the 1970
regional reforms to shatter the post-war settlement of which the Christian Democrats
had stood as epitome; together they created space for '// voto di opinione '151 - the
vote of opinion - to grow. The first two of these factors are now accepted as givens in
any discussion of the crisis of the First Republic but the third deserves more attention
since intuitively it would seem that a devolution of considerable power to the regions
would allay not increase subsequent demands for regional autonomy. However, the
manner in which these reforms were implemented was typical of the distributional
politics of the party-controlled Italian state with many centrally appointed officials
allocated to DC or Socialist (PSI) controlled councils. As such the Italian regions had
the carrot of greater control held out before them only to see further sclerosis at the
centre block any real developments. The appetite for autonomy was whetted in an
experience which would provide succour to Scottish Conservative 'slippery slope'
adherents, as Putnam puts it "Discontent with the practical performance of the
regional government has not undermined popular support for a strong and
autonomous regional institution."152 Although as previously mentioned the strength
of any institutional vacuum at the regional level depends very much on the make-up
150 por a fun discussion of these different types of vote see R. Mannheimer & G. Sani (1986)
'Electoral Trends & Political subcultures' in R.Leonardi & R. Nanetti (ed.) 'Italian Politics - A
Review V pp.164-175.
151 Ibid.
152 r_ Putnam et. al. (1993a) op. cit. p.57.
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of internal geography of any given region, regional reform at least removed the
debate on effective government from solely Roman terms of reference.
Where though does this leave consideration of a distinct Venetian, Lombard, or now
Northern, identity? A useful discussion of the identities employed by the various
leagues to mobilise support is conducted by Percy Allum as he analyses the
mechanism through which Bossi captured the widespread dissension against the
traditional parties and translated this into votes after the collapse of the subcultural
bonds. He draws a distinction between the different leagues, focusing explicitly on
the Liga Veneta, which, founded in 1979, was the oldest of those who united under
the Northern League banner in February 1991. It started off as a very distinct party
campaigning for use of the Venetian dialect in schools and public places and
garnered 5% of the regional vote in 1983; however it had slumped to only 1.7% by
1989 and only revived its electoral fortunes by alliance with Bossi. Allum provides
real insight into the Northern League in the following instructive quote:
"This was not just a case of personal charisma; it was above all a case of
conception and strategy. The Liga Veneta's strategy was based on a
conception of territorial identity : the region as the source of values and
historical identity. This limited the possibility of communication with the
wider population which had more urgent material problems. Bossi realised
this and quickly played down the symbolic elements and gave priority to
instrumental ones. Territorial identity was used simply as a basis for the
representation and conflict of interests. The region, quickly replaced by the
North, was a mere marker for the larger conflict of interests : north vs.
south, producers vs. non-producers, market logic vs. welfare logic,
efficiency vs. inefficiency. Hence the Lega Nord quickly established itself
as the producers' party against the state and its accomplices."153
Here then one sees a dichotomy between traditional nationalism, based on explicit
ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic considerations, and its modern Italian variant,
in that the latter will subjugate many traditional values to the instrumental desire for
power. However one must be careful of imposing hegemony on a very
153 P. Allum (1992) "The Liga Veneta' ppl7-19. Note that the spelling of League with an 'i'
not an 'e' reflects the use of the Venetian dialect.
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heterogeneous North of Italy. For instance Diamanti quotes Franco Rocchetta,
former leader of the Liga Veneta, that "..for us the Veneto, equal to Lombardy,
Tuscany, Sicily, is a nation with the same rights as Denmark, France, Poland, Greece
and Holland."154 The strength of Venetian identity in particular is shown by Table
3.1 below, again from Diamanti:
Table 3.1155
Feelings of Territorial Belonging in Lombardy and the Veneto (%)
All Close to Lombard Venetian
Northerners League 'Leghisti' 'Leghisti'
Feel closest to..
Local town/Commune 21 18 20 16
Region 24 28 29 27
North 9 22 15 30
Italy 23 9 13 3
Europe/World 12 23 23 23
N= 660 145 78 67
Thus although many commentators characterise the Northern League as pragmatic
and populist, there is a very definite identity which is being mobilised as the analysis
above shows. 44% of Lombard adherents and 57% of Venetian supporters see
themselves as belonging primarily to their region or the North and the same survey
reveals that 35% of League supporters feel themselves to be far from the South.
Umberto Bossi was the key figure in marrying this nascent regional identity to
political activity in the form of demands for autonomy, for Gallagher:
"Bossi defined a new community in historical and territorial terms and used
provocative language and imagery to identify threats to the viability of the
community...Perhaps his greatest achievement to date has been to unite
regionalist movements, prone to split and always jealous of their own
identity within a single movement."156
154 I. Diamanti (1993) op. cit.p.52.
155 Ibid.p.100 Table 9 from Poster Survey on political attachments in Vicenza and Padua in
the Veneto and Brescia and Bergamo in Lombardy conducted in December 1992 and
January 1993. The first column gives the results of all 660 of those resident in these places,
the next one gives the 22% or 145 of the survey who identified themselves as League voters,
figures which are then broken down in columns three and four into their Lombard (78) and
Venetian (67) components.
156 T. Gallagher (1993) 'Regional Nationalism & Party System Change : Italy's Northern
League' p.617.
91
Bossi openly admits now that in the early days he sought to create the impression
that the various leagues were simply harmless, linguistic-based groups with no real
grasp of Rome's machinations. He is quoted to this effect by Joseph Farrell: "We
pretended to be what we were not - nostalgically simple-minded for lost dialects and
brutally intolerant of Southerners. The journalists fell for it."157 Thus to Bossi and
those around him in the tight hierarchy which controls the Northern League it seems
that any conception of ethnic difference is employed merely as a means to their
autonomist end. Whilst there are undoubtedly adherents to more strict ethnic and
linguistic definitions of what a future 'republic of the north' should look like, the split
between Bossi and Miglio on the former's lack of move toward a federalisation of
the state after coming to power in the March 1994 general election informs one that
the prevailing attitude from above on the use of regional identity is an instrumental
one, aiming to prise autonomy from the central state rather than create a Gellner type
nation in which 'ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones'158. As such
the aims of the Northern League appear much closer to the more fluid model of
'post'-nationalism being developed here than to any traditional, hegemonic model of
nationalism, with the central concern of accountability and a pragmatic use of
identity to achieve this end.
3.6 Becoming a Nation again
What, though, of the Scottish variant? Here the historical pathway within the
centralised state has been very different, for whilst Scotland has lacked its national
status for almost three centuries it has enjoyed substantial autonomy within the
British nation-state (or 'state-nation'). The conduits of such 'managerial autonomy'
are laid out very clearly by Lindsay Paterson in his discussion of the Treaty of Union
through the years , which has at its heart the contention previously discussed that
157 Quoted in J.Farrell (1993) 'The Lombard League - Regionalism Italian Style?' p.15.
E. Gellner (1983) op.cit. p.l.
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sovereignty is a 'negotiated process'. Thus Scottish identity has had considerable
opportunity for its own self-maintenance through the institutions negotiated in 1707 -
the famous Holy Trinity of law, church and education - and those devolved during
the process of negotiation - initially ad hoc boards, later consolidated under the
auspices of the Scottish Office and concurrently through its significant cultural
differences from the rest of the UK . In such a context, where the bulk of the
'efficient' part of the state resided in Scotland there was little need for political
nationalism on the part of the Scottish middle-class since all they could have added
were highly constrained economic and foreign policies, indeed Scotland occupied a
position analogous to small states in Europe, for Paterson:
"Scotland has been autonomous for most of the three centuries since the
Union - not a fully independent state, of course, but more than a mere
province. It has been at least as autonomous as other small European
nations, for which the reality of politics has always been the negotiation of
partial independence amid the rivalry of the great powers. The forms of
Scottish autonomy have changed as the state and society and the economy
have changed, and what one generation might regard as autonomy might be
felt by their successors to be dependency; we must be wary of that Whig
aberration of judging the past by the standards of the present."159
However, over the course of this democratising century the extension of the suffrage,
coinciding with the international developments already outlined in the previous
chapter, has called into question the bureaucratic compromise and negotiated
autonomy which characterised the response to Scottish demands in the first two
hundred years plus of the Union. Nowhere is this clearer than in current discussions
dealing with popular sovereignty. The central concept to emerge in this discourse is
that of the 'democratic deficit' which highlights the lack of accountability of the
Scottish bureaucratic state over the last two decades and calls for a redressing of this
balance either through devolution or wholesale independence. Crucially, in the
context of this crisis of legitimacy, the combination of the neo-liberal Thatcherite
attack on this devolved bureaucracy and the increasing inability of the traditional
159 L. Paterson (1994) op. cit. p.4.
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British state to meet the economic and social demands of the late twentieth century,
has helped create a re-birth of a more political Scottish identity, as Paterson
highlights:
"Pulling all these strands of contemporary development together, we have a
weakening of the bargains which have held the Union in place, an
autonomous reinvention of Scottish identity, and a probably growing
indifference to British state institutions."160
Such discussion of 're-invention' and 'indifference' seems to mirror much more
closely the type of dynamic used in describing the Northern League. What it
suggests is that the identity now manifested by Scottish civil society may be
substantially different from previous manifestations of Scottish identity, in that it is
more politicised. Indeed the current identity may be largely explicable as a reaction
to the same type of problems already discussed in the Italian context, namely those
stemming from the crisis of the lack of democracy and accountability of traditional
nation-states in the late twentieth century.
With its anti-centralism and complex demand for different shades of autonomy
contemporary Scotland does not fit neatly into the paradigmatic models of
nationalism outlined earlier, as Table 3.2 overleaf makes clear:
160 L. Paterson (1991) op. cit. p.116.
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Table 3J2™
Scottish versus British National Identity
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The above data shows that for many Scots identity is not a simple concept and many
profess to having dual identity shared between their Britishness and Scottishness.
Such duality will be examined in depth in the next chapter, for now it is enough to
have evidenced the complexity of identities in both the North of Italy and Scotland.
Scotland is undoubtedly a nation, but is not a nation-state. Many Scots do not desire
full statehood but rather devolved economic and social powers - a limited autonomy
which would make Scotland stronger in controlling her own destiny. Some want full¬
blown independence, though there is no neat correlation between these voters and
SNP support, and most of these would immediately subsume such independence
within a deepening and widening European Union. Scotland then seems to represent
a confused example of the new type of autonomism or 'post'-nationalism which this
chapter has tried to highlight.
Whilst the bulk of the quantitative and qualitative work to evidence this theoretical
discussion will be reported in Chapters Five and Six, it is worthwhile to conclude
this historical chapter by bringing the story right up-to-date with a discussion of the
issue of identity in the partisan context. The problem with any discussion of the
161 -phg question posed runs 'We are interested to know how people living in Scotland see
themselves in terms of their nationality. Which of these statements best describes how you
regard yourself?' and the five sources are L. Moreno (1988) op. cit., ICM poll (September
1991), ICM poll (April 1992), the Scottish Election Survey (April 1992) and the Rowntree
State of the Nation poll conducted by MORI (1992).
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change in the direction of an identity is that the change does not occur in a vacuum,
in fact it must occur in relation to previous definitions of identity. Thus the Scottish
identity of the current Thatcherite/Major generation has, of course, been shaped by
the events and attitudes of those years but it is refracted through the lens of the
Scottish identity of the corporatist generation in the sense that they gave meaning to
what it was to be Scottish both before and during the period in which the next
generation forges its Scottishness. Nor are these identities mutually exclusive as was
made clear earlier in the discussion of Smout's concentric circles, as Paterson has
pointed out in an editorial on 'Scottishness':
"..the core of the problem is that debate about Scottish culture has little room
for the idea that there might be several and deeply contradictory cultures co¬
existing, all of them with an equally valid claim to being truly Scottish."162
Thus any discussion of a changing identity must be tempered by this very valid idea
that being Scottish or Northern Italian can mean very different things to different
people at the same time. However, it still seems valid to talk of the dominant strand
of a given identity and the strictures which it may face.
Luis Moreno completed his thesis research comparing Scotland and Catalonia in
1986 and in an article based on that work in the Scottish Government Yearbook of
1988 compared the attitudes and strategies of the two autonomist movements. He
contrasted the 'reactive' nature of Catalan separatists with the more 'assertive'
characteristics of their Scottish counterparts and vitally highlighted the near
irrelevance of party distinction in the Catalan case as opposed to the virtual partisan
sclerosis which Scotland had by the mid-1980s. Thus the 'Assemblea de Catalunya'
encompassed Liberals, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Socialists,
Communists, trade union representatives, community associations, intellectuals and
ordinary Catalans. The inter-party discussion and negotiation cannot be
underestimated in the achievement of Catalan home rule, for by bringing the debate
I62 L.Paterson (1993) 'Scottishness' p.l.
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into the broadest possible public realm, the widest possible consensus was achieved,
resulting in 88.1% of those who voted in the 1979 referendum backing the
assembly's plan. In that same year 51.6% of Scots voting also chose devolution in the
home-rule referendum but were thwarted by the 40% rule introduced to the Bill by
the British Labour Party, which meant that the referendum failed because despite a
majority of those voting the 'yes' vote did not break through the 40% of the
electorate required.
This episode surely serves as a totem for all Scottish autonomists for whilst the
majority of Scots, both above and below, have increasingly voiced the desire for
some form of democratic autonomy over the last two decades, such demands have
always been subordinated to the priorities of each party. The fissures and
recriminations which characterised the lead-up and the aftermath of the 1979
referendum are a case in point. Thus whilst Moreno's counsel was that :"...(a) climate
of political consensus is the sine-qua-non requirement prior to any further
development."163 partisanship has remained king for the various Scottish players. It
is not enough to claim that consensualism is a particularly Catalan value, one must
seek explanation as to why it is so difficult to achieve in the Scottish context.
Nowhere was this more evident than in Scotland's own Constitutional Convention :
the Labour Party joined only reluctantly, though later displayed the zealousness of a
typical convert, there was no Scottish Conservative Party still committed to trenchant
unionism and most importantly the SNP, under its new leadership, deigned the
Convention too accepting of the status quo and so withdrew its support before any
discussions had really started. Thus instead of a Catalan-type coalition of forces to
gain a wide consensus, what occurred was a confusing mass of contradictory signals
typified by the SNP pushing the idea of a multi-option referendum from outside the
Convention. It is this entrenched partisanship which provides the best explanation for
L. Moreno (1988) op. cit. p.173.
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the huge let-down which April 1992 proved for those seeking constitutional change,
with only Aberdeen South changing hands (Conservative gain) and Glasgow Govan
and Kincardine and Deeside reverting back to Labour and Conservatives respectively
from the by-elections wins of SNP and Liberal Democrats.
Thus there can be little doubting the partisan rigidity of the supposed purveyors of
Scottish political identity, and the possibility of inter-party co-operation since 1992
has remained moribund and is likely to stay so with the virulently anti-SNP, George
Robertson as Labour's shadow Scottish Secretary. In this 'above', elite sphere,
certainly, little has changed and there is scant evidence for a new, different form of
identity or its political manifestation of 'post'-nationalism. However this study is
premised on analysis both from above and below, and given the peculiar constraints
placed on all players in a democracy unaccustomed to radical change (a hugely
different terrain to that inhabited by Bossi and the League), it might prove more
instructive to analyse what has been happening in identity terms below.
This is no easy task and encounters precisely those problems expounded by Paterson
in that there is never one homogeneous identity existing in a given civic society,
despite the best efforts of such ethnic nationalists as Settler Watch. However, there
seems persuasive evidence that outwith the partisan sphere, changes have been
occurring in Scottish civil society which represent a qualitative break with past
conceptions of Scottish identity. These changes are summed up by Andrew Marr,
thus:
"Civil politics may be defined as politics that involves significant numbers of
people outside the parties...It happens only rarely in a developed democracy,
where the aggressive competition of parties is essential to the system. Civil
politics occurs when voters, including party members, think that the party
system is failing to answer a specific demand."164
164 A. Marr (1992) "The Battle for Scotland" p.165.
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The evidence for such a rise in civil politics is convincing for whilst the negative,
partisan side of the Constitutional Convention was highlighted above, on the positive
side it did embrace a considerable number of civil organisations such as the Catholic
Church, the Church of Scotland, the umbrella organisation of Scottish local
government, COSLA, and the STUC. Moreover, there has been a considerable
cultural renaissance in Scotland over the last two decades ranging from popular
music to Clydeside fiction and the new cultural heroes are often actively involved in
non-partisan movements for Scottish autonomy (from pop stars Pat Kane and Ricky
Ross, to the novelist William Mcllvanney). That their home rule message is striking
a chord is surely evidenced by the numbers attending such events as Scotland's 'Big
Day' and the various marches for democracy. Pressure groups always perform this
role in a stagnant partisan context but previously in Scottish politics such pressure
has been a role largely left to the SNP and its cultural affiliates; the reaction to 1979
saw the consensus for some from of change widen considerably with an average
around 70% desiring some form of constitutional change in recent opinion polls.
In terms of the discussion of differing identities, this 'civil' nationalism seems much
more akin to that outlined in the Italian context; it is much less clearly defined, still
residing largely in the womb of civil society, but its central concerns are the lack of
accountability of government in Scotland and the perceived injustices of a
Westminster government dismissive of Scottish interests. It is a reaction conceived
by the contemporary crisis of the traditional British state, one which was still-born in
April 1992 but which has remained expectant165, awaiting the arrival of more able
partisan midwives. The over-riding clash here would seem to be between
instrumentality and partisan rigidity. There is a new form of autonomy struggling to
be born in Scotland because the elite as yet have not managed to channel the new
165 witness the substantial street protest to coincide with the holding of the EU Council of
Ministers meeting in Edinburgh in December 1992, bringing attention to the ceremonial
rather than tangible importance afforded to the city during a summit at which attempt was
made to define the principle of subsidiarity - an irony not lost on the estimated 30,000 Scots
who marched in protest. See [The Scotsman. 13/12/92] p.l.
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identities in a political vein - as it were to recast the 'imagined community' from
above to match the changing subject of the 'daily plebiscite'166 below. However it
seems that a new conception - a broadly politicised Scotland - has emerged much
more in keeping with a Melucci-like conception than a traditional nationalist party,
summed up well by Kellas:
"With the advent of the SNP, Scottish nationalism takes on a double aspect.
On the one hand, there is the electoral history of the SNP, and the demand
for political devolution, while on the other, there is the continuing
development of Scottish national consciousness in all its forms...a steady
growth to the position today in which national consciousness is to be found
throughout Scottish society." 167
The SNP is a part of this, but not the whole part, and in this sense the politics of
modern Scotland and its heterogeneous demand for autonomy fits better into the
complex 'post'-national model espoused thus far.
3.7 Summary
This chapter has argued that the nation-states of Great Britain and Italy have both
experienced difficulties in achieving the goal of merging the parameters of the state
with the imaginings of the nation. Recent historical writing on both countries reveals
the extent to which unitary identities were invented and imposed on the respective
populaces. Whilst not suggesting that these nationalist enterprises totally failed, it is
argued that they were never as complete and homogeneous as some previous theories
of nationalism have argued. Neither Great Britain nor Italy represented the
paradigmatic nation-state which some literature on nationalism portrays but which is
hard to situate empirically. The evidence is that identities persisted at a sub-national
level and that recent developments have seen these come back in a more politicised
form. The most convincing explanation of this is that dual or multiple identities have
continued to exist and at differing times in their histories the dominant identity can
166 e. Renan (1990) op.cit. p.19.
167 J. G. Kellas (1989) op. cit. p.128.
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shift. The task for the rest of this thesis is to ask how and why such shifts occur and
the next chapter will look at the part played by political parties in any causal chain.
This chapter has also filled out the discussion of globalisation in Chapter Two with
the historical experience of Great Britain and Italy that the constraints facing would-
be nations are far greater at the tail end of the twentieth century than they would have
been say a century before. This partly stems from the specific context of the
European Union within which the politics of both are situated, but also comes from
the more general constraints on autonomy which international developments have
wrought and the failure of national polities to 'absorb' dissenters as effectively in the
age of mass, democratic welfarism. The British Empire and the Italian colonial foray
into Africa are very much historical interludes now, as are periods of high
protectionism, cultural monism and general national myth-making. The global age
has shifted the parameters of nationhood substantially and it is the contention of this
thesis that the movements of the late twentieth century are different to the extent that
they deserve to have their diversity noted and studied. The following chapters will
carry out this examination of the SNP and the Northern League and present evidence
in support of the contentions made thus far.
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CHAPTER FOUR -
IDENTITIES RECLAIMED - THE EMERGENCE OF THE SCOTTISH
NATIONAL PARTY AND THE NORTHERN LEAGUE
4.1 Situating the Argument
The argument thus far has been built up on a theoretical level and then placed in the
context of the histories of the two 'nation-states' under consideration. The next two
chapters will situate the argument further by undertaking an explicit examination of
the two parties involved in Scotland and Northern Italy. This chapter will begin this
process with a full account of both these parties' histories and the next chapter will
then undertake an explicit comparison by looking at the evidence on the sociological
make-up and electoral support for both parties. The parties will be analysed in terms
of some of the major models of voting behaviour and attempt will be made to assess
to what extent, if any, they are different to more traditional parties. The underlying
context of these chapters is one of seeking to explain why these parties emerged
significantly when they did, of analysing the issues and motives which brought them
forward in the political fray and assessing if and how they have then changed since
that time.
An attempt will be made to gauge the extent to which each party can be said to be a
traditional 'nationalist' movement drawing on some of the analyses already outlined.
It will be argued that both the SNP and the Northern League fail to fit into the
various categories proffered by the established theories of both voting behaviour and
nationalist politics and that instead they need to be conceptualised in new ways,
certainly with regard to the content of their nationalism, if not its name.
The Northern League and the Scottish National Party are not identical phenomena -
no two autonomist movements are - but they share considerable similarity in their
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genesis and motive. Neither can be understood outwith their specific societal setting.
However this chapter will contend that there is considerable overlap between the
reasons for the emergence of the two parties, and these need to be conceptualised in
ways which recognise changes in the causes and conditions of nationalism in the late
twentieth century European Union. As the last chapter made clear neither can be
properly understood in isolation and part of this chapter's task is to situate both
parties in the wider context looking at the attitudes of other parties who are also
electoral competitors and societal attitudes to reform and change.
4.2 The Northern League
The first notable study of the 'leghe' (the collective Italian name for the various
leagues in the north) came with Renato Mannheimer's 1991 study of the Lega
Lombarda. The general theme of the collection of essays, edited by him, focused on
the gestation and growth of the various leagues. Some of the authors have since been
accused of searching for solutions which characterised these new movements as
unequivocally on the right and probably racist, but the true complexity of the
phenomenon was well captured by Mannheimer:
"The 'leghista' is...a figure too heterogeneous to be described in an
unequivocal way. In reality 'one' leghista does not exist, there are several
such figures, and for each the prevalent characteristics can be elucidated
depending on the different grade of commitment to the League."168
This theme of diversity is one picked up by a contributor to the above study, Ilvo
Diamanti, who develops his typology of 'leghisti' (the collective name for League
voters) in his 1993 book (updated in 1995). He highlights four markedly different
phases in the League's short history which it is useful to summarise as a guide to its
electoral pragmatism.169
168 R. Mannheimer et. al. (1991) op. cit.p.124.
1691. Diamanti (1993) op. cit. This time frame comprises Chapters Three - Six of the book.
Leghista is the Italian term for League activist or partisan.
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1983-1987 : The initial breakthrough came with the Liga Veneta (the spelling here
reflecting the use of Venetian dialect) which gained 4.2% of the region's vote in the
1983 general election. It was a political party which had emerged out of linguistic
and cultural revivals in the 1970s and at that time possessed a clearly 'ethnic'
orientation believing in an ancient Venetian nation which should be revived as the
solution to the Veneto region's contemporary problems. The limited data of the time
indicates that the bulk of its votes were gained from disaffected Christian Democrat
voters who were concentrated in the areas of the northern industrial periphery.
However the explicitly ethnic definition of nationality set up an immediate barrier
and the Liga slipped back in subsequent elections. It is this phase which most closely
resembles a traditional, folkloristic, nationalist movement but this was an emphasis
soon to be swamped by the influence of neighbouring Lombardy.
1987-1990 : This second period saw a shift in focus from the Veneto to Lombardy
and the growing importance of the Lega Lombarda and its leader Umberto Bossi.
Under his guidance the focus shifted from an ethnic-based identity to the idea of a
community of interests under threat. It was this period which saw the development of
the anti-Southern and anti-immigrant strands in the League's rhetoric, but these are
now seen as mobilising tools in its anti-centrist effort rather than ends in themselves.
It was a message put across in an unorthodox fashion with Bossi moving from the
Venetian use of dialect, to a more colloquial Italian of the streets, using slang and
swear-words. League activists were to be found in bars and football terraces, taking
every opportunity to distance themselves from the traditional parties and their
mediums. Thus this period saw significant change in the League's project, summed
up by Diamanti:
"From the idea of territory as the source of historical identity, with the
region as nation, the Lombard League, and especially its leader Umberto
Bossi, substituted the idea of territory as the centre of an identity founded
on interests, a community with great traditions and productive capacity,
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constrained by its subordination to the logic of the state and the parties."170
1990-1992 : As the crises of the Italian political and economic systems deepened, the
League expanded its strength throughout the regions of the North. This was overseen
by the creation of the umbrella organisation, the Lega Nord, or Northern League,
which despite having Bossi as its leader and a very hierarchical power structure was
more than just the Lombard League writ large, in that under its auspices came
organisations from all the regions of 'Padania' or Northern Italy. It was a period
which saw a normalisation in the League's vote and an advance at the expense of all
the major traditional parties. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had a profound
effect on the Italian polity weakening the communist subculture and further
weakening its opposing Christian Democrat subculture which had used communism
as its bogeyman for forty years. The League stepped into the ensuing vacuum with a
clever concentration in this period on its opposition to the traditional parties and the
organs of the state which in many spheres meant the same thing such was the overlap
between the two (the relationship between citizen and state and party and state is
dealt with at length by Paul Ginsborg in his comprehensive history of Italy since
1943.171)
The League's reward came with spectacular advances across the North in the 1992
general election. The League consolidated its base in the regions of Lombardy, the
Veneto and Piedmont. However it also made significant advances in the so-called
special-statute region (with considerable autonomous concessions due to its
linguistic make-up) of Friuli Venezia-Giulia and the 'red' region of Emilia-Romagna.
The results in the different regions are displayed overleaf in Table 4.1:
170 Ibid p.57.
171 P. Ginsborg (1990) "A History of Contemporary Italy - Society & Politics 1943 -1988"
"This deformed relationship between citizen and state, with its emphasis on the individual's
capacity to trigger discretionary action, was a legacy which became an enduring feature of
the republican state." p.149.
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Table 4.1172
Regional Distribution of Lega Nord Support
Regions 1990 (Regional) 1992(General) 1994(General)
Votes % Votes % Votes %
Lombardy 1 ,183,493 21.4 1,497,600 25.1 1,460,844 22.1
Veneto 180,676 5.7 575,814 18.9 701,801 21.6
Piedmont 148,450 5.4 505,055 19.4 484,737 15.7
Emilia-Romagna 85,379 3.0 292,962 10.6 195,192 6.4
Liguria 71,311 5.2 175,973 15.5 140,132 11.4
Friuli-Venezia Giulia - - 137,167 15.5 150,272 16.9
Tuscany 20,657 0.7 80,557 2.8 56,476 2.2
Trentino-Alto Adige - - 56,527 9.0 47,572 7.5
TOTAL 1 ,689,966 9.1 3,321,655 16.7 3,237,026 15.2
1992-1994 : In the year which followed the 1992 election Diamanti noted a further
substantial shift in the League's political position caused largely by the disintegration
of the Italian system around it. The economic crises of the budget deficit and soaring
state expenditure were brought into sharp focus by the convergence criteria laid
down in the Maastricht treaty for monetary union. In the North this caused anger at
the possibility that the South would prevent Italy from entering the European fast-
track. Meanwhile the investigations of the Milanese magistrates, led by Antonio Di
Pietro, unearthed the trail which led to the 'tangentopoli' or 'kickback city' scandals
which finally confirmed the corruption of all the traditional parties in the use of
government funds. Indeed several observers believe it was no coincidence that the
judicial breakthroughs against the corruption came in the North not the clientelistic
South.173
172 The first two columns are from R. Mannheimer (1993) 'L'elettorato della Lega Nord' p.
255 and the third was calculated from the PR ballot results recorded in M. Corte (ed.) (1995)
"II Libro dei Fatti" pp.421-426 - it was impossible to disaggregate the Polo delle liberta votes in
the 75% majority ballot due to stand down candidatures. The percentages shown indicate
the percentage of the vote gained in each particular region and those in the total row show
the percentage gained across all the regions shown ie. all those in which the League stood
except the Valle D'Aosta where the local league runs independently of the Northern League
and in 1994 got 54.1% of the vote against 17.1% for the latter. The regions in which the
League has an electoral presence are those which have been defined as part of Padania, and
are highlighted in Appendix II.
173 See for example M. Clark (1995) 'Post-Fascist Italy' where he says "The rise of the
leagues hugely destabilised an already fragile political situation, but it did more. It provided
106
The League was thrust to the forefront of the political spectrum and had to rid itself
of its oppositional status and present itself as a force for change of the whole political
system. It accomplished this task by focusing tirelessly on the need for fundamental
institutional and economic reforms, which it saw as best achieved through the three
highly-devolved macro-regions proposed by its intellectual mentor, Gianfranco
Miglio (who since the March 1994 election has severed his links with Bossi due to
his perception that the latter prefers power over principle174). For Diamanti this
further shift in stance to a party of neo-liberal, territorial renovation presented the
League with considerable problems of holding together the consensus it had
assembled up to that point to its new leitmotif. However as Table 4.1 above shows
the League did hold on to a stable number of voters in the PR part of the March 1994
election, dropping only 84,629 votes to still stand around the three and a quarter
million preference vote tally. The League markedly improved in the Veneto and held
fairly constant elsewhere despite the significant entry of a new media-powered force
for innovation in the shape of Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia. Sensing a direct
confrontation between the League and Berlusconi's movement as vehicles for
renewal, Bossi chose a path of coalition to prevent the renewal in power of the old
men of pentapartito power, for in his words: "There had already started a
sophisticated and transformist operation to save the centralist system by substituting
the faces and the names on the front-line."175.
However warning against any complacency came in the June 1994 European election
when all parties ran on their own in a PR election which saw Berlusconi prove his
electoral potential throughout Italy with 30.6% of the vote nation-wide (Italy is
the political cover for investigating magistrates. Italy's judiciary had been itching for years to
probe corruption." p.239.
174 Indeed much of his quickly published book about his time with the League consisted of
a scathing personal attack on Bossi's arrogance and his inability to lead a party in power -
see Miglio (1994) op. cit.
17^ U. Bossi (1995) "Tutta la Verita - Perche ho partecipato al governo Berlusconi. Perche
l'ho fatto cadere. Dove voglio arrivare" p.3.
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divided into five large Euro-constituencies). The League meanwhile suffered its first
substantial electoral set-back since its rise to prominence, falling to 6.6% in the
relevant Northern seats. Subsequent opinion polls showed Fini's National Alliance as
the chief beneficiary of Berlusconi's troubles over tangentopoli, Fininvest (his
holding company) and his showing of pro-govemment adverts on both state and his
own private television. However it should be noted that when the League's vote is
expressed as an all-Italian percentage, it loses some of its veracity for the very
obvious point that the League is not an all-Italian party. Thus in the same way that
the SNP vote can look paltry when expressed as a British percentage, the League
vote is dissipated when taken at the Italian level and even when expressed as a
percentage of all the regions in which they have a presence it loses impact because of
the party's predominant concentration in Lombardy, the Veneto and Piedmont. Table
4.2 below makes the point clear and includes 1996 election figures. Indeed
developments since the middle of 1995 can be seen as marking a further chapter in
the League's history with the embracing of an explicit secessionist platform which,
as can be seen from Table 4.2 below, has reaped considerable electoral reward :
Table 4.2176
League Vote Expressed as Percentage of Different Areas
Area l92(Gen) '94(Gen) '94(Euro)177 l96(Gen)178
All Italy 8.7% 8.4% 6.6% 10.1%
All Regions in which
League has candidates 16.7% 15.2% 12.7% 18.2%
Lombardy, Piedmont
and the Veneto 22.2% 20.4% 12.7% 24.7%
1^6 Same sources used as those for Table 4.1 above - see Footnote 172.
177 in the European elections the League had candidates in all five of the macro-
constituencies into which Italy is divided but outwith the North-Eastern and North-Western
areas these were simply nominal candidacies. In the above table the first row gives the all
Italian figure, whilst the second and third row give the amount polled in the two Northern
constituencies which unfortunately cannot be broken down any further into regions, since
they were only collated at this aggregate macro level.
178 xjle 1996 data was calculated from figures published in Corriere della Sera [23/4/96],
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Thus one can see that the league's vote is generally twice as high as a percentage of
all regions in which it runs as compared to an all-Italian figure, and when one
concentrates only on its heartlands, this figure rises again. However 1994
undoubtedly represented in electoral terms the toughest year which the League had
faced - its previously unchecked rise from election to election was put into reverse by
the entry of Berlusconi and the European result was a real blow and did nothing for
the cohesion of the newly-formed government. The League regrouped and
confounded its critics by bouncing back with 1996 representing its best electoral
performance ever.
It soon became clear that the tensions which had riven the coalition throughout the
1994 election179 had been carried into government - the League had achieved a
tactical triumph with its garnering of 75% of coalition candidates in the Northern
seats, but it found it very difficult to translate this into governing influence as shown
by the distinct lack of any move to decentralisation, despite the League securing the
Ministry for Institutional Reform. Such conflict was hardly a surprise given the
ideological polarisation that existed between the League and Gianfranco Fini's
National Alliance which not only wanted to strengthen the central state, but to
expand it by re-negotiating territories such as Istria (part of Slovenia) lost to Italy at
the end of the Second World War.
179 There Was no hiding of the League's antagonism to Forza Italia in the election campaign,
but their short-term electoral pragmatism was always to the fore, highlighted in the
following pronouncement by Bossi distributed at the League's closing election rally in Milan
on 25th March 1994: "I decided to construct the 'pole of liberty' a few months ago when there
was a complex operation afoot to destroy the League...Forza Italia, a movement born to
destroy us, has been transformed into a useful ally. This has entailed some sacrifice, it is
true. In some seats Berlusconi has presented men recycled from the old regime,
demonstrating what we have known all along, that his political project aims at recycling, not
at change. But, on the whole, we have put Berlusconi's movement into a straight-jacket, we
have manoeuvred him into an electoral accord which will give him only a minority of
deputies and senators.".
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The collapse of Berlusconi's government in December 1994 after the League
withdrew its support should not be seen as a surprise, the tensions having come to a
head after a summer of disputes and reconciliation. Bossi also felt threatened by the
encroachment of Forza Italia into the League heartlands - at the March 1994
election their geographical profile returned more to that of the industrial periphery
rather than the urban centres. The decline in vote-share at the 1994 European
elections was followed by a trickling away of opinion poll support, with the League
very much on the defensive:
"Bossi, in fact, has to defend the identity and interests of a socio-economic
periphery ambushed not only by the capital of the first republic, the Rome
of the traditional parties, but also by that of the second : the Milan of
Berlusconi."180
Thus bringing down the Berlusconi government was a reaction both to the League's
frustration at being unable to advance its own agenda due to deadlock with the statist
National Alliance, but also due to the worry that it would lose its electoral credibility
as a protest movement and be seen increasingly just as a normal party. The fact that
Bossi took the vast majority of the party with him at a special conference in 1995 is a
testament to his control of the party, for at one stage the future of the movement
seemed under threat as around a fifth of the league's parliamentarians defected to
more pro-Berlusconi groupings. The subsequent move to the centre and flirtation
with the revitalised left under ex-Christian Democrat, Roman Prodi, also represents
continuity with the League's entrepreneurial past and finally nails shut the far-right
coffin.
1994 ~ It would seem that a fifth period has occurred in the League's history which
can be traced from December 1994, in which the League has stood alone and has
begun to flirt with the ideas of outright separatism (as outlined in Chapter Two) and
180 I. Diamanti (1994) "La Lega Nord - un partito per la periferia" in P. Ginsborg (ed.) "Stato
deiritalia" p.677.
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is using much more confrontational tactics such as the recall parliament which has
conducted several meetings at Mantua. Diamanti has analysed the headline stability
of the League's vote between 1992 and 1994 to reveal a profound redistribution at
work. In the 3,611 electoral colleges of the North in which the League had a
presence at both elections it remained stable - defined as less than 1% variance
between the two elections - in only 31 of them or less than 1% of colleges. The
strongest League presence after 1994 was to be found in the Veneto and those areas
of Lombardy where the League initially found success - provinces such as Bergamo,
Brescia, Como, Sondrio and Bossi's home Varese - in Diamanti's words "the zones
in which the League phenomenon had seen its first affirmation."181 It seems that this
return to the Northern periphery in geographical terms has been mirrored by a return
in terms of policy to the stance of the late 1980s and earlier 1990s. The League's
fingers have been burned in terms of participating in the Roman game, it lost in
credibility far more than it gained in tangible reforms and it hastened a return to a
much more isolationist stance in which the threat of outright secession has come to
be used again as a political axe to unexpected effect. As Bossi has made clear, the
League feels there is quite a thin line which is in danger of being crossed:
"For now, we in the League have succeeded in avoiding the anxiety for
change degenerating towards armed revolution. But, come the next crisis,
what will happen if reform doesn't come in a very short time...?"182
This consistent unpredictability in the League's stance and position seems to confirm
Diamanti's characterisation of the League as a 'political entrepreneur' of the first
order, and in a short period of time it has enjoyed considerable success built on this
instrumental approach. In the decade and a half since the Liga Veneta's first
emergence the various leagues have displayed a large capacity for political
pragmatism, shaping their message to the prevailing political climate. Vitally in
increasing their vote over this period they have attracted different voters for different
181 Ibid. p. 675.
182 U. Bossi (1995) op. cit. p.205.
Ill
reasons without alienating those already voting for it - the curse of the single issue
groups which Italy, like many other Western polities, saw emerge in the 1980s.
Moreover the League by the very novelty of its presence in the political market and
its new methods of communication helped to contribute to the electoral fluidity from
which it benefited, for Diamanti:
"The Lega Nord appears..as a political entrepreneur of the crisis, which
reflects and at the same time produces the feelings and resentments of wide
sectors of the Northern social landscape, thus translating into consensus
the many reasons and directions of dissensus distilled through the eighties
and nineties."183
4.3 The Scottish National Party
What of the Scottish National Party? This party has existed far longer than the
League dating back to 1934 and it was formed by the amalgamation of other
nationalist groupings, which were themselves pre-figured by the Scottish Home Rule
Association, set up in 1886. However as a significant political force it has only been
a presence since the mid-1960s and it is this period of its history which this thesis
will focus on. Its major breakthrough came in 1967 with victory at the Hamilton by-
election against Labour expectations of an easy win. The SNP has not experienced
the rapid rise to power of the Italian Northern League with its geographically diverse
vote being penalised by the UK's first-past-the-post electoral system and its inability
to penetrate first Conservative and latterly Labour electoral dominance. However it
has now established itself as a major player in the Scottish polity and in the European
elections of 1994 and the regional elections of 1995 has quite easily occupied second
place behind the Scottish Labour Party. In many ways the SNP defines much of the
Scottish political agenda by focusing attention on the best way to govern Scotland184,
as Mitchell says:
1831. Diamanti (1993) op. cit. p.85.
184 November 1995 provided adequate example of this with all the major political parties
involved in the launch of major new initiatives concerning the governance of Scotland : the
Conservatives unveiled proposals for a beefed-up Scottish Grand Committee, which marked
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"It has been the SNP's ability to enter centre stage despite its persistently
weak party presence which has been the most notable feature of the party
political debate since the 1960s. Its periodic advances have caused the other
parties to shift their focus and concentrate attacks on the SNP."185
An analysis of both parties' sociological and attitudinal make-up will follow in
Chapter Five after a brief summary of its history, with a specific focus on the goals
of the organisation and any changes in them over time.
Pre - 1934 A Home Rule Bill had passed its second reading in 1914 before the First
World War intervened to prevent it receiving passage and so it joined the previous
attempts to deliver self-government for Scotland in 1894, 1895, 1908, 1911 and then
after the war in 1920 and 1925, all of which were talked out by unionist opponents,
both on the left and the right. The collective result of such filibuster, combined with
the reaching of an Irish settlement in 1921, was to heighten activism both in the
nationalist vein with a re-assertive Scottish Home Rule Association and in the class
sphere with the revolutionary undercurrents of Red Clydeside. After the failure of the
General Strike in 1926, more energies were channelled into the former. September
1927 saw John MacCormick set up the Scottish Nationalist Association at Glasgow
University with the minutes of the first meeting stating the object to be: "To foster
and maintain Scottish Nationalism by (i) securing self-government for Scotland and
(ii) advancing the ideals of Scottish culture within and without the University"186
a considerable retreat from their 'status quo' entrenchment since the 'Taking Stock' exercise
after the last general election; the SNP launched a policy document called 'Citizens not
Subjects' which brought together much of their previous policy strands regarding an
independent Scotland as a full member state of the European Union, whilst introducing the
new idea that Scotland would remain part of an 'Association of States of the British Isles';
The Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats used St. Andrew's Day to launch their
document 'Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right' the result of six years consultation in the
Scottish Constitutional Convention and which details plans for a devolved parliament with
tax-raising powers and an electoral agreement which mandates equal male and female
representation - see "The Herald' [1/12/95] pp. 8-9.
188 J. Mitchell (1992) 'The 1992 Election in Scotland in Context' p. 619.
186 A. Marr (1992) op. cit. p.64.
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Of immediate note is the use of 'self-government' rather than independence and the
cultural emphasis of the organisation. MacCormick's association was quickly
followed in 1928 by the National Party of Scotland set up at a rally at Bannockburn
and fusing small nationalist groupings into a party which was agreed on the need for
self-government and its opposition to socialism but little else, though by these two
stances it alienated virtually all of its potential vote which was either unionist or
socialist:
"Even now the SNP attracts a kind of floating, in-between political class-
millions of Scots were born into Labour-voting traditions, and the SNP has
had to struggle not to seem alien to them...The gap between Labour
socialists and SNP socialists remains a deep and jagged fissure in Scottish
politics. This is often explained as the fall-out from the devolution years of
the 1970s. But it goes right back to the origins of the Nationalist Party in
the 1920s."187
1934 - 1961 The two parties were merged in 1934 to form the Scottish National
Party as we know it today but the heterogeneous nature of the organisation created
much internal tension, for example between the cantankerous Hugh MacDiarmid
who believed only in ideological nationalism and the more pragmatic MacCormick
who struck a deal with the Liberals so that they would stand down in twelve seats. In
these early years one can see the seeds of debates which have continued throughout
the history of the SNP and which mirror those of other autonomy parties such as the
League - namely how best to achieve the stated objective whilst avoiding
assimilation to the central system that is the goal of change. In its early years the
SNP believed that the force of its aim was sufficient, as Richard Finlay states:
"The newly created Scottish National Party encompassed elements from all
shades of political opinion and it was believed that the existence of such a
body vindicated the idea that Home Rule could act as a cohesive force,
relying simply on its own momentum to achieve constitutional change."188
187 Ibid, pp.69-70.
188 R. Finlay (1994) "Independent and Free : Scottish Politics and the Origins of the Scottish
National Party 1918 -1945" p. 252.
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However the decade of the National Government and a looming world war was not a
good one to choose to launch a new political doctrine and the marginal nature of the
SNP in these years is shown by its 1.1% of the Scottish vote in the 1935 election.189
The party did gain some success by its refusal to sign the war truce which saw it gain
7,300 votes in Argyll in 1940 and then win its first parliamentary representation
through victory in a by-election in Motherwell in 1945 when Robert Mclntyre
flouted the war-time pact. The seat was resoundingly lost in the general election later
that year and the war did not serve the party well. A large rift was created at the 1942
conference, nominally over conscription but really on the question of whether the
nationalists should be fighting all other parties for independence or should work with
others to maximise enthusiasm for Home-Rule - put simply, fundamentalism versus
gradualism. The radicals had come to dominate the outlook of the party and for
Finlay it was their key three points which provided the key philosophy of the party,
viz.: the definition of self-government as sovereignty equal in status to that enjoyed
by the Dominion nations in the British Empire; the use of the electoral system to
achieve this political objective and forbidding members from having membership in
any other political party. These tenets have remained at the core of the SNP's radical
or fundamentalist wing until the present day, as Finlay makes clear:
"In 1942 the radicals took control of the party and established a political
character which would last up until the present day. MacCormick's
experiment with moderation and latterly with cross-party co-operation had
proved to be a failure...they (the radicals) were determined that principle,
not expediency, would be their guiding light come what may."190
The fundamentalist SNP fared no better than MacCormick's more pragmatic party
(he left in disgust after his ousting and joined the Liberal Party and then in 1947 set
up the Scottish Covenant to try and win Home-Rule but two million signatures were
rejected by the Labour government of Attlee). The Butskellite consensualism of the
1^9 Although in the eight seats contested the party averaged a respectable 16% see C.
Harvie (1994) "Scotland & Nationalism : Scottish Society and Politics 1707 - 1994" p. 28.
190 R. Finlay (1994) op. cit p.253.
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1940s and 1950s (a vital element in the maintenance of a sense of British nationalism
after a war fought on the home front with the promise of building a New Jerusalem)
was as harsh an environment as the pre-war decade particularly as Scotland did well
out of the quasi-corporatist British state in which the Scottish Office became a strong
player in the national game. In fact for Lindsay Paterson the foundation of the
welfare state buoyed unionist sentiment by allowing considerable Scottish autonomy
in the fields of education, housing and to a lesser extent in health and social work
and providing adequate resources, thus:
"The Scottish Office led the way in promoting this notion of a Scottish
national economic interest, no matter that it was part of the UK government
and therefore nominally subordinate to the British national interest
...Furthermore, this Scottish nationalism was furthered by being embedded
in Britishness : if Scottish politicians could be seen to be enthusiastically
backing British interests, then they might be listened to in London when
they went on to argue for redistribution in favour of Scotland within
Britain."191
Partisan Scottish nationalism then had little to feed on in these years and the
frustration showed in resorting to acts such as the stealing of the Stone of Destiny or
the blowing up of Royal Mail post-boxes (with the claim that the ER II with which
they were embossed after the coronation in 1953 had no legitimacy in Scotland for
whom Elizabeth was the first monarch to bear that name). According to Marr, in the
two post-war decades, it was 'more of a sect than a party'192 However the seeds of
growth in the next decades had already been sown in these years, just as much of the
structure and the positioning of the SNP can be traced back to its early years.
1961-1974Why then did the SNP emerge as a significant political force in the 1960s
but not before? To understand this, it is necessary to develop a clear picture of the
Scottish political system and this is best done by thinking of all the political parties
as two-way hinges. A Scottish party must both speak for Scotland at the centre and
interpret British issues into a Scottish context - those which do this best reap the
191 L. Paterson (1994) op. cit. p.118.
192 A. Marr (1992) op. cit. p.95.
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largest political reward. Thus the Conservatives were the dominant party in the
immediate post-war years because they combined their unionist and Protestant,
'Orange' appeal with an overt acceptance of welfarism and a consequently large role
for the Scottish Office. Their party's move to the economic right and the consequent
hawkishness on the welfare state combined with the ongoing secularisation of
Scottish society served to decrease their hegemony. Their position came to be filled
by a Labour Party which has moved away from its traditional statist unionism to a
now fully-fledged devolutionist stance.193 However much of this Labour change can
be attributed to the presence of the SNP as a serious electoral alternative and so one
is back to the question of why the party achieved this position in the Scottish polity.
In some ways it is easier to understand the contemporary SNP as a pressure group
than as a fully-fledged political party : it exerts pressure on the Labour Party to
campaign for devolution by outflanking it and pushing for full-scale independence.
Paradoxically this role as a pressure group can only be performed properly by a
political party, for:
"Its own history suggests strongly that becoming a movement rather than a
party is very unlikely to bring about independence, and its fear of the
devolutionist, home-rule option has deep historical roots."194
The situation for the SNP is further complicated because it cannot operate in the
classic two-way fashion described above, since part of its raison d'etre is to sever
political links with the British state. It is thus caught in a very complicated political
matrix with little of the fluidity which characterises the Italian situation described
earlier in this chapter, although the experience of the Northern League in government
has marked similarities to the difficulties the SNP faces in 'playing the Westminster
game'. How has this varied over the last three decades?
193 Tony Blair has promised a Scottish parliament within the first year of a British Labour
government - a promise criticised by several commentators as wholly unrealistic, given the
complexity which such legislation would necessarily entail - see I MacWhirter op. cit.
pp.21-23.
194 D. McCrone (1994d) 'Review : A Tale of Two Histories' p.107.
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The nationalist pick-up can be traced from the early 1960s with 19% in the Glasgow
Bridgeton by-election in 1961 and Billy Wolfe's second to Tam Dalyell with 23% in
the West Lothian by-election the following year195. Under the 'Put Scotland First'
banner the party passed from being a small cabal to being a much more truly national
force, from 20 branches and 2,000 members in 1960, to 484 branches and 120,000
members by 1968. This membership explosion coincided with the growing
disillusion with the corporatist British state as the Scottish Office gravy train began
to run drier as Britain's relative economic decline of the post-war years was laid
more bare. The timing of the Hamilton by-election in 1967 - the year of the Wilson
government's humiliating devaluation - could not have been worse for the Labour
Party. Disillusion with Wilson translated into a protest vote for the SNP aided by its
new organisation and much tactical voting from the Conservatives in the
constituency. The 46% of the vote which saw Winnie Ewing elected created a media
sensation which the SNP rode to become the largest party in the May 1968 local
elections in Scotland with 34%. More importantly the SNP achieved an
unprecedented effect on the two major parties - both quickly addressed Home Rule
as an attempt to provide a sop to the disillusioned voters who had embraced the SNP
as a potential solution, as Marr says:
"The successes of 1967-68 were early skirmishes between the SNP and the
big Unionist parties...their real significance was seen inside the
Conservative and Labour leadership, where the unexpectedness of the
Nationalist challenge produced panic...Intellectually the first puff from the
Nationalist wolf had set the Unionist house rocking."196
In this scenario the discovery of oil in October 1970 when BP struck in what would
become the Forties field can be seen to be very important in its timing. The initial
flurry of activity in which Edward Heath had taken the Scottish Conservative
19^ s. Kendrick (1983) "Social Change and Nationalism in Modern Scotland" p. 299 "It was
only after these two pleasant surprises that the SNP decided to go for a full scale electoral
strategy." IanMcDonald, the defeated Bridgeton candidate, sold his farm and became the
first national organiser in the history of the SNP.
196 A. Marr (1992) op. cit. pp.119-120.
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conference by surprise in May 1968 had fizzled out once the Conservatives were
entrenched in office and the SNP were back down to 11.4% in the 1970 general
election.197 The BP oil strike, followed quickly by ones at Brent and Ninian, opened
up a whole new line of campaigning. Previously the SNP had often been criticised on
the economic viability of their project but, after the OPEC price hikes of 1973 made
North Sea production viable, the discovery of oil provided economic manna. Using
the famous slogan 'It's Scotland's Oil' the SNP could now promise not only an
undefined political freedom to be derived away from Westminster's yoke but more
important to most voters, it could present a coherent case for possible economic
prosperity. However it is worth noting that the SNP was an established party from
the late 1960s - before the North Sea's potential was fully recognised. Like the
Northern League, the SNP cannot be satisfactorily explained by a single issue or
cleavage, instead it is a complex response to complex conditions, involving many
different levels and motives.
1974-1979 Like the Conservatives, the ruling Labour Party now moved toward
Home Rule adopting the recommendation of a 100-seat, PR-elected Scottish Senate
made by the long-delayed Kilbrandon Royal Commission which reported in October
1973, two years later than planned. Their conversion was a slow and arduous process
however and included a remarkable turn-around in the summer of 1974. In their
February manifesto Labour went no further than suggesting meetings of the Scottish
Grand Committee in Edinburgh. Labour won the election, albeit very narrowly, and
then did well in the May 1974 elections to the new local authorities. The government
Green Paper was published in June and offered several options but hinted at
executive rather than legislative devolution, then on June 28th Labour's Scottish
executive met and rejected all schemes with the conclusion that "Constitutional
197 Winnie Ewing lost her Hamilton seat gained in the by-election but the SNP did win their
first general election seat as a consolation with Donald Stewart victorious in the Western
Isles and the party's vote was more than double that obtained in 1966.
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tinkering does not make a meaningful contribution towards achieving socialist
objectives."198 The National Executive in London stepped in at this point sensing
how large the SNP threat could be and commanded the annual Scottish conference to
be re-convened in August. At this conference, union bloc votes ensured that an
elective legislative assembly became policy as well as sowing the seeds of
conference division which would grow into the Scottish Labour Party.199 Thus
unlike the Conservatives the Labour Party in government found itself in a far tighter
position with a majority of only four even after the second election of October 1974.
Between the first February election and this second in October, the SNP increased its
representation from six to eleven seats and with 30.4% of the vote and could no
longer be ignored by the London government. Thus the road to the referendum at the
decade's end had been determined by the political and economic developments at its
beginning. The very rapid rise of the SNP over these few years is captured in Table
4.3 overleaf:
As quoted in C. Harvie (1994) op. cit. p. 189.
199 This was a short-lived breakaway from the British party founded by Jim Sillars in
January 1976, and should not to be confused with the official Labour Party in Scotland. In
the words of H. M. Drucker "The breakaway Scottish Labour Party set Scottish politics alight
when it was founded in January 1976 by a group of Labour politicians and sympathetic
journalists. It was an immediate success with the Scottish press, gained nearly nine hundred
members in less than a year, performed creditably in local government by-elections, and
threatened to alter the face of British politics." (quote from back cover). However the party
stumbled after infiltration by two Trotskyite groups and failed to fulfil its early promise. For
a full account of it - see H. M. Drucker (1978) "Breakaway : The Scottish Labour Party".
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It is clear that with eleven seats in a parliament where the government possessed only
a very small majority, which had disappeared entirely by 1976, that the SNP could
exert considerable influence and there is no dispute that the presence of the Scottish
Nationalist members kept the Labour government committed to a devolution bill
which caused considerable internal rifts within the party of government. The process
was a long and tortuous one which caused splits both in the Labour Party and the
SNP. The first Bill had 350 amendments tabled when it went into committee stage to
immobilise it and a guillotine motion in February 1977 to press it through was lost
by 29 votes. However nationalist gains in the May local elections of that year upped
the electoral pressure on the Labour administration and they pressed ahead. In the
procedural maelstrom which ensued, the Labour back-bench MP George
Cunningham gained the vital concessionary clause allowing repeal if less than 40%
of the electorate backed the constitutional change201. Thus the vote on 1st March
200 Figures taken from R.Parry (1988) "Scottish Political Facts" pp.2-3 and McCrone (1992)
op.cit. pp.148-149.
201 The Cunningham amendment of January 25th 1978 stated that "if it appears to the
Secretary of State that less than 40% of the persons entitled to vote in the referendum have
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1979 approved a devolved Scottish parliament by 1.23 million votes for to 1.15
million against, and whilst of those who voted this represented 51.6% in favour and
48.4% against, this only translated into 32.9 % of the electorate in favour, with
30.8% against whilst 36.3% did not vote.202 Thus the referendum result meant the
Act was not legally binding. The SNP were outraged by what was seen as a denial of
democracy and brought a vote of no confidence against the Callaghan government,
though it had called for all-party consultations instead of setting a date for the vote
on the order to repeal Scotland Act. Six days later on March 28th the Conservatives
brought another vote of no confidence. This vote was lost by Labour and at the
resultant general election the Conservatives acceded to government under the UK's
first ever woman Prime Minister. The Commons then passed a repeal order of the
Act in June 1979 by 301 votes to 206 against and the challenge to Westminster had
passed.
1979-1987 In this 1979 election it was the SNP which paid the penalty of
devolution's failure, for whilst the Conservatives surged from 24.7% to 31.4%,
Labour also increased their vote from October 1974's 36.3% to 41.5%, but the SNP
fell from its 30.4% zenith to 17.3%. The effect in terms of seats was particularly
devastating with only two members returning to Westminster where before there had
been eleven. It is no surprise that the party reacted to this defeat with a prolonged
period of in-fighting which centred around the gradualist versus fundamentalist split.
For the latter the debacle of the 1970s was definitive evidence that the tactic of
gradualism bore no fruit, for it was the SNP which bore the electoral brunt of the
voted 'Yes' ...he shall lay before Parliament the draft of an Order in Council for the repeal of
this Act" It was carried by 168 votes to 142 and a Denis Canavan amendment to remove the
'40% rule' was defeated in February by 298 to 248 - from "Scottish Government Yearbook
1979" Reference Section [Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland, Edinburgh
University, 1980] p.207.
202 The question posed in the referendum was "Do you want the provisions of the Scotland
Act 1978 to be put into effect?" - from "Scottish Government Yearbook 1980" Reference
Section [Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland, Edinburgh University, 1981] p.231.
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blame for the referendum's failure, exposing some of the 30% of 1974 as a transitory
protest vote. Instead they argued that the party should concentrate on building up a
more solid base of support committed to the goal of full Scottish independence. On
the other side were those who saw much encouragement from a majority of those
who voted in 1979 endorsing change and who thought it better to court further
incremental improvements in the SNP's position. The argument came to a head in
1982 with the expulsion of the leftist 79 Group including future leader Alex
Salmond. Ironically the party then slowly rehabilitated itself as a left-of-centre
movement. It lost further ground in the 1983 general election, falling to 11.7% and 2
seats, but this was largely a function of the SDP/Liberal Alliance coming from
nowhere to capture 24.5% of the Scottish vote as a British vehicle for protest against
two-party hegemony.
1987 ~ Since the mid 1980s the SNP has been on a steady upward spiral, capturing
14% and 3 seats in 1987 and then surging to 21.5% in 1992 though this brought no
added reward in terms of parliamentary representation due to the even geographical
distribution of its vote in a majoritarian system which rewards territorial
concentration. For a time in the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a tangible
belief that constitutional change was going to happen, be it through the devolutionary
path of the Constitutional Convention203 or the 'Independence in Europe' coined by
Jim Sillars, a convert to the SNP, who had won Govan at a by-election in November
1988 and so re-ignited hopes of an SNP bandwagon. However the Conservative
victory in April 1992 put paid to such hopes. The SNP has had a good electoral
record in the 1990s, and as Table 4.4 overleaf shows has established itself as
Scotland's second largest party in the various elections of the last few years,
203 -jhe SNP refused to participate in this organisation which comprised a cross-section of
Scottish life on the grounds that its mandate was too limited and unclear.
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although traditionally second order elections have a lower turn-out and a higher
protest element:
Table 4.4
Elections in Scotland 1990-1995(%)204
May 1990 Apr 1992 May 1994 June 1994 April 1995
Regional General Regional European Local Gov.
Labour 42.7 39.0 41.8 42.5 43.6
SNP 21.8 21.5 26.8 32.6 26.1
Conservative 19.5 25.6 13.7 14.5 11.5
Liberal Democrat 8.6 13.1 12.0 7.2 9.8
Other 7.4 0.8 5.7 3.2 9.0
Thus with the important exception of the general election the SNP has run Labour
second in every second-order election in Scotland in the 1990s. The 32.6% gained in
the 1994 European election represented the party's highest ever level, surpassing the
30.4% of October 1974 and bringing a second MEP, Allan Macartney in North-East
Scotland to add to the Highlands and Islands Euro-constituency member, Winnie
Ewing, which the party has held since direct elections began in 1979. The SNP is
now supported by 1 in every 4 Scots, and since 1992 has represented the major
electoral rival to the dominant Labour Party in Scotland.205 The party's clear
positioning of itself on the left of the spectrum seems to have brought tangible
electoral reward. However the SNP's support remains very geographically spread
and they have failed to displace Labour in its Central Belt heartlands. Yet the
question remains as to why this situation has not been translated into tangible
constitutional change. The next chapter will attempt to answer these questions by
looking at the make-up of the SNP support and the structural barriers which it faces
in a Labour-dominated system.
204 jhe 1990 & 1994 regional figures are from D. Denver & H. Bochel (1994) The Last Act:
The Regional Elections of 1994' p.74; 1992 general election and 1994 European election
figures are from D. Denver (1994) 'The 1994 European Elections in Scotland' p.66; the 1995
shadow election figures are from "The Scotsman' 8/4/95, Election pull-out.
205 must be distinguished from the short-lived Scottish Labour Party which was
described in Footnote 199. The Labour Party in Scotland was adopted as the official title at
the 1994 Scottish conference and has been used increasingly as a signal of difference for
those disaffected with the centralist leadership of Blair.
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4.4 Summary
This chapter has sought to provide much of the building blocks for the analysis to be
undertaken by narrating the histories of the two parties under specific consideration.
Several similarities are apparent from this narration, both in political approach and in
the constraints faced. Both parties have been electoral chameleons - the early version
of the SNP had a devolved settlement as its goal and throughout its subsequent
history there has been ebb and flow across the gradualist/fundamentalist divide.
Likewise the League's stance on constitutional matters has shifted almost constantly
with independence and three strong macro-regions setting the parameters of the
debate. Both parties have performed best when opposing the central government, or
to put it another way, both have found it hard to play the political game which
participation in the centre often demands - the SNP stuttered between 1976 and 1979
when its Westminster representation gave it real power, just as the League was
unprepared for its turbulent nine months in office in 1994. This would be a more
understandable failing in terms of it being difficult to function effectively within
institutions which one wishes to fundamentally reform, were it not for the success
within similar constraints of movements in Catalonia and, to a lesser extent, Quebec.
This chapter has shown that despite their different time-scales, similarities can be
drawn in the histories of the parties and their role as symptoms of the collapse of
hegemonic states; the next chapter will seek to extend this comparability to the




AN ANALYSIS OF THE PARTIES' VOTERS
5.1 Introduction
The last chapter looked at the histories of both the Northern League and the Scottish
National Party. Neither of these parties would possess such important stories had
they not managed to attract significant numbers of voters to their message. This may
sound a bland assertion of the obvious but the historical work of Miroslav Hroch
illustrates that nineteenth-century Europe - the apex of traditional nation-state
building - is littered with potential nationalist movements which failed to find
political voice for their cultural, linguistic, religious or economic stimuli.206 Thus the
fact that both the parties under consideration have been able to garner and keep at
least some voters' electoral endorsement in the twentieth century context of mass
enfranchisement is significant and has allowed them to become influential political
players, rather than Utopian no-hopers. Admittedly, neither has yet achieved their
stated goal, but much can be learned about the nature of contemporary autonomism
from an analysis of who votes for the League and the SNP.
Specifically this chapter will gauge factors such as age, gender, social class, loyalty
to the party and previous political affiliation. It will attempt to compare both parties
206 por Hroch, to move from potential to fulfilled nationhood there had to be an active
bourgeoisie, in the sense of an elite group prepared to lead a movement for national revival.
He goes on to propose three different phases in the creation of nations : Phase A was a
period of scholarly interest in which intellectuals undertook a cultural revival of language,
history and customs; Phase B was a period of patriotic agitation which in Hroch's words
represented "the fermentation process of national consciousness" (p.23) and in which the
revival of Phase A was carried to the masses, and if successful was followed by Phase C
which was the period of the rise of a mass national movement. The central part of Hroch's
schema then is Phase B since whether or not it was successful determined achievement of
nationhood - Hroch saw many potential nations as stuck in Phase B, in other words still
striving to convince the masses - see M. Hroch (1985) "Social Preconditions of National
Revival in Europe".
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by explicitly examining these variables. Use will be made of various voting models,
such as the protest vote model, the relative deprivation model, the identity model and
finally the new social movements model. All of this analysis will take place whilst
asking the question of whether the Scottish National Party and the Italian Northern
League are different both from previous autonomist movements and other political
parties. The argument will be set in the context of the debate on changing values and
political orientations in western societies like Britain and Italy, which may help
explain the emergence of new parties. It is the interplay of economic, cultural and
political factors which determines the success of a given political party at a given
time and this chapter will ask how much any or all of these factors can be said to
have changed to the advantage of autonomist parties over the last few decades.
5.2 Changing Values?
Ronald Inglehart inspired a large debate in the whole question of value changes and
the potential explanations of them with his 1977 book "The Silent Revolution"
which contained the assertion that:
"The values ofWestern publics have been shifting from an overwhelming
emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater
emphasis on the quality of life...Today, an unprecedentedly large portion of
Western populations have been raised under conditions of exceptional
economic security. Economic and physical security continue to be valued
positively, but their relative priority is lower than in the past."207
On such an interpretation voters can afford to move away from traditional parties
whose main ideological cleavage has revolved around the question of how best to
maximise economic wealth; relative affluence allows the luxury of pursuing other
non-material ends with one's vote, freed from previous class-based constraints. Such
an emergence from Hobbes' state of nature, with physical security at a historical
high, and the surpassing of Locke's materialism, with unprecedented numbers in
society having stable property and sufficient wealth, is concentrated in the affluent
207 R. Inglehart (1977) op. cit. p. 3.
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regions of the globe, namely Western Europe and North America. Inglehart argued
that it is precisely these areas which have seen the emergence of new parties and the
concurrent weakening of older mass and catch-all parties, based on material and
religious cleavages, over the last couple of decades. However, one must be wary of
treating this material satiation as a one-off step; it is rather part of an on-going
economic process which has seen much change in the late 1980s and early 1990s
with increased job insecurity and a move toward part-time or casual work. The micro
picture, then, is constantly changing, but it seems fair at the macro level to posit a
large shift in average material circumstances since the Second World War, both in
Great Britain and more spectacularly in Italy, notwithstanding the UK's well-
documented relative economic decline during this period.208
Examples of the new political entrants can be found in the form of the Green parties
in various West European states, especially in Germany, the women's parties which
have come to the fore in Scandinavia and, less clear-cut in orientation, the
autonomist parties in Quebec, Catalonia, Belgium and the two areas under
consideration in this thesis, Scotland and Northern Italy. In Inglehart's words:
"The political and economic systems continue to produce outputs that
respond relatively well to traditional demands, but they do not seem to
provide adequate satisfaction for other needs and demands that are
increasingly important among certain segments of the population. Changing
values combine with a growing sense of the inadequacy of existing
institutions to encourage the use of new and different political inputs,
including protest activity and the formation of new political movements and
organisations."209
Reference can also be to made to the burgeoning numbers of non-partisan, single-
issue movements, such as the nuclear disarmament, women's, pensioners' and
various environmental movements which shun the traditional route of the ballot box
and undertake direct action. This route can be very effective across national borders,
Indeed a significant post-war economic event came in Italy when its GDP per capita
overtook that of Britain in the 1980s - 'II Sorpasso' ("The Overtaking') as it was known was
much disputed by the British government but was nonetheless significant as an indication of
relative economic trends.
209 R. Inglehart (1977) op. cit. pp.14-15.
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as Greenpeace's campaign against Shell's plans to dispose of the Brent Spar oil
installation at sea showed in 1995. It is of note that the membership figures of many
of these non-parliamentary groups have been growing as those of all British political
parties have been falling.210 The question here is to what extent autonomist parties
can be said to belong to such changes.
Inglehart's theory has attracted much criticism, most of which argues that his
conclusions are too sweeping and can too often be challenged by empirical evidence.
Thomas Trump focused on Inglehart's assertion that levels of economic and physical
security were the primary determinants of the values shaping political attitudes and
that, with growing levels of both types of security, these values have moved from
mainly selfish material concerns to more selfless post-materialist ones.211 He was
concerned about the emphasis placed on the change in 'values' and seeks to test the
theoretical base of this process using data collected in the United States and
Germany in 1984 amongst 'preadults'. This age cohort was chosen because of the
particular importance which Inglehart placed on the environmental conditions during
one's formative years, which he used as an important factor in explaining his posited
generational shift in values between those who grew up in the war-time or interwar
years of the first half of the twentieth century and those whose formative period
came in the post-war 'long boom' in its second half212 This 'environmental' tack
210 See Andrew Marr (1995) "Ruling Britannia - The Failure and Future of British
Democracy" pp .40-42 Marr estimates that the Conservative Party has fallen from 2.8 million
members in 1952 to less than 750,000 now, whilst non-unionised Labour members declined
from over a million under Attlee in 1950 to less than 250,000 in the early 90's, though Tony
Blair's arrival as party leader has seen this figure increase to more than 330,000. The Liberal
Democrats have around 100,000 members, the SNP comes next with around 20,000, Plaid
Cmyru has around 9,000 and the Greens around 5,000.
211 y Trump (1991) 'Value Formation and Postmaterialism- Inglehart's Theory of Value
Change Reconsidered' pp.365-390.
212 See R. Inglehart (1990) "Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society" p.423
"...throughout advanced industrial society, younger birth cohorts are much likelier to have
Postmaterialist values than their elders. A massive body of survey evidence demonstrates
that these cohort differences persisted throughout the period from 1970-1988; consequently,
intergenerational population replacement during this period led to a gradual decline in the
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was extended by Inglehart to include the relative affluence of the region and locality
in which individuals live, with those areas enjoying prosperity supposed to be more
post-material in their value formation - hence the selection by Trump of West
Germany and the USA as two of the most successful post-war economies with
widespread levels of material comfort.
Trump's research questions the universality of Inglehart's theory - he finds the
German data provides at least qualified support for it, but the American results cast
doubt on the hypothesis, such that:
"The finding that economic conditions are not strongly related to either the
need hierarchy or values has clear and substantial implications for
Inglehart's theory of value change...because material well-being based on
economic conditions has been the primary theoretical explanation for the
rise of post-materialist values. This evidence strongly suggests that
continuing or increasing affluence is not sufficient to bring about a
post-materialist future."213
Trump's evidence then would tend to suggest that the link between economic well-
being and post-materialism is by no means clear cut and he concludes by calling for
more analysis of any nexus observing that "Materialist and post-materialist
orientations may not be fundamental values, but rather may be more transient social
and political attitudes".214 It seems clear then that materialism has not withered away
and any change in values is, at best, partial and incomplete. In looking at autonomist
parties, this chapter will argue that material concerns figure highly amongst the party
supporters.
The tendency to use Inglehart's theory as a broad explanatory tool - a kind of post-
material panacea - by political commentators without adequately testing its
provisions is also highlighted by Joseph Janssen in an article focusing on support for





the supranational project of European integration.215 He highlights the way the
conclusions of "The Silent Revolution" are used as 'the' explanation of Europe
without, again, any extensive empirical test. Thus Inglehart and others following him
have argued that European integration fits better with the values of post-materialists
than with those of materialists, firstly because they are more cosmopolitan and
intellectual in attitude than selfish materialists, and secondly because their need to
belong can no longer be adequately be met by predominantly materialist nation-
states. Janssen paraphrases Inglehart thus: "Their need for belonging and their
contempt for the nation-state drives post-materialists to a preoccupation with the sub-
or supra- national levels of government."216 Janssen tries to fill in some of the
missing empirical colour by examining data on attitudes to Europe from France,
West Germany, Italy and Great Britain between 1973 and 1988. In this he finds no
significant difference between attitudes toward integration expressed by the pre-war
and post-war generations, nor is there is a discernible shift in favour of the EU as
generational replacement occurs. Janssen is not totally critical, accepting that nation-
states have become less materialist in the years since "The Silent Revolution" was
published, for instance in adopting at least limited environment friendly policies such
as the banning of CFCs, and he concludes that:
"..it is necessary for political scientists who use Inglehart's value distinction
in studying the formation of attitudes to consider whether a possible
relationship between values and the attitude being studied is not bound to
time and place i.e.. country. This could enhance our understanding of
political changes and also leave us with the hard core of the consequences of
the changes described by Inglehart." 217
This sentiment is one which seems the right way to approach the whole question of
value change and political development. One must be as thorough in the treatment of
relatively new theories as one would be when dealing with those which are more
215 J. I. H. Janssen (1991) 'Postmaterialism, Cognitive Mobilisation and Public Support for
European Integration' pp.443-468.
216 Ibid, p.445 and see Inglehart (1977) op. cit. Ch.12 'Parochialism, Nationalism, and
Supra-nationalism' pp.322-362.
217 Ibid. p. 468.
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well-established, such as those dealing with nation-building. There is no panacea
which can explain all the political and social changes which developed democracies
have witnessed over recent decades. This is where post-materialism has over-reached
itself, and is precisely why any theory put forward here concerning 'post'-
nationalism will at best be guarded and subject to much further research. Rather than
seeking simplistic explanations, one must try to explain a complex interaction of
factors and stimuli, whilst simultaneously informing any comparative discussion
with the context of time and place as Janssen suggests and as Chapters Three and
Four have already undertaken.
It is the contention of this thesis that the SNP and the Northern League are symptoms
of at least some of these changes. Both parties have been analysed within the post-
materialist schema with mixed conclusions. In the Scottish context Saul Newman
investigated the rise and decline of the SNP218 and concluded that although
Inglehart's theory might explain the rise of the SNP, it struggled to explain the
consequent decline of the party from the late 1970s since a value shift was supposed
to be a once-and-for-all move, not a short-term mood swing. However, Newman,
writing in the early 1990s did not have the SNP's steady rise to second place in the
Scottish polls and elections to digest and perhaps the decline can be somewhat
explained by bringing in Janssen's proviso of time and place with the referendum
and its recriminations hitting the SNP hard in the first half of the 1980s. As for the
League Carlo Lottieri has argued that its a la carte programme held together by the
thread of autonomy attracts voters from across the political spectrum in a post¬
modern and post-materialist fashion.219
218 S.Newman (1992) "The Rise and Decline of the SNP : Ethnic Politics in a Post-Industrial
World' pp.1-35.
219 C. Lottieri (1995) 'La Lega Nord A1 Bivio' p.6 "The territorial unit of reference of young
adherents of the League from the early 1990s appeared far closer to administrative frontiers
than historic and cultural realities. The passion for 'place' appeared to belong rather to the
symbolic imagination than to direct experience of a place actually known.".
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The question which this chapter will aim to answer is to what extent these two
parties can be said to be symptoms of value change. Both parties will be assessed in
turn within various voting models outlined and it will be asked whether they are
transitory protest vehicles or can be seen to represent more permanent, new
cleavages with voters who are believers not protesters. The chapter will conclude
with an appraisal of its role in understanding autonomy movements in the late
twentieth century European Union220.
5.3 The 'Leghisti'
Who votes for the Northern League? This simple question has been one of the largest
causes of controversy in the Italian literature on the league phenomenon and several
competing answers have arisen to the question of where the leagues gained most of
their adherents from. The first issue to be investigated is the political orientation of
the League electorate. This question more than any other first brought the League to
public attention with myriad journalistic and academic attacks on their alleged far
right stance and it was tacitly assumed that their voters and sympathisers shared a
similar political outlook. The initial analyses221 identified the League as an anti-
immigration, racist party such as the French National Front or German Republican
Party, or as a single-issue, potentially post-materialist, protest party such as the
220 The question of where the EU fits into the post-materialist schema is a contentious one
which will be considered in depth in the penultimate chapter. A. Milward (1993) op. cit. is
one of the foremost proponents of the idea that it is an organisation which furthers the
material interests of nation-state members, thus p.27 "Rather than see the Single European
Act (SEA) as a confirmation of neo-functionalist theories of integration, we see the new
treaty as confirmation that the integrationist framework would still be chosen by
governments for the advancement of new national policy objectives after the changes of the
70's".
221 For instance L.Balbo & L.Manconi (1990) "I razzismi possibili". V. Moioli (1990) "I
Nuovi Razzismi. Miserie e fortune della Lega Lombarda". or more recently in English E.
Vasta's chapter on Italy in J. Solomos & J. Wrench (eds.) (1993) "Racism and Migration in
Western Europe" which says "These Leagues seem to attract the same types of voters as the
National Front in France" p.92.
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Greens, but these seem to have stemmed more from academic supposition than any
empirical evidence.
More substantively the League was portrayed in the early 1990s as the beneficiary of
the drastic contractions in the vote of the Christian Democrat (DC) Party222, which
went from 38.3% in 1979 to 29.7% in 1992 and then into oblivion by 1994 as the
party was subsumed by corruption investigations and ultimately disbanded to be
refounded in the various centrist splinters which lost heavily in the 1994 election.
The main source of evidence for this contention came from the Veneto region, a
former bedrock of the 'zone bianche' ('white zones') which were the strongest areas
of the Catholic subculture. This is an argument forged by Italian and British
commentators alike223 but it fails to cross the necessary statistical hurdles, with the
DC element largest only as a function of its size and pre-eminent electoral position.
The DC decline is an important element in explaining the rise of the leagues but is by
no means the whole story. Another explanation of the rise of the leagues explains
them as protest movements against the established order. This would logically
involve the gaining of a large majority of votes from the 'pentapartito' or five
established parties who formed the basis of the various governments over the last
decade of the First Republic, namely the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the
smaller Liberal, Republican and Social Democratic parties.
However the most recent data damages this projection, with no statistically
significant movement toward defection from these parties. The most convincing
222 See J. Newell (1993) 'The SNP and the Lega Nord : A Lesson for their rivals?' (paper
presented at "Local Politics' Workshop at ECPR conference in Leiden) p. 10 ".significant
numbers of DC supporters no longer felt compelled to vote for the party as the main
bulwark against communism, and instead felt free to express their dissatisfaction with the
system of clientelism and corruption that the DC had been involved in by voting for the
League.".
223 See P. Natale (1991) 'The Lombard League and its Territorial Base - an Ecological
Analysis' in Mannheimer (1991) op. cit. pp.83-121.
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evidence of this contention comes in the analysis of voter movements between the
1987 and 1992 general elections cited by Piergiorgio Corbetta.224 He uses the data
from the 4,659 interviews of the DOXA exit-poll supplemented by the 716 telephone
interviews carried out by the Cattaneo Institute in the two days after April 5th 1992,
both asking the two simple questions 'How did you vote this time?' and 'How did
you vote last time?'. The results obtained are very significant and reproduced in
Table 5.1 below:
Table 5.1
Electoral Movement to the League from 1987 to 1992
Party No. of Voters % Vote chai
Proletarian Democracy(DP) 1 0 +4
Communist (PCI) 65 19 -10
Socialist (PSI) 44 13 -1
Social-Democratic (PSDI) 13 4 -
Republican (PRI) 19 5 +1
Christian Democratic (DC) 89 25 -5
Liberal (PLI) 5 1 +1
Italian Social Movement (MSI) 23 7 -
Radical (Radicali) 12 3 -1
Greens (Verdi) 14 4 -
Autonomists (separate from LN) 13 4 -
Northern League (Lega Nord) 54 15 +8
Total 352 100
With reservations as to the size of the sample, these results suggest several salient
factors. They are a testament to the remarkable growth of the league phenomenon in
five years. Only 15% of the League voters surveyed in 1992 had voted that way in
1987. However of the 64 who voted for the League in 1987 only 10 did not do so in
1992, giving 84% voter stability in an election in which the average was only 68%
(first indications from the 1996 election place the League's voter loyalty at around
75% providing evidence for loyalty over a longer term). Most importantly the table
shows the diversity of parties from which the Northern League garnered its votes,
224 From P. Corbetta (1993) 'La Lega e Lo Sfaldamento del Sistema'. The first column comes
from Table 2, p.240 and the second from Table 3, p.241 which expresses the same data as a
percentage of the League's vote in 1992.
135
spanning the traditional left-right spectrum from former communists to neo-fascists,
in an election in which it soared up 8% in terms of the national vote as the third
column of the table makes clear. Significantly the gaining of votes from the
subcultural Christian Democrat and Communist parties is offset by adherents from
such diverse groups as the neo-fascist MSI and the Greens. The 25% gained from the
DC was actually less than if the League had attracted voters from all parties equally,
dependent only on their vote-share. These findings of heterogeneity are confirmed by
the tensions during the 1994 campaign caused by the alliance with Berlusconi, the
discontent with him summed up thus by one leghista interviewed : 'Because he is on
the right, whilst I, if I was not a leghista, would be on the left'225. Moreover Bossi
after the 1994 election issued several veiled threats regarding the League's ability to
ally with the centre and even the left in response to Berlusconi's talk of returning to
the electorate. The League did indeed make its first such alliance, after the collapse
of the government in December 1994, against Forza Italia and the National Alliance,
in the victorious campaign for the mayor of Padua in the Veneto in April 1995.226
and its go-it-alone tactic in the 1996 election confirms its unpredictable nature. The
Northern League cannot be accurately seen as an uncomplicated right-wing party.
There is no discernible pattern as to where the League attracts its votes from. There
is no unicausal explanation, rather a complex interaction of different factors which
this chapter will seek to clarify. Corbetta extends his analysis to testing the dominant
theses of partisan make-up of the leagues through log-linear analysis. He finds the
model with most statistical significance is one employing the traditional left-right
225 From interview in [La Repubblica, 27/2/94] p.7.
226 jhjg js a sentiment shared by League activists whom I interviewed thus :
"..from the political point of view, we have moved from the image of a racist party, a party
of the right, and that's better for the function we perform...there are many opinions, there is
the more liberal opinion, and there is the more left-wing opinion, there are so many
opinions, in fact it's difficult sometimes to bring them all together in a party."
"..it is clear that the League is neither of the right or the left and almost everyone shares the
political line and everyone shares the same political objective, so we are quite united.".
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spectrum but which situates the League at a point outside it, equidistant from all
parties. It simply cannot be pinned down on the traditional partisan spectrum, given
the flows outlined above. Thus the League's 1992 electoral performance comprises :
"A vote so undifferentiated, so uniformly distributed across the partisan
arc, that has at its root either a new cleavage which traverses all the
parties at the same time, a cleavage which has up till now remained
latent in society and moreover unexplored in the programmes of the
other parties, or it is the product of the moulting of the system."227
For Corbetta it is this last factor which possesses the chief explanatory power for the
League's rise. They have been the beneficiaries of a flaking of the system not along
any ideological or social schism, but rather from exasperation with and antagonism
toward the traditional parties and organs of the state. He dismisses the ability of neo-
regionalism to serve as a new cross-party cleavage, describing the 'northism' of the
Northern League as a 'rhetorical invention'.
However, this latter claim is based on the author's own assertion and may be
challenged by empirical data cited by Diamanti and the endurance of the League
through the 1994 and 1996 elections. The attitudes summarised in Table 5.2 come
from a survey conducted by the Poster Institute from December 1992-January 1993
of 660 voters equally distributed between Lombardy and the Veneto of whom 145
declared themselves close to the Lombard or Venetian Leagues respectively. The
interviewees were asked about their feelings about institutional reform and the
answers were then broken down as follows :
Table 5.2228
Attitudes Toward Institutional Reform in Lombardy and the Veneto
(% of sample and each sub-sample)
All 'Leghisti' 'Lombardi' 'Veneti'
Status Quo 14 6 11 0
More powers to regions 39 30 46 9
All regions special statute 29 27 15 41
Three Macroregions 12 24 21 29
Separation of the North 7 13 7 21
N= 660 145 78 67
227 P. Corbetta (1993) op. cit. p.248.
228 I. Diamanti (1993) op. cit. p.101, Table 10.
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Whilst one must again be wary of the size of the sample there are several features
revealed by the table. Most noticeable is the fact that only 6% of League voters feel
happy with the constitutional status quo compared with 14% of all voters, itself a
noteworthy figure for a nation which had been unified for over a century, before
limited regionalism was introduced in 1970. This single-figure response is similar to
the small numbers of SNP voters who are content with the British status quo.
Meanwhile as the reform options become more radical i.e. the League's proposal of
the time - macro-regions - or beyond this complete separation, the gap between the
'leghistV and all voters becomes more pronounced, a trend which, when added to
the feelings on territorial belonging reported earlier in Table 3.1 from the same
survey, seems sufficient to challenge Corbetta's dismissal of regional identity as a
possible new cleavage cutting across the old Italian schisms. Of note are the
considerable internal differences which characterise the Northern League : just as
Venetian voters were twice as likely to feel 'northern' as their Lombard counterparts,
they are also considerably more radical in their vision of the future with three times
as many in favour of complete separation for the North, and not one of them satisfied
with the status quo. These differences serve to remind one again of the internal
heterogeneity of the league phenomenon and Diamanti posits that they spring in part
from the different historical trajectories earlier outlined and indeed from the different
histories of many of Italy's regions.
Before turning to a consideration of the voting models best equipped to explain the
League's decade of rise, it is necessary to provide evidence for the contention that
the League's vote has now 'normalised' in terms of political and sociological
composition and so escape from the simplistic electoral pigeon-holing which too
often characterises analyses of the movement. The League is a far more subtle
phenomenon than either the German Republikaner or French National Front parties
with which many journalists and several academics blithely compared it.
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Mannheimer's 1991 study with its specific focus on the Lombard League began to
recognise its complexity but also highlighted a tendency toward male, intolerant and
uneducated voters which the explosion in 1992 and subsequent sustaining in 1994
and increase in 1996 made redundant. Put simply, if the League had been constrained
to a fairly narrow sector of the electorate it could not have grown so rapidly,
Diamanti hinted at his later conclusion in his chapter in Mannheimer's collection,
thus:
"The consensus of the Lombard League, therefore, rather than traversing one
precise and distinct profile, seems to express itself across a 'plurality' of
profiles which are related and, at times, overlapping, because the borders
which characterise them are not always clear-cut."229
Further data from the same Poster Institute survey of January 1993 in Diamanti's
book is shown in Table 5.3 below, to back up this 'normalisation' assertion:
Table 5.3230
Northern League Vote by Gender & Age (% of sample and sub-sample)
Northerners 'Leghisti' 'Lombardi' 'Veneti'
Male 48 51 56 48
Female 52 49 44 52
Age:
18-35 41 45 49 39
36-50 28 26 26 25
>50 31 30 25 36
N= 660 145 78 67
This data suggests that the previous male bias of League supporters had waned with
no significant gender imbalance amongst 'leghisti' in 1992, although there was a
considerable gap in Lombardy, made up by a female preponderance in the Veneto.
There is, however, still a noticeable trend for League supporters to belong to younger
age cohorts. This is particularly pronounced in Lombardy with just under half of
those interviewed being under 35 (unfortunately the Italian norms in age cohorts
differ from the more specific British measures, thus preventing direct comparison).
In the Veneto there is a more even spread of support across age which may be a
229 I. Diamanti in R. Mannheimer (1991) op. cit. p. 166.
230 I. Diamanti (1993) op. cit. p. 98, Table 7.
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function of the Liga Veneta's longer history. Diamanti's data also revealed a
tendency for League supporters to lack advanced educational qualifications, with
leghisti being only half as likely as the general public to have a university degree.
Data from the revised 1995 version of Diamanti's book seems to contradict some of
these trends, as Table 5.4 below makes clear:
Table 5.4231
League Vote by Gender, Age and Educational Qualification











No/Elementary Qualification 11 10
Ordinary Qualification 39 35
Advanced Qualification 45 43
Degree Qualification 5 12
N= 115 1339
These figures confirm the bias toward a youthful age group with the League
attracting significantly more than average votes from those below thirty. They also
back up the portrayal of League voters as slightly less well educated than the norm.
However, the figures suggest that in 1995 the gender gap previously seen to narrow
had returned to the league vote to suggest male bias as an enduring facet of the
Northern League vote.
231 This data comes from an IPSO survey for T1 Corriere Delia Sera' directed by Renato
Mannheimer in January 1995 involving almost 3,000 respondents. The columns show the
League voters contrasted to all voters in the North (defined as far south as Tuscany). The
data is quoted in I. Diamanti (1995) "La Lega - Geografia. Storia e Sociologia di un Soggetto
Politico" Table 9, p.163 & Table 10, p.164.
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In general the picture presented is of a fairly normal electorate with small deviations
on gender, age and education. The 'leghisti' do not inhabit some kind of quasi-
subcultural ghetto. Mirroring the complexity of their former votes and their attitudes
to identity, the League's sociological make-up can be seen to be anything but
simplistic causing Mannheimer to conclude that:
"As has been underlined in the past, the choice of voting for the League is not
reducible to one single characteristic, but is determined by the simultaneous
marriage of a series of attachments, characteristics and orientations"232
5.4 The League and Voting Models
How best can we understand the League in terms of voting-behaviour models? In
this context the specificity of the first Italian Republic must be noted. As earlier
discussed in Chapter Three, the party-voter relationship was very stunted by the two
dominant subcultures and by the patron-client relationship which held sway
especially in the South. The strong Catholic and Communist links meant that the
Italian system developed a subcultural form of voting behaviour. The Italian case can
be discussed more generally as part of the ' dominant identity' model of voting
where membership of a social group is a more important determinant of voting than
any 'rational actor' considerations, in that voting becomes equivalent to an
affirmation of belonging.233 Thus the Republic was characterised by defined zones
of 'red' and 'white' subcultural voting, the latter being supplemented in the South by
the clientelistic exchange vote. The fact that deviations from this pattern were termed
'votes of opinion' confirms the fact that identity and belonging was more important
than individual motive for many Italians in the bulk of the elections held since the
Second World War.
232 R. Mannheimer (1993) op. cit. p.271.
233 For a definitive account of the various types of vote see A. Parisi and G. Pasquino
'Relazioni Partiti-Elettori e Tipi di Voto' in G. Pasquino (1985) (ed.) "II Sistema Politico
Itahano" pp.74-97.
141
Situating the League in this context is confusing because it is both symptomatic of
and causal in the break-down of subcultural stability. Thus from the terrorism-filled
years of the late 1970s, there was evidence of an erosion of the dominance of
subcultural votes in the decline of vote share of the Christian Democrats(DC) and
Communist(PCI) parties. Concomitant to this, there was a rise in abstention levels
and the tentative emergence of new parties such as the Greens and the Pensioners
party in the early 1980s. There was some room for the League to emerge then and, as
mentioned earlier, much of the initial appeal in the Veneto was to disaffected
Christian Democrats. However the explosion of the League to over three million
votes in the North in the early 1990s then helped to bring about the collapse of post¬
war norms which saw the complete disappearance of both the DC and the PCI. How
then should the League be explained in the explicit appeal it made to voters?
The initial analyses of the League situated it very much in the 'protest' model, and
comparisons were drawn with the short-lived post-war L'Uomo Qualunque Party.234
However the associated attributes of extreme voter volatility and a lack of party
identification are challenged both by the growth of the League at each successive
election through the late 1980s and 1990s and also by Corbetta's analysis which
suggest a high percentage of his sample voted again for the League, indicative of at
least some degree of affiliation. Undoubtedly there was and is an element of protest
in the League's vote, as there is for any non-establishment party, but it is not enough
to wholly explain its endurance well beyond the stage of being a simple 'flash' party.
234 ThiS literally translates as the Common Man's Front - it came to the fore in the aftermath
of the Second World War and obtained over amillion votes and 30 deputies in the 1948
election. Its main appeal lay in the South amongst the peasantry who were very anti-
centralist and resented the post-war agricultural reforms, and with whom its leader,
Giannini's, campaigns on behalf of the 'ordinary Italian' struck a chord. It did not endure,
however, and its only lasting contribution came in the bequeathing of the term 'cjualunquista'
meaning a cynic or potential fascist. It is in the application of this insult to Bossi's party that
some have drawn the comparison between the League and the Front but there is little to
substantively connect them - see Ginsborg (1990) op. cit. pp.99-100.
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Many in the Italian press and beyond predicted that 1996, like 1994 before it, would
see the demise of the League but instead they claimed more votes than ever.
Other explanations of the League have looked at the degree to which it has managed
to become an 'identity' party itself, creating some sort of new cleavage. On such a
reading the League filled the vacuum which the collapse of the old order left and
with its spin-off organisations, party paper and extensive merchandise operation set
about creating its own quasi-subculture with associated changes in values. Paolo
Natale in his chapter analysing the territorial dispersal of the vote in Mannheimer's
analysis of the Lombard League was struck by the uniformity of its spread outwards
from the epicentres of the mid-1980s till it stretched all the way across the North by
the early-1990s, such that:
"The quality of this diffusion (of votes) presents some resemblance with the
type of territorial base, for example, of the 'red' or 'white' zones : this can
therefore be interpreted as a signal of a phenomenon which could, in the
next few years, turn into the formation of a new territorial, political
culture."235
However the evidence of the intervening years is not conclusive, the League is still a
major party of the North but, after 1994 and the entry of Forza Italia, it was no
longer on an unstoppable rise. Diamanti has termed March 1994 as marking the
League as 'a party for the peripheries' which was concentrated in "the zones in
which the league phenomenon had seen its first affirmation".236 The jury is still out
on the territorial nature of the 1996 elections but the figures reported earlier point to
a wide coverage suggesting one can argue for the growth of a Rokkan-esque schism
between centre and periphery as explanatory of recent voting patterns. As with the
'protest' model it is likely that the 'identity' model explains some but not all of the
League's appeal. As Pasquino says : "The regionalist cleavage, or centre-periphery,
is for the League only a pretext, or rather a point of departure."237
235 p Nataie jn p. Mannheimer (1991) op. cit. p.104.
236 I. Diamanti (1994) op. cit. p. 675.
232 G. Pasquino (1991) 'Meno Partito Piu Lega' p. 557.
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This leaves a much more 'materialist' conception of the League's vote - put simply
this would contend that the League's rise is fundamentally tied up with economic
concerns. The most relevant voting model here would normally be the 'relative
deprivation' one, although it may seem at first glance to be inappropriate for the
North of Italy which represents one of the most prosperous regions of the European
Union. However the vital factor in this model is the feeling of relative deprivation
and the concomitant belief that it is an unnecessary consequence of the political
situation, most commonly of centralist mismanagement. To avoid a confusion of
terms due to the connotations of the concept of relative poverty, one can rephrase it
as 'potential wealth'. This term captures the idea that despite being apparently
affluent, a region can still feel some kind of collective, relative poverty when
compared to the standard of what could have been.
Support for this line of argument comes from the research conducted by Renato
Mannheimer into the League's electorate in the 1992 general election.238 He uses
correlations to quantify the most important factors in the decision to vote for the
League, as compared to other parties. He finds economic and fiscal factors the most
useful in distinguishing leghisti, followed by a distrust of politicians and Southerners
and then by the age of the interviewee, thus:
"This factor [economics] is shown to be the best in distinguishing the
League's electors from those of other parties. Added to this, though with less
weight, there is evidence for the importance of distrust in politicians and
Southerners and for the role of youthful age."239
Pride in one's region of residence distinguishes only one in five League voters, which
represents only a quarter of the number (78%) distinguished by economic factors,
although it must be noted that Italians of all complexions have retained a strong
sense of locality since unification, which may explain this lack of explanatory power.
238 R. Mannheimer (1993) op. cit.
239 Ibid. p. 271.
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Mannheimer adds the rider that there are many whose votes are not explained by the
factors outlined which he attributes to the composite nature across the political
spectrum of the League's support.
An economics-based argument can thus be made that through the constant
redistribution from North to South under the centralised state, institutionalised under
the Christian Democrats as the 'Cassa per il Mezzogiorno' (The Southern Fund),
Northerners feel 'relatively deprived' in the sense that they could have been a lot
richer without this type of drain. Certainly the League's rhetoric makes much of the
Southern albatross around the Northerners' neck and its effect on the North's
'potential wealth' and place at the core of Europe. However previous parties had
campaigned for wholesale fiscal reform without achieving significant electoral
success. It is in the interaction of this economic argument with the revival of
territorial identity that the specificity of the League is to be found. The League was
fortunate in the timing of international events, especially the ending of the Cold War
which hammered further nails into the subcultural coffin already under construction
in the 1980s. However it still had to capitalise on these circumstances, but in
Gallagher's words, it did just this: "The League has built up an electoral constituency
by turning regional identity into a new political resource and identifying a series of
threats felt to endanger the economic prosperity and cultural identity of Northern
Italy."240
Finally, mention should be made of the 'new social movements' voting theory which
follows the Inglehart line of post-industrial politics where social movements replace
staid political parties and attract young, middle class egalitarian adults in mature
democracies. This argument stands in stark contrast to that just outlined for it would
situate the League's voters as post-materialist in their value orientation. Whilst the
240 J Gallagher (1992a) 'The Rise of the Regional Leagues in Italy' p.66.
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League's voter profile does reveal an attraction of the young and the middle classes,
it seems hard to sustain that their primary motivation is post-material when economic
well-being remains so central a plank.241 Their voter profile may be progressive but
the content of their message is in some ways reactionary. However the penultimate
section of this chapter will argue that Inglehart does have relevance to Italy when one
also considers the critiques of his theory. Italy has seen one of the most rapid
developments in per capita GDP242 in the post-war era and such far reaching changes
have not bypassed value systems. The problem comes in disentangling material and
identity motives from values, particularly when one is dealing with as electorally
promiscuous a party as the League has been.
There is no one voting model which explains adherence to the League, rather a
complex matrix of motives supplemented by the League's own marriage of protest,
identity, belonging, economics and a feeling of some sort of potential affluence,
notwithstanding the region's comparative prosperity. The League then has managed
to interweave many different values into a coherent political message. It is not
simply an ethno-regionalist party, nor a protest party, nor an anti-system party, rather
it is all of these things and more and it manages to combine these different facets in
an inclusionist manner. It has managed to turn the geographical limitations it faced
into a powerful electoral asset. The Northern League stands as the one party to
successfully bridge the gap between the last years of the First Republic and the first
years of its successor. Through its pragmatism and adaptation it is in prime position
to answer the desires of those Italian citizens who want greater autonomy for the
241 Evidence for this economic attitude can be found in numerous surveys, for example
Martnheimer presents CNR survey findings which show 66% of leghisti believing that taxes
should stay in the region where they are paid, as opposed to 36% of the public at large - see
R. Mannheimer (1993) op. cit. Table 5 p. 263.
242 However the GDP per capita is hugely unbalanced between North and South, for
instance 1990 figures which take the Italian average to be 100 show Lombardy to be above
130 and Sicily and Calabria to be between 50 and 70 - see [The Economist 'Until the Fat Lady
Sings' - A Survey of Italy, 26/6/93],
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North, whether they hold a materialist or post-materialist outlook. Vitally these
citizens do not represent a very closeted, unrepresentative group, rather they mirror
closely the broad cross-section of Scots who also desire greater autonomy, as the
next section will make clear.
5.5 Nationalists with a capital 'N'
The period in which the SNP is to be explicitly studied is from the 1970s onwards
and the resources for comparison across this time are ample with the boosted
Scottish Election Surveys of 1974, 1979 and 1992. It is fair to say that whilst the
SNP didn't quite explode onto the political scene at quite the same rate as the
Northern League; it certainly emerged quickly after forty unspectacular years, when
it had been little more than a rump grouping. Thus its vote rose from 2.4 % of the
national vote in 1964 to 30.4% a decade later. Even when one takes the 10.7%
gained in 1964 in the seats contested, the expansion was remarkable and as earlier
shown in Chapter Four it caused large effects on the other Scottish political parties.
The October 1974 election was studied in depth by an Election Survey team and
their data provides much information on the make-up of the SNP's vote at the critical
time of its explosion onto the Scottish political scene. It was a vote characterised by
its youth, its masculinity and its social mobility, thus:
Table 5.5243
SNP Vote In October 1974 by Age and Gender (% by age cohort)
All Male Female
18 to 24 41.7 50.0 32.1
25 to 34 39.0 45.1 33.3
35 to 44 29.3 36.0 23.2
45 to 54 24.7 36.2 17.0
55 to 64 20.1 22.7 17.1
65 or over 16.8 16.1 16.3
Total 28.4 34.2 22.9
243 S. Kendrick (1983) op. cit. p. 42 Figures taken from the 1974 Scottish Election Survey -
percentages are for SNP share of total electors surveyed.
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These figures from Kendrick show the SNP dominant over Labour as the largest
party amongst both the 18-24 and the 25-34 age groups and the most striking piece
of data is the fact that one in two male voters aged between 18 and 24, and so very
likely to be first time voters in one of the two elections of 1974, voted for the SNP.
The gap between the male and female voters is also significant through all age
cohorts except the 65 or over one, yet as Kendrick says "this differential has received
remarkably little attention"244. It simply seemed to be accepted by commentators that
independence was somehow a more 'macho' policy option and so attracted a higher
male vote, mirroring the initial masculinity of the Northern League.
What of the social distribution of the SNP vote? Again the 1974 Scottish Election
Survey provides valuable data as Table 5.6 below shows:
Table 5.6245
Scottish National Party Vote in October 1974 by Social Class
(% by class strata in rows)
All Male Female
A 27 39 11
B 32 35 28
CIA 29 37 22
C1B 28 30 27
C2 32 39 24
D 23 24 23
All 28 34 23
This table shows a remarkable spread of SNP voters across all social classes with
only the female vote at the highest social grade standing out as significantly lower
than the vote share across the electorate. The contrast with other parties is instructive
as Table 5.7 with a four-party breakdown overleaf shows:
244 Ibid. p. 41.
24^ Ibid. p. 268 - again percentages are for share of total electors.
148
Table 5.7246
All Parties Votes by social class in October 1974 (% by row)
Conservative Labour Liberal SNP
A 45 15 13 27
B 40 16 13 32
CIA 41 22 7 29
C1B 31 31 10 28
C2 15 47 6 32
D 14 61 2 23
All 25 38 8 28
The spread of votes for the Conservative and Labour parties here is broadly in
inverse proportion and is very much in keeping with the class-based voting model
which has been dominant in explanations of the post-war British polity. However the
Scottish National Party stood very much outside this model, with an evenly-spread
'classless' vote. One is reminded here of Corbetta's 'flaking' metaphor in describing
the flow of votes to the Northern League - there was no one dominant sector of
society, nor party from which the SNP made its advance, rather its vote represented a
heterogeneous and volatile cocktail made up of several differently motivated mixers.
Such an analysis fits with the SNP's history both before and after its spectacular rise
of 1974. Before that time, most commentaries point to the SNP as an elitist, cultural
party with little mass appeal (an attitude backed up in interviews with older
activists). This started to change after the good by-election showings of the early
1960s, and the SNP could not have grown so quickly had its appeal not shifted and
widened (mirroring the Venetian League to Lombard League shift in the mid-1980s).
Likewise the manner in which the SNP vote slipped back in 1979 and 1983 is
suggestive of a fragile electorate, mobile and uncommitted to independence per se,
but which had used the SNP to try and hasten some constitutional reform. There was
no mass Pauline conversion to nationalism, rather a pragmatic use of Scotland's
four-party system. As Kendrick says:
Ibid. p. 268 Table 6.5 The size of the subsamples used are A-60; B-101; C1A-112; C1B-
120; C2-337 and D-183.
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"One could almost say that this suggests that the meaning of SNP voting is
largely to be found in the experience of a generation - a generation that
came to political maturity in the thirty years after the Second World War.
However, the rate of fluctuation of the SNP vote itself - from 11% in 1970
to a peak of 30% in October 1974 and back down to 17% in 1979 - was far
too great to be explicable in terms of the differing political beliefs of
successive cohorts of voters"247
In the 1970s then the SNP was in a situation very anomalous to the Northern League
in the early 1990s, appealing to disaffected voters right across the partisan spectrum
but not necessarily for the same reasons and on the same values. But after its
disappointments of 1979 and 1983 it emerged a more self-consciously party of the
left, although the data from the 1992 Scottish Election Survey seems to suggest that
the SNP is still difficult to situate definitively on the traditional left-right spectrum,
even for its own supporters.248 However the SNP has to face a factor unknown to the
League which is explicit constitutional competition. One of the most striking features
of Table 4.4 reported in the previous chapter is the durability of the Labour vote in
the 1990s - it remains entrenched around the 40% figure and brings Labour
disproportionate reward in terms of seats won.249 The SNP rise in the 1990s then can
hardly be said to have come at the expense of Labour, yet it is this party which the
SNP sets about with the greatest vitriol. This in itself is a natural stance given the
SNP's self-positioning since the loss of its 1974 constituency. A by-product of this
repositioning has been an increased animosity with its main rival Labour and in
recent elections the direct campaigning against each other has reached vitriolic
proportions, as the sectarian element in the 1994 Monklands by-election clearly
illustrated.250
247 Ibid. p. 44.
248 J. Brand et.al. (1994a) op. cit. p. 620 Table 2 summed up that "amongst its own voters it
has not had as much success as might be expected. A large proportion of SNP voters placed
their party neither on the left nor the right.".
249 Of the seats available Labour won 68% at the 1992 general election, 75 % at the 1994
European elections and 53% at the 1995 regional elections.
250 The May 1994 regional elections saw an explicit attempt to replace the Labour party as
the choice of working-class Scots. It is a strategy highlighted in the following SNP regional
election leaflet: "Labour a once great political party, founded by women and men of
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The biggest problem for the SNP in the scenario outlined is that it is not the
dominant party, indeed it is the antithesis of such since it is striving to break the
status quo. Thus it has undoubtedly had an influence on the Labour Party in making
it much more committed in the 1990s than it ever has been to the fundamentals of
devolution, as their involvement in the Constitutional Convention makes clear.
However in then trying to prise away voters from that party to its programme of
'Independence in Europe' it faces a twofold problem. Firstly its combative approach
entrenches many Labour partisans - there is tangible hatred between the parties as
my interviews with SNP activists make clear.251 Such aggression makes future
defection in either direction very difficult (hence its headline news status if it occurs
as when Isobel Lindsay left the SNP for Labour over the former's non-participation
in the Constitutional Convention), for Gallagher:
"The level of aggression the SNP directs at its chief foe is in danger of
discrediting politics as a worthwhile activity from which citizens can expect
a better future... The SNP may unwittingly, through its aggressive tactics,
have reinforced the existing party boundaries in Scotland during a period
when they could have been more flexible."252
What has happened sociologically to the SNP vote since the 1970s? Table 5.8 shows
the gender findings of the Scottish Election Surveys in 1974, 1979 and 1992
supplemented by MORI polls from 1984 and 1989 (there was no Scottish booster to
the British Election Surveys of 1983 and 1987):
principle and compassion, dedicated to changing society, is now transformed into a sterile
electoral machine, with no vision, abandoning principles for the sake of power, yet
delivering nothing for Scotland." Meanwhile Salmond made his opinion very clear
addressing a rally of young nationalists in 1989 "It is only through undermining the Labour
Party in Scotland that we can achieve our objectives" quoted in T. Gallagher (1991) op. cit.
p.119.
251 For instance "The Constitutional Convention was set up basically by the Labour party
to stymie us, we could have a Labour government in Scotland now regardless of the result of
the last general election, the fact is that the Labour Party in Scotland prefers a British Tory
government to a Scottish Labour government."
"Scotland gets branded as a region, we are a nation, we're the oldest nation in this
hemisphere but the Westminster government and the so-called Scottish Labour Party
believes that we're a region.".
252 p Gallagher (1991) op. cit. p.6.
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Table 5.8253







Given the relative closeness of the sampling sizes in these different snapshots of
opinion, one can see that there has been a normalising of the gender difference over
time. Both the male and female vote-share declined dramatically in the late 1970s
and the early 1980s as the SNP suffered the backlash from the 1979 fiasco. Both
have since recovered with 1989's slight female lead having been overhauled by
1992, although both of these differences are within the sampling error margin. It
could be argued that the SNP seems to possess a larger potential male vote, having
reached one-third of Scottish males in October 1974, whereas the female maximum
was one quarter, albeit in 1989. Certainly the large differences seen in the early
1970s are no longer a dominant feature of its vote.
What has happened to the class make-up of the SNP vote over the same time period?
Table 5.9 uses the same sources to evidence the class make-up of the SNP's vote
over time:
Table 5.9254







2^3 These figures come from A. Brown, D. McCrone & L. Paterson (1996) "Politics and
Society in Scotland" p.147 Table 7.3. The relevant sample sizes, given as male, female are as
follows : 1974 - 550,488; 1979 - 306,332; 1984 - 373,456; 1989 - 464, 457 and 1992 377, 439.
254 ibid. p.151 Table 7.6. Here the sample sizes are (non-manual, manual): 1974 - 392, 646;
1979 - 249,392; 1984 - 265, 564; 1989 - 317, 604; 1992 - 406, 410.
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Here the gender fall in party support is mirrored with the substantial mid-1980's dip
in both non-manual and manual support. However more of note is the move toward a
more non-manual base, although again one must express caution as to sampling
error. These figures certainly lend credence to the SNP becoming a more left-wing
party due to its explicit battle with the Labour Party in the bulk of Scottish seats. To
try and provide a more detailed picture of the trends over the last few years Table
5.10 overleaf summarises opinion poll findings over that period:
Table 5.10255
SNP Opinion Poll Ratings by Gender, Age and Social Class (%)
MORI All Male Female 18-24 25-34 35-54 55+ AB CI C2 DE
Feb. 1989 24 23 25 27 27 25 19 21 23 22 27
Feb. 1990 17 16 18 23 20 18 11 7 19 20 16
ICM All Male Female 18-34 35-64 65+ AB/C1 C2 DE
Sep. 1991 19 20 18 23 17 15 15 19 22
Jan. 1992 21 27 15 24 22 14 19 25 20
Apr. 1992 19 21 18 29 17 7 19 25 16
Jun. 1994 24 26 22 29 22 21 24 27 22
Feb. 1995 19 22 16 20 20 15 16 21 21
These figures show that the SNP still retains an age bias, but it is far less pronounced
than in the 1970s and the latest February 1995 poll shows the same level of support,
20%, for both the 18-34 and 35-64 cohorts. There is also a gender difference in the
ICM figures, although the MORI polls give a small majority of female supporters.
The difference in recent ICM polls is larger than that for age or social class, causing
McCrone to conclude that : "the SNP, uniquely among the parties in Scotland,
continues to appeal less successfully to women than to men."256 However the
discrepancy seems less stark than in the 1970s and, as the MORI polls and the
255 xhe first two polls quoted here are MORI opinion polls and the rest ICM ones
(borrowed from David McCrone's collection). The percentages are SNP proportions of the
total interviewed. Unfortunately the age and class cohorts are measured slightly differently
by these two different companies, but broad comparisons can still be made. These polls all
involved a sample of just over 1,000 people in between 30 and 40 Scottish constituencies -
their headline voting figures are reported in the newspapers but these figures come from the
detailed cross-tabulation tables.
256 David McCrone (1994c) 'Opinion Polls in Scotland July 1994-June 1995' p. 142.
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Scottish Election Surveys quoted in Table 5.7 show, it is fairly fluid. Finally when
broken down in social class the SNP's vote is still well distributed, there are
problems of direct comparison because of the different categories used in defining
class, but it still seems true to say that the SNP garners votes from across the social
spectrum if to a lesser extent than when it exploded in the 1970s, whilst the Labour
Party attracts around twice as many voters as the SNP in the battleground DE cohort,
and is still more skewed towards a class base.
The second problem which the SNP has traditionally faced and the League has not,
on top of Labour hegemony, is the even more troublesome one that it has yet to win
over a majority of Scots to support of independence. Apart from a 'Scotsman' poll of
January 1992 in which the total favouring the different options of independence
totalled more than 50%, thus setting off a media frenzy, there has been no evidence
that the majority of Scots favour the independence option. In fact on the contrary the
body of evidence suggests that the largest proportion of Scots want devolution and
Table 5.11 below summarises the attitudes toward constitutional reform shown from
1974 until 1992 :
Table 5.11257
Preferences for Constitutional Change (%)
Independence Home Rule Status Quo
1974 21 44 34
1979 7 54 26
1984 25 45 27
1989 34 49 15
1992 23 50 24
Thus there has been a consolidation through the 1980s and the early 1990s of the
independence option, with the dip in 1992 coming after the intense constitutional
debate in the run-up to the general election. However the home rule or devolution
257 A. Brown et al.(1996) op. cit. p.152 Table 7.7 The sample sizes are 1974 - 1175; 1979 - 729;
1984 - 962; 1989 - 1054 and 1992 - 957. " 'Independence' refers to options which mentioned
that word or 'separation'. 'Home Rule' refers to any other type of directly elected assembly
or parliament.".
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option is clearly the most consistent performer as the option favoured by roughly half
of all Scots. It was the status quo which fell back as independence surged in 1989,
not the home rule option. The situation is worsened for the SNP by its own failure to
win a majority of those who favour independence. For example in an ICM poll from
April-May 1996, the SNP had 25% of its supporters favouring and 6% the status quo
whilst the other three parties had significant minorities choosing independence
within the European Union, the SNP's policy as their favourite choice.258 There are
then many electors who favour independence but don't back the SNP, as Newman
says:
"The SNP is still unable to mobilise adequately the independence vote. In the
glory days of 1974, 60.5% of independence supporters voted SNP. By May
1979 that number had dropped to 49.2%. In March 1991 approximately 29%
of all supporters of independence would vote SNP."259
There is danger here of becoming over-reliant on single pieces of evidence but the
trend is definitely apparent, for instance in the Herald/System Three opinion poll of
January 1995 the SNP got 43% of the preferences of those who said they favoured its
policy of independence within Europe, but the Labour Party got 51% of this same
group, a fact initially obscured because of relative party sizes.260 This lack of fit
between constitutional preference and voting has always been a thorn in the SNP's
side. Since 1974 the SNP has struggled both to make its own supporters favour
independence and to make all those in favour of independence vote for it, however
the move away from the status quo reported in Table 5.10 above does provide some
succour, As Brown et. al. make clear:
"..it seems reasonable to say that someone who expresses support for
independence is fairly determined about constitutional change. In other
words, the most cautious interpretation of the rise in the support for the
independence option...is that it tells us about the strength of support for
some type of Scottish parliament, even if not necessarily about the strength
ICM poll April-May 1996 with a sample size of 1,000. Those in favour of independence
as their constitutional option were Conservative-17%, Labour-29%, SNP-67% and Liberal-
13%.
259 S. Newman (1992) op. cit. p.27.
260 See Herald/System Three Poll on Scottish Self-Govemment of January 1995, p.5.
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of the parliament that would be supported." 261
Thus the 1990's Scottish polity is far more complex than the 1970's one with many
more constitutional options on offer and the SNP an established player, rather than a
new entrant. This endogenous change has made it more difficult for the SNP to
appear distinct, a change predicted by Kendrick when writing about the 1970s, thus:
"It is this historical specificity of the experience which produced the SNP
surge which makes looking into the future all but impossible. What is
certain is that whatever the form in which the Scottish dimension is
manifested in the future, it will inevitably be quite different from the
confident surge which this study has attempted to understand. That is the
only inevitability." 262
National identity is now a key concept in Scottish politics but one must consider all
the four parties as in some ways Scottish. The Labour, Liberal-Democrat and
Conservative parties all have distinctive organisations from the British parties and
the SNP certainly has no monopoly on the Scottish identity, as the evidence has
shown. It has long outlived the honeymoon period which the Northern League in
Italy found itself in until 1994 - a vital difference to be taken into account in the
analysis of the two of them and their activists and supporters which the next chapter
will undertake. However in terms of the heterogeneity of their vote and its spread
across the partisan spectrum, this section has shown the Scottish National Party to
bear considerable similarities to the Northern League. The next section will ask
whether these similarities extend into the realm of which voting models best explain
the SNP.
5.6 The SNP and Voting Models
Much of the work in assessing the SNP in terms of the same voting behaviour
models which were earlier applied to the Northern League has already been done by
261 A. Brown et. al. (1996) op. cit. p. 132.
2^2 s. Kendrick (1983) op. cit. p.386.
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Jack Brand and his colleagues in a series of articles looking at the SNP and its import
on the Scottish political system. Of most relevance is their article in 'Political
Studies' in 1994 in which they use data from the 1992 Scottish Election survey to
assess the protest, identity, new social movements and relative deprivation models.
Saul Newman sees the SNP as simply one of many examples of failed single-issue,
protest movements such that:
"..the decline of the SNP tends to foreshadow a revolving door of single-issue
movements that enter the political arena, partially transform political
perceptions and the popularity of political issues, and then recede,
eventually to be replaced by new movements emphasising new issues. The
traditional political actors may be enlightened by the process but remain
largely intact."263
In reply to Newman and his specific claim that the SNP decline occurred because
voters lacked sufficient loyalty, Brand et. al. show his 'protest' model to explain only
a small minority of SNP voters. The level of party affiliation is only slightly below
that of the Labour and Conservative parties and still represented a majority of SNP
voters in 1992, whilst only 29% of the SNP voters professed a proclivity toward
another party. Meanwhile the length of time which the SNP has participated as a
valid member of a four-party system suggests that it is definitely not a simple 'flash'
protest party, indeed it can be argued that one of its problems lies in being too much
a part of the establishment.
As for the 'new social movements' model, the SNP is very much a political party in
its structure, though it would probably claim itself to be less hierarchical than its
rivals. Its voters are certainly younger in profile and have sympathy with post-
materialist concerns such as nuclear disarmament, the ecology and equal
opportunities, but : "..the pattern of support for the SNP does, however, appear to
have changed. In 1974 the SNP polled equally well amongst both middle-class and
working-class identifiers, but in 1992 its support was noticeably higher amongst the
263 S. Newman (1992) op. cit. p. 31.
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working-class."264 Any SNP sympathies with post-material values does not extend to
putting them anywhere near the top of their salience list in 1992 which was still
dominated by issues such as unemployment, the poll tax, standard of living and the
social issue giants, education and health.265 Most importantly SNP supporters are
indistinguishable from their Labour counterparts under this model and so it cannot be
said to possess adequate explanatory power, in terms of value changes being the
chief causal factor in voting for the SNP.
Likewise perhaps the most intuitively plausible theory, namely the 'identity' model,
struggles to separate SNP and Labour supporters. For instance, in the 1992 Scottish
Election Survey 38% of those who saw themselves as Scottish not British voted SNP
but 31% of this cohort voted for the Labour Party. Similarly if one resorts to the class
identity which so dominated British politics in the post-war years, there is little to
separate the parties either in 'objective' or 'subjective' class terms and nor do
attitudes to constitutional reform explain the SNP's vote. This is the peril of
competing in a system in which the SNP itself has caused two of its three major
competitors to be neo-nationalists. The argument now is not over whether change in
governance should occur, but rather what type of change it should be, with even the
Conservatives participating in the debate since the end of 1995. This is 'Nationalism'
with a capital 'N' versus 'nationalism' with a small 'n', as Brand says: "..a major
problem for the SNP is that the basic Scottish identity, to which the Nationalists want
to appeal, is felt almost as strongly by Labour voters as by those who choose the
SNP."266
264 J. Brand et.al. (1994a) op. cit. p. 219 - de facto the SNP vote does seem to have become
more concentrated amongst traditionally left-wing voters. What this might suggest is a
decline in the number of those who associate themselves with the left or the working class.
265 This evidence comes from an ICM Survey of March 1992 which asked the question
"What two or three issues will be most important to you in deciding which party to vote for
in the next general election?' The constitutional question came seventh equal with housing
and the first 'post'-material issue was the environment in eleventh position.
266 Brand et. al (1994b) 'Social Constituency and Ideological Profile : Scottish Nationalism
in the 1990s' p. 616.
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For Brand and his colleagues, whilst elements of all the models need to be included
to furnish the full picture, the most explanatory power comes in a 'relative
deprivation' model with the added proviso of what type of constitutional change
would rectify the deprivation. Thus whilst relative deprivation itself, like the other
factors mentioned, fails to separate SNP and Labour voters, when independence is
added there is a statistically significant difference:
"We must conclude from these models that it is a feeling of sociotropic
relative deprivation based on evaluations of the past that are the most useful
in characterising SNP voters...to explain SNP support one requires a sense
of community deprivation along with a feeling that constitutional change
would help redress the balance."267
It can be argued, however, that SNP rhetoric couches the relative deprivation
argument in much the same 'potential affluence' terms as the Northern League.
There is much talk of the loss of oil and tax revenues to Westminster and a focus on
the potential wealth of all Scotland's natural resources, were they not constantly
plundered. Scotland, as the next chapter will illustrate, could be a rich, successful
European nation, like Denmark, in the SNP's world-view.
Thus the picture of complexity built up in analysing League voters is replicated in
looking at the SNP. No one theory dominates and the picture is one of different
layers of motive and meaning being filtered through both these parties. Somewhat
paradoxically, it seems that it was easier to argue the SNP as being post-materialist
in the 1970s than in the 1990s despite the ongoing generational shift which has been
occurring. However the sociotropic (concern for one's society and self) rather than
egocentric (concern for oneself in society) trait reported above, along with the
presence of at least some post-materialist values, show the picture to be a far from
simple one. This chapter will be concluded by considering to what extent the
267 Ibid. p. 628.
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Scottish National Party and the Northern League can be said to represent simple
protest movements or deeper, new schisms in their societies.
5.7 New Cleavages or Old Protest?
Both Italy and Britain with their subcultural and class-based cleavages had long
established voting patterns which were not going to disappear overnight and deep
recessions in both the early 1980s and early 1990s did little to lessen material
concerns. Where Inglehart is useful is in trying to understand some of the stimulus to
the initial challenges to these systems. Both the Northern League and the Scottish
National Party were characterised when they emerged by an overt youthfulness in
their vote which fits his theory of generational replacement. There is evidence that
both also cut across traditional cleavages and garnered votes from across the political
and social spectrum. The image of being outwith the traditional spectrum at a point
equidistant from all, conjured up by Corbetta, may have lost some relevance as the
SNP has self-consciously pursued Labour votes, but it has not lost all as Corbetta's
and Brand's evidence on the difficulty in placing the Northern League and the SNP
respectively on the left-right spectrum shows. The extent to which they have created
new cleavages will require assessment over a longer time period, but the interim
evidence of the 1990s suggests that both have introduced the element of territory to
their polities in a substantial way.
It is difficult to sustain the argument that these parties are post-materialist when
confronted with the salience of economic factors in the genesis of both parties (a type
of relative deprivation which has been termed the 'potential wealth' model). It can be
argued that the salience of materialist concerns are so high in Scotland and Northern
Italy because of the perceived injustices from the controlling centre and votes for
both parties definitely contain an element of protest against the centre. However it is
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an enduring form of protest with considerable loyalty which seems to suggest that
they represent something beyond simple protest.
Both Scotland and Northern Italy have yet, for many of their citizens, to reach their
perceived level of material satiation, because they have been constrained within
mismanaging centralist states and so have not explicitly passed to the 'post'-material
phase. However the fact that both are, de facto, relatively affluent regions of the
world, means that some of their citizens have achieved such a state, hence the
sympathy for some post-materialist issues such as the environment and women's
rights in both places.
Inglehart's idea of 'post-materialism' it seems is best used in setting the scene for
both movements, in the sense that rises in material and physical security helped
create the environment for the decline of traditional parties. The 'silent revolution' in
values helped in creating a cleaner slate in both Scotland and Northern Italy and so
helped create the vital political space which both have exploited. However it is a
revolution that certainly the parties in question and those who vote for them, either
permanently or periodically, see as essentially unfinished because of their lack of
autonomy.
One crucial question to which the remaining chapters of this thesis will be addressed
is to what extent contemporary autonomy movements can themselves be seen as part
of this revolution. Are they an accompaniment to the economic and social changes of
post-war Europe or a conservative reaction to it?
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5.8 Summary
The last two chapters have looked explicitly at the two parties to be compared in this
thesis. By closely examining the partisan histories and the sociological make-up of
the Italian Northern League and the Scottish National Party, they have shown several
salient traits which both share. Neither party is a simple, protest party - both attract
heterogeneous social class backing, which suggests an appeal to some sort of
umbrella identity or a positioning outwith the traditional left-right spectrum. Both
parties seemed initially to display a tendency to appeal to male voters, though this
factor has declined in size as they have remained on the political scene. More
permanent seems to be the proclivity toward younger age cohorts of both parties,
suggestive that both have benefited, at least, from the generational aspects of post-
materialism and the dealignments which both the Italian and British systems have
undergone in the last few decades. However the most convincing explanations for
the emergence of both the Scottish National Party and the Italian Northern League
remain those based on material, economic concerns and the ways in which the
perceived potential wealth can be achieved.
A large question has then been raised, namely, to what extent post-materialist
concerns would be unlocked by the materialist key of greater autonomy which will
require more research if and when the goals are achieved. The endurance of both
parties suggests that they represent something deeper than simple protest vehicles.
Voters may not have as definite an identity as the parties espouse but the SNP and
the League can both be said to have tapped into something with which hundreds of
thousands of voters identify
The next chapter will seek to answer the questions raised here and to provide the
evidence that the movements of the late twentieth century under consideration within
162
the context of the European Union are qualitatively very different from those which
traditionally have been analysed as nationalist movements.
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CHAPTER SIX -
TNSIDE THE PARTIES -
A COMPARISON OF POLICIES AND RHETORICS
6.1 Thematic Overview
This chapter will seek to build on the historical and sociological analysis already
undertaken in Chapters Three, Four and Five. It aims to build up a thorough picture
of the Scottish National Party and the Northern League through two main sources.
These are an examination of party literature and pamphlets, accompanied by party
pronouncements reported in the respective written media and the use of interviews
conducted with party activists in both countries which will be supplemented by a
continued use of the secondary data which has already been utilised in previous
chapters. Rather than go through these sources one-by-one, the preferred approach
will be a thematic one. The aim of this methodology is to provide evidence for some
of the arguments which the previous chapters have raised.
Specifically the issues to be examined are : the arguments over constitutional end
which can be discerned in both parties; the anti-centralism which is a cornerstone of
their rhetoric; their favourable attitudes toward the European Union and the
contradictions contained therein; their use of identity in presenting policies to the
voters; their ideological fluidity and their lack of fit on the traditional left-right
spectrum and the nature and rhetoric of their campaigns.
Whilst the broader societal setting of specific time and place will form the
background to the concluding analysis in Chapters Seven and Eight, this chapter
aims to show that these two areas have considerable overlap and that there is ground
for comparison of the two parties. An initial analysis of the two parties under
consideration may conclude that they differ greatly, the one being a centre-left party
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aiming for independence, the other a rightist party seeking a federal Italian state.
However this thesis contends that these interpretations are very simplistic, as the
previous chapters have sought to show, and not indicative of the true situation which
contains much similarity in motive, approach and it will be argued in aim.
Through an analysis of the sources outlined within a controlled triangulation
structure268, it is hoped to provide evidence for the qualitative difference of these
parties from both the traditional models of nationalism and also any distinct features
which they possess when compared to their competitors within contemporary party
systems. The penultimate chapter will then use this evidence to assess the strength of
the claim to provide a new model of nationalism within the European Union, which,
for the sake of distinction from previous theories, is best granted some degree of
terminological distinctiveness.
By analysing two of the most explicit European, electoral variants of modern
autonomist movements, we can begin to understand how salient a 'post-national'
identity may be as a 'home' in the contemporary European Union. The general
argument will continue to be informed by the fact that there can never be one
definitive explanation of nationalisms and identities because these concepts can
mean quite different things to different people at the same time and in the same
'imagined nation'.
268 por a fup explanation of 'triangulation' see C. Hakim (1987) op. cit. pp.144-145 "the
design of a research programme is much more solid if one can ensure that individual
projects are selected with a view to ensuring that both micro-level and macro-level
perspectives are covered - which means in practice that both large scale or national data will
be required as well as more focused and intensive studies.".
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6.2 Sources Used
What then will be the main empirical evidence used to assess the themes outlined?
Much use has been made already of the substantial poll and survey data available on
the sociological make-up of both parties' cohorts of supporters. It is hoped to gain a
more specific snapshot of the activists of both parties, comparing and contrasting
them to each other and also to the voters of both parties.
Another important element in gauging the onset of a new kind of politics is the
position of the parties as held up by its politicians. This will be analysed by a close
examination of both parties' literature and pamphlets since the 1980s. The British
tradition of summing up all policy positions in a comprehensive election manifesto is
not one which has been consistently pursued in Italy. Thus whilst the SNP's election
manifestos for 1983, 1987 and 1992 general elections and the 1989 and 1994
European elections can be referred to, the League's policy pronouncements have
tended to be on a slightly more ad hoc basis, though the publication of the party's
own paper since 1984 provides a valuable resource and the various regional leagues
have provided policy programmes which supplement those produced since the
Northern League's formation in 1991. Close study will be made of the rationale
behind any substantive changes in policy stance, for example the SNP's move from
'It's Scotland's Oil' in the 1970s to its 'Independence in Europe' stance of the late
1980s and early 1990s and the League's shift from a 'Republic of the North' to three
confederal 'macroregions' and beyond to its 1996 stance with secession to the fore.
At least as important as the parties' own writings is the transfer of these messages to
the public through the mass media, given that first-time voters or potential defectors
from other parties are highly unlikely to have had access to party propaganda.
McLuhan's famous phrase 'the medium is the message'269 suggests that the means in
269 See M. McLuhan (1967) "The Medium is the Message".
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which the content of a new party's programme is relayed through both electronic and
print media can have a crucial effect on its likelihood of success. For parties such as
the SNP and the League which are not at the centre of their dominant media and
indeed may be viewed as challenges to an established system, this can create
problems in even featuring on the agenda at times other than those of crisis. Scotland
is, however, relatively well off with two indigenous quality dailies 'The Scotsman'
and 'The Herald' which deal with both Scottish and British politics, and several TV
programmes dedicated to Scottish news and political affairs. Italy is more
centralised, with most of the quality press and television being national in coverage
and the spectre of Silvio Berlusconi's ownership of the three main commercial
channels and his placement of sympathisers in important positions on the public RAI
channels looms large. However, most of the quality dailies carry extensive local
supplements and with 'Corriere della Sera' based in Milan and its rival Roman-
based 'La Repubblica' providing equally extensive coverage of the League. Several
of these newspaper sources will be used in the course of this chapter.
6.3 Interviews with Party Activists270
Twenty-eight interviews were conducted with activists in the Scottish National Party
and the Italian Northern League. This number is obviously not enough to base
statistical calculations on. The constraints imposed by money, time and most of all
recalcitrance amongst SNP branch secretaries in responding to several enquiries
meant that any large-scale interview process was impossible within the remit of a
doctoral thesis. (The full frustrations and accompanying sense of achievement in
conducting the interviews are summed up in the Interview Commentary section of
Appendix I). However in the triangulation context outlined above, the data collected
270 The full text of the questions asked in the interviews appears in Appendix I of this
thesis.
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will be used to help the argument that despite the obvious differences between the
two movements, many of those convinced enough of their arguments to get actively
involved, have large similarities in motive and goal.
The interviews were tightly structured, so as to make comparisons between each
group with two different languages and cultural settings easier. The interviews
covered several different areas, thus :
- Basic information : Name, birthplace, age, occupation, when the respondent joined
the party, when the interviewee became involved as an activist and whether he or she
had ever been a member of any other political party.
- Motives for joining the party were explored by asking whether this decision had
ever been questioned, whether they were pleased or not with the progress made
during their membership, what their reaction in terms of continuing membership
would have been if London or Rome had conceded more in the past, which areas
they looked to for inspiration, what areas were seen as a prototype and if their party's
demands were primarily economic.
- Identity and the myths surrounding it followed with the 'Moreno' five-choice
question on identity being posed271, in what way (if any) their area was different
from the rest of the country, whether any differences derived from a different
identity, how long any distinctiveness had lasted and whether there was an ethnic
element to it.
271 See L. Moreno (1986) "Decentralisation in Britain and Spain" pp.439-442. Moreno uses
comparative data from Scottish and Catalan polls which ask the respondents to rate their
belonging as x, not y; more x then y; equally x and y; more y than x or y, not x where x=sub-
national identity and y= 'official' national identity.
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- Methods and Goals were examined next with questions on the type of society being
sought, what form autonomy would initially take, how they reacted to potential
alliance with parties who were also competitors, how much influence the individual
felt they had on party policy, whether the party had shifted its stance over time, how
the individual would react to a devolved settlement and how unified the party was
now, as compared to the past.
- International Environment provided the final topic with the interviewees quizzed on
how they reacted to the criticism that their party's policies would mean being
swallowed up and effectively replacing the disliked 'nation-states' with Brussels,
how nationalism had changed since 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, whether
these changes had helped the party in question and finally whether the activist had
heard of the SNP or the League. Also in this last section was a question on identity in
which the interviewee had to mark themselves on a linear scale with the poles being
the two identity choices previously given and the SNP activists were asked what they
thought of Settler Watch, whilst the League activists were asked about their reaction
to the regional reforms of the 1970s.
In general the interviews lasted between thirty and forty minutes, ranging from
twenty minutes to one hour. Two pilot interviews were conducted in December 1994
in Scotland which led to a few questions being dropped as they were obviously going
to be answered as part of other questions. The bulk of the fieldwork was then carried
out in Scotland in Glasgow in March and Edinburgh in May and in Italy in July and
August of 1995 in Vicenza, Verona and Brescia. In addition two further interviews
with women were held in Edinburgh in October 1995 to correct a gender imbalance
between the two groups - SNP women had to be actively sought out. One of the most
frustrating aspects of the whole interview process was the degree of self-selection
involved. At the outset SNP branches in Glasgow Govan, Aberdeen North, Peterhead
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and Perth & Kinross were written to but only the first of these offered their co¬
operation and a contact in the SNP in Edinburgh then had to be used to arrange more
interviews. The Northern League were much more co-operative - benefit deriving
from the 'flattering factor' of a foreign student being interested enough to come to
Italy and talk to them - and the only place which didn't reply was the Milanese
League branch. Seven interviews were conducted in the Veneto (Verona and
Vicenza) and seven in Lombardy (Brescia) to try and get a flavour of the diversity
between these two regions under the Northern League's umbrella.
The twenty-eight interviews, while small in number, are an important part of the
integrated research design. The intention is to use the interviews to illustrate points
made based on secondary literature and data sources such as opinion polls or party
literature. They comprise a snapshot of party sentiment during a particular year and
any comments made on specific questions are intended not as definitive statements
but rather as exploratory routes which may be followed up or left to be disproved by
further research. Full transcriptions of the interviews were made - a time-consuming
exercise but one which has been important to the analysis which follows.
Of the fourteen SNP respondents, eight were male and six were female and on the
League side there were nine men and five women. The ages of the SNP activists
ranged from 20 to 63, and for the League from 20 to 50.272 As regards membership
of other parties three SNP members had previously been in the Labour Party and two
League activists had been members of the small Liberal Party, one of the discredited
pentapartito coalition members through the 1980s and into the 1990s. Birthplaces
tended to be where the activists now lived especially in Italy (showing loyalty first
and foremost to the commune which several interviewees commented on), though
one League activist actually came from the South which is interesting given some of
272 The median age of SNP members was 38 and that of the League was 34.
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the claims made in the literature about the League's uncompromising, racist stance
and another came from Argentina, the daughter of Italian and Scottish parents. The
SNP had one activist born in South Africa, though again to expatriate parents. The
occupations were fairly well matched with the SNP group comprising four students,
two unemployed men, two retired people, one lecturer, one engineer, one security
officer, one nurse, one printer and one teacher; whilst in the League there were also
four students, two teachers, two entrepreneurs, one clerk, one doctor, one retired man
(a railwayman who retired at forty-five after thirty years service providing a good
example of why Italy is facing a pensions crisis), one local representative, one forest
engineer and one research assistant.
One of the most interesting responses came in reply to the question on identity. Of
the fourteen SNP activists all but one of them felt Scottish not British, and the sole
dissenter had lived in London for twenty or so years but still felt more Scottish than
British. On the League side nine of the fourteen interviewed felt Northern not Italian,
one felt more Northern than Italian, three felt equally Northern as Italian and one
gentleman insisted that neither description fitted him, he was instead a citizen of the
commune of Brescia. Whilst fewer League members than SNP expressed the
strongest identity choice, this still constituted a high proportion given the supposedly
tenuous existence of any Northern identity and the comparative youth of the concept
as compared to the Scottish identity and it is of considerable note that none of the
'Italians' interviewed gave preference to their 'official' national identity. As for the
year of joining : the SNP stretches back to 1961 up to 1993, whilst the Northern
League is much more recent with a span from 1990 up to 1993, although the median
year is 1990 for the SNP and 1991 for the League. This cannot be held to be
surprising given the different histories of the two parties, though the SNP had eight
of its activists joining in the same time-frame as the League.
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When it came to naming prototypes, the SNP activists were more forthcoming with
four citing Norway, two Denmark, two Quebec and two Spain and there was one
mention each for Iceland, Luxembourg, Austria, Canada, the USA and the Persian
Gulf; the League supporters were less keen to name particular places many saying
that they wanted to construct their own model but for those who did name a specific
prototype Spain was most popular with three mentions and Switzerland's cantons
had two with one for Belgium and one for Italy's own autonomous regions (these
comprise the islands of Sardinia and Sicily and the bi-lingual border regions).
Regarding whether the activists had heard of the other party in the present study,
there was a fairly high degree of ignorance in the SNP of the League with six having
no knowledge whilst two knew very little and only six having heard and having a
coherent opinion of the League. The League supporters fared a little better with nine
having heard of and having a cogent opinion on the SNP, two having heard
something and only three with no knowledge. Finally the linear identity scale utilised
in the interviews is shown below in Figure 6.1:
Figure 6.1: Linear Identity Scale used in Interviews with Party Activists
Where do you see yourself situated on the following linear scale?
I 1
Scottish British
Why did you choose this position?
Dove si vede sulla linea seguita ?
I 1
Settentrionale (Northern) Italiano (Italian)
Perche Lei ha scelto questo luogo ?
This was used more as a check on the other Moreno-identity question than as a tool
in itself, all but two of the SNP supporters put themselves very close to the Scottish
pole with four actually at the extremity and one putting himself off the scale, the
largest distance came from the one activist who described himself as more Scottish
than British. For the Northern League six activists were at the Northern end, another
172
three very close to it, and three less than half way along and one at the Italian
extremity (three of the latter four being those who had described themselves as
equally Northern as Italian), the activist who described himself as Brescian, scored
out 'Northern' and wrote in 'Brescian' to re-assert his point. The results of the two
identity questions are thus a good check on each other and reveal the Scottishness of
SNP activists as very firmly entrenched, whilst the Northern-ness of League
supporters is a prominent feature and stronger than might have been anticipated from
secondary sources.
This commentary is intended to provide a broad picture of the activists interviewed
and some idea of their identities. Obviously we would expect activists to feel
strongly in identity terms, and as the conduits of the party message they play an
important part in the process of activating the electorate. Their responses to specific
questions will be used along with the other data sources outlined as the rest of this
chapter looks at the evidence for similarity or difference along the several different
themes outlined in Section 6.1.
6.4 To Devolve or not to Devolve
One of the most contentious issues with which both parties have wrestled with is the
exact type of autonomy which they seek. The specific controversy centres on the
strength of the institutions and the types of power which they would possess under
autonomy. This can broadly be characterised as independence or secession versus
devolution or federalism. The former represents a severance of all governing links
with the respective British and Italian states and the establishment of a new state
with the presumption of membership of inter-governmental organisations, such as
the European Union and the United Nations. The latter, in contrast, preserves the
existing international situation, but changes the internal balance of governance by
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devolving powers away from the centre, most commonly on domestic issues, such as
health, education, transport, and more controversially, tax-raising autonomy and
perhaps welfare provision. Typically a devolved settlement would leave foreign
policy, defence policy, monetary policy and the issue of notes and coins with the
central authorities.
Why is this question of devolution versus independence such a controversial one in
the parties under consideration? Surely one can simply examine party policy and so
discover which side of the argument the Scottish National Party and the Northern
League lie on? Unfortunately, these policy positions are far from clear or static. We
have already mentioned the gradualist versus fundamentalist split in the SNP, and the
Northern League, having favoured confederal devolution for a number of years, has
from 1995 flirted with a more militant secessionist position. The Scottish situation is
further complicated by the commitment of both the Scottish Labour Party and the
Scottish Liberal Democrats to a devolved Scottish Assembly through their
membership of the Scottish Constitutional Convention. Even the Scottish
Conservative and Unionist Party has recently claimed to be devolving power through
the re-vamping of the Grand Committee structure.
The Scottish National Party's stated goal is one of independence from the current
British state - its 1992 general election manifesto's title page bore the clarion call
'Independence in Europe - Make it Happen Now!' 273. However, as soon as one
delves below the surface, the picture becomes less clear. For instance in the
application for membership issued by the North Charlotte Street headquarters, the
aims of the Scottish National Party are stated as :
" a) Self-Government for Scotland - that is the restoration of Scottish
National sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic Scottish
Parliament within the Commonwealth, freely elected by the Scottish people.
273 Scottish National Party (1992a), 'Independence in Europe - Make it Happen Now'.
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b) The furtherance of all Scottish interests." 274
When this is compared to the opening statement of the Constitutional Convention's
case for change in its flagship document which says that "the first and greatest reason
for creating a Scottish Parliament is that the people of Scotland want and deserve
democracy"275, there is clearly a considerable overlap, with the question of how
'self-government' is defined to the fore. As the section below on the SNP's attitude
to Europe will highlight, at least some of the difference in their stance is merely
rhetorical, stemming from the need to appear electorally distinct, when the basic
beliefs are similar.
It is this closeness in core beliefs concerning Scotland's distinctiveness and its
democratic right to a parliament which also causes much of the intra-SNP friction
between those who want full independence and nothing less, and those who see a
devolved parliament as a logical, or at least necessary, step on the road to ultimate
separation. The SNP's student wing, the Federation of Student Nationalists (FSN),
makes its fundamentalist credentials perfectly clear in its 1993/1994 handbook :
"The FSN is confident that Independence in Europe would win a multi-option
referendum. With over 75% voting for change in Scotland at the last general
election, the outcome would be unlikely to support the status quo, moreover
a majority of those supporting devolution believe it would soon lead to
independence. We believe however that devolution offers no solution to the
problems faced by Scotland today. Devolution is seen by many as offering a
stepping stone to Independence, however it could simply be a delaying
tactic offered by the British parties to appease the people of Scotland."276
However, inherent in this statement is the admission that there are considerable
numbers who do see devolution as a 'stepping-stone' toward independence.
Importantly the current SNP leadership, under Alex Salmond, seems to lie firmly
within this latter camp. Much was made of remarks he made in the build-up to the
274 Scottish National Party 'Application for Membership'.
27^ Scottish Constitutional Convention (1995) 'Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right'.
276 Scottish National Party (1993b) 'Federation of Student Nationalists Members Handbook
1993/94'.
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1995 SNP conference, in which he incurred the wrath of anti-devolution nationalists
by saying :
"...we're being pragmatic about political developments. Far better than the
total domination of pragmatism of the Seventies or the other extreme which
would be to say it's that (independence) and that alone, nothing else will do
at any time whatsoever. I actually think that (devolution) would be a good
opportunity - not the best way to get independence perhaps, but a perfectly
legitimate development - to get to independence through devolution; it's a
perfectly valid way."277
Salmond predicted that in a devolved Scottish parliament, the Labour Party would
split between its unionist and nationalist wings and that the latter would be free to
join with the SNP. However his position is not one which is unequivocally accepted,
with the SNP executive member Iain Lawson saying : "A great many people in the
Scottish National Party will be astonished that Alex Salmond is prepared to work
with people in the Labour Party rather than life-long nationalists...he should hang his
head in shame." 278 The split was publicly aired at the 1995 party conference when
Margaret Ewing MP claimed that if the SNP didn't participate in Scottish Assembly
elections by carrying on its boycott of all things related to the Constitutional
Convention, independence may have to wait upward of fifty years, thus :
"..let's use any bridge that's there. People who say we shouldn't be looking at
the possibility of standing for an assembly - what is their alternative ? - are
we just going to wait for the big bang theory in another fifty years?" 279
Again Iain Lawson spoke out against this gradualist leadership line, saying that "The
grassroots of this party believe in independence and it is about time the leadership
started to recognise that." 280 The evidence is clear then that the constitutional end of
the SNP, or at least the equally important means of reaching that end, is by no means
a clearly agreed one at the leadership level. What though of Lawson's grassroots and
the electorate in general?
277 "Salmond shims 'the pure way'" IThe Scotsman. 20/9/95] p. 5.
278 "SNP critics round on Salmond over offer to Labour" [The Scotsman. 25/9/95] p.l.
279 "Ewing opens up split over home rule" fThe Scotsman. 22/9/95] p.l.
280 Ibid.
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The poll evidence shows a very confused picture as regards attitudes to devolution
and independence. As the data cited in Chapter 5 has shown the SNP does not have a
monopoly of those Scots who state independence as their preferred constitutional
option and, indeed, a significant minority of their own supporters favour devolution
or the status quo. The Scottish Election Survey of 1992 contained a majority for the
option of staying within the UK with a devolved assembly, as Table 6.1 makes clear:
Table 6.1281
Attitudes to Constitutional Reform in Scottish Election Survey
Scotland... %
In UK, with Assembly 50
No change from Status Quo 24
Independent within EC 17




The devolution option was then chosen by 50% of respondents, in a survey which is
commonly seen as having more credibility than other polls. Second behind it was no
constitutional change which had 24% support, and only third came independence in
Europe with 17%, although if added to independence outwith the European Union
which gained 6% support, independence would have 23%, giving a neat trichotomy
in which half of the electors surveyed favoured devolution, one quarter the status quo
and the remaining quarter independence. The gradualists then can be said to be
playing a pragmatic game in accepting the dominant preference of the Scottish
electorate, which under devolution they would then seek to radicalise.
281 These figures are taken from the author's own analysis of the 1992 Scottish Election
Survey (SES) processed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The data
set was provided along with variables and cases by Paula Surridge, one of the participants in
the SES. These responses are from Q60a 'Respondent's view on Scottish Assembly'. There
are 957 cases in the Scottish Election Survey.
177
How do the activists interviewed relate to this debate? Amongst them there was also
no agreement as to a clear position, with such replies to the question on devolution
as:
"I'd love it when devolution comes if it ever does because if it's not given it's
a great reason to pressurise the British system if it's not been delivered, if it
does come it would be in the middle of a Labour government which means
we'd probably do well and it would greatly help to legitimise the SNP as an
active political party because we would actually be working for tangible
political change within a Scottish forum - we could say why not bring all
things into a Scottish forum.".
A statement which contrasts markedly with the following attitude :
"..see Scotland United and things like that they're a nonsense. The SNP was
born out of the fact that these things never worked in the past, there's
always been home-rule associations, ..but at the end of the day it never
worked because there wasn't a platform, a party - the constitutional
convention, that'll fail as well because there's not a party whose raison
d'etre or principal aim is to achieve that. They've all got British agendas."
Thus it seems that there are real differences of opinion within the SNP. These
ultimately centre around the means of independence, rather than the goal itself,
although there is substantial poll evidence that many SNP supporters would be happy
with devolution (as reported in Chapter Five) and this sentiment finds echo even
among some activists with the proviso that the parties work together, thus :
"In the future I believe the best form of government is consensus
government, a coalition type of government,...I remember talking to
somebody outside a polling station a couple of years ago who was from the
Labour Party and everything he said that he wanted for Scotland, I wanted
for Scotland but I believed it would come from independence and he
believed it would come through devolution, so that's your normal Labour
activist."
We can discern then that there is no unity over short-term constitutional end amongst
leadership, activists or voters, only rhetorical unity over a vague, long-term need for
independence, which as Section 6.6 will show is compromised by immediately
concomitant membership of the European Union.
What then of the Northern League and its constitutional position? Like the SNP the
League's position is not as clearly defined as some commentators would like to
suggest. Broadly it has come to be seen as a party within the Italian federalising
tradition, a perception built on its constitutional proposal for three macro-regions
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which was its main policy when it came to prominence in the 1992 Italian general
election.282 However, beneath this surface there has been considerable debate as to
the competencies of the various echelons of government. In this context the first
programme of the Lombard League makes interesting reading with its first article
calling for "self-government for Lombardy"283. Indeed some have argued for
outright independence from the Italian state, a line which has been fuelled since the
League withdrew its participation in Berlusconi's seven-month long administration
in 1994 and so precipitated Lamberto Dini's technocratic government and which has
certainly been tentatively embraced in the call for secession in 1996 because reform
has failed to come from the centre.
One consistent theme in the League's constitutional argument is the claim that the
arrangements made after the Risorgimento did not serve the North well at all, in
creating a bias toward centralism which continued from the pre-First World War
Liberal period, through fascism, and into the First Republic after the Second World
War. To this end the arguments of the federalist Carlo Cattaneo are proffered as an
alternative at the time of unification which was ignored in favour of Piedmontese
centralisation. 284 The idea of making up for this historical error and all the negative
consequences which can be associated with it is captured in one of the League's
posters285, thus :
"The Second Risorgimento. Against the mafia and its parties. A federal state.
North - Central - South."286
282 See Z. Ciuffoletti (1994) "Federalismo e Regionalismo : Da Cattaneo alia Lega".
283 Lega Nord (1993) op. cit. Bossi - 'II Pensiero' p.24.
284 See U. Bossi & D. Vimercati (1993) "La Rivoluzione - La Lega : Storia e Idee" pp.27-29.
288 It should be noted that the Italian streetscape provides much more overt political
propaganda than the average Scottish urban landscape - political posters are a prominent
part of Italian parties' communication and in this thesis the sentiments expressed on League
posters are treated as comparable to those in SNP pamphlets and leaflets - indeed arguably
they are more widespread reaching a much larger audience.
286 Lombard League/Northern League poster displayed in L. Costantini (1994) "Dentro La
Lega - Come Nasce. Come Cresce. Come Comunica" p.194 Fig.5.
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The actual competencies envisaged under the so-called macro-regions proposal
involved only foreign policy, defence, law codification, telecommunications and the
minting of money being left at the confederal Italian level. The rest of the
government's tasks would be devolved down to the regions and the three macro-
regions. The former would control local police, agriculture, public works, the
administration of justice, taxes, health, social welfare, education (including
universities) and planning regulations; the macro-regions would be in charge of
industry and commerce, transport, civil and penal codes, taxes, scientific research,
citizenship, co-ordinating policing and foreign trade.287 It is interesting to note that
of the powers left at the centre under these institutional proposals, most could
theoretically be ceded to the European Union - if qualified majority voting is
extended into the security/foreign policy and home affairs/justice pillars of
community affairs, as is being discussed by the IGC which started in March 1996
and is due to conclude in 1997 or 1998 . Both the League and Italians in general
favour participation in monetary union, whilst by the Treaty of Rome Italian law
(like those of other member states) is already subservient to European law in many
areas. Moreover, the European Commission is seeking to create a more
homogeneous European telecommunications system, leaving it very unclear exactly
what competencies a national government would retain.
However the rhetoric used in arguing the case for the above institutional division
illustrates the very thin line between different types of constitutional end. Whilst
three macro-regions were being sought by the League and it made tentative attempts
to set up like-minded organisations in the centre and the south of Italy, it was the
concept of the Republic of the North which grabbed the headlines after Bossi first
mentioned it in an interview with 'II Giornale' on 31st August 1990. The reason for
287 Lega Nord (1992) 'Progetto Istituzionale della Lega Nord per una Repubblica
Confederate'.
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this was the overtones which were associated with the proposal, one made clear in
the following poster proclamation:
"The Republic of the North is the road away from Rome. If there is not
autonomy, there will be a struggle for self-determination for the North."288
This inherent tension between simple devolution and a more Wilsonian degree of
self-determination has become a more obvious one since the fall of the Berlusconi
government in December 1994 and the manifest failure of seven months of
government to deliver any kind of federal settlement, despite the League holding the
portfolio for institutional reform and the Interior Ministry. The promised fight for
self-determination was begun with the 'recall' parliament of the North which was
launched by the League in Mantua in the summer of 1995 using the sixteenth century
Villa Berni as its seat. At its first meeting Bossi raised the possibility of secession if
that was what the people of the North wanted, using a phraseology very reminiscent
of Scottish National Party rhetoric, thus:
"It is the turn of the people to decide what type of capital Mantua will be.
Whether it is the capital of a federal state or something more, the capital of
an independent state. The North is by now activated and is moving to see in
the form of a referendum if the people want autonomy for the North or
not."289
Further evidence for the thin dividing line comes in the opinions expressed regarding
the concepts of 'nation' and 'state'. Franco Rocchetta, the leader of the Venetian
League from the 1970s until the early 1990s (when he was ousted and replaced with
the Bossi ally, Fabrizio Comencini) is very clear on his view, that:
"Those which officially, in administrative language are called regions, are in
reality nations, they signify peoples endowed with cultural, linguistic,
social, economic, administrative and institutional coherence. I want to be
clear, for us the Veneto, equal to Lombardy, Tuscany, Sicily, is a nation
with the same rights as Denmark, France, Poland, Greece and Holland."290
This is a perception reinforced by Bossi during the opening salvos of the 1994
election campaign. When talking of Italy and comparing himself to Berlusconi and
L. Costantini (1994) op. cit. p.194 Fig.7.
28° 'Bossi rilancia la sfida - Pronti alia secessione' [La Repubblica. 25/7/95] p.12.
2°0 I. Diamanti (1993) op. cit. 'La Lega' p.52.
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Fini he said "I am talking about a state [Italy], they are talking of a nation [Italy]."291
For many beyond Bossi and Rocchetta, Italy is no more than a state, with their
'imagined nation' residing in the north, or more commonly one of its constituent
These sentiments are also mirrored in the interviews conducted with League
activists. For example "..in Italy there is not a unitary history, instead there are many
different histories and we live in a region which has had a unique history for many,
many centuries." And more specifically on the constitutional end sought:
"I would like to see a North that is independent, or at the very least
confederal to let the North realise its full potential which at the moment is
too bound by institutional mechanisms, too constrained...the independent
North would be all the North down to Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany and
no more."
Whilst the relative modernity of the Italian state is captured thus :
"I believe that the term Italian debases the many zones of Italy...in my
opinion with the passing of years we have approached each other with the
mass media and information flows but there are profound differences which
derive from the fact that at the historical level, Italy is a very recently united
state, there is profound diversity."
This debate is reflected amongst the population at large, where there is evidence for
considerable demand for some type of devolution and beyond as Table 5.2 made
clear, reproduced below as Table 6.2 for ease of reference:
parts.
Table 6.2292
Attitudes to different types of Institutional Reform
Northerners 'Leghisti' 'Lombardi 'Veneti'
Status Quo
More Powers to Regions
All Regions Special Statute
Three Macroregions
















N= 660 145 78 67
'Bossi, Siluro a Berlusconi' fLa Repubblica. 1/2/94] p.13.
292 Figures taken from Poster Institute Survey as quoted in Diamanti (1993) op. cit. p.101.
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These figures show very little satisfaction with the status quo and a solid majority
behind regional devolution, be it a strengthening of current arrangements or a move
to give all regions the considerable devolved powers which the five special-statute
regions currently enjoy. Beyond this there is a minority who favour the League's
macro-regions proposal and a smaller number who desire complete separation for the
North. As one would expect these sentiments radicalise when one looks only at
League supporters, with a significant difference between Lombard and Venetian
feeling, the latter displaying more proclivity to more drastic change. What they
illustrate is that the Italian constitutional picture is also a messy one with many
different demands and options, mirroring the Scottish situation.
Thus whilst the dominant argument of the League has been toward a confederal
devolution, there have always been substantial undercurrents toward a more
complete secession which have resurfaced spectacularly in 1996. The headline
differences between the nationalist SNP and the federalist League are not nearly as
clear-cut as simple analysis might suggest, particularly when attitudes to the
European Union are added into the equation in Section 6.6 below. This blurring of
ends and the substantial overlap of means provide support for the thesis being
developed, namely the presence in contemporary Europe of a very different form of
nationalism to the traditional form seen in that continent.
6.5 AH Roads Don't Lead to Rome (or London)
A key plank of both the Scottish National Party's and the Northern League's political
attack is the centralism to be found in the respective capitals, Rome and London. In
the Italian case this goes further in accusations of corruption which can be said to be
very real in the sense that so many leading political figures of the First Republic have
been charged with varying degrees of criminal involvement during the tangentopoli
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investigations of the last few years. In the British context, the accusations aren't so
violent; they focus rather on the perceived south-east centricity of the anachronistic
Westminster parliament and its institutional inability to serve the Scottish interest.
This section will assess to what extent this anti-centralism pervades the different
party echelons.
Such anti-central sentiment is well captured in a series of SNP flyers designed to
increase membership, all carrying the slogan "Independence Works - Britain's
Finished". In one of these leaflets under a block heading, listing countries which
Scotland could aspire to be similar to, namely Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland, Eire,
Portugal, Finland, Austria, Sweden, Norway and Holland, the text continues :
"Scotland's a rich country in people and resources - but Westminster prefers
to see Scots on the dole. London is denying Scotland better jobs,
improved hospitals, a first-class education system, higher pensions and new
chances for our young people. We're not being saved by the Union - it's
destroying us! Over the next five years Scotland will lose £18 billion in
economic growth because we don't have a Scottish Parliament. New jobs.
Improved hospitals. Better education services. Expanded healthcare. All
denied Scotland by a London Government. Independence works - Britain's
finished." 293
This sentiment is by no means a new one, indeed it has been one of the linking
threads in the SNP's volatile electoral history. Thus the 1987 manifesto states that:
"The North/South divide is really a Scotland/England divide. Never before
have our two countries moved so far and so decisively apart. As England's
unemployment falls by leaps and bounds, the Scottish totals hardly budge.
As poverty is reduced in England, the crisis in Scotland becomes graver. As
the English economy booms, Scotland stagnates...In 1974 the election of a
strong group of SNP MPs forced London to pay attention to Scotland. In
1987 more SNP MPs elected will magnify the voice of Scotland both at
Westminster, and at home. This is the time to make the break and to vote
decisively for self-government. The British system has failed Scotland - it's
time to Play the Scottish Card."294
Implicit in this passage is a generalising of the anti-centralism, a synecdoche in
which the whole and the part become intertwined with London and England used to
represent the same concept, which is very similar to the League's rhetoric versus
293 Scottish National Party (1994a) 'Independence Works - Britain's Finished'.
294 Scottish National Party (1987) 'Play the Scottish Card - SNP General Election Manifesto
1987' p.5.
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Rome and the South, as the second part of this section will show. This overwhelming
notion of Scottish distinctiveness and repugnance at the thought of the Westminster
system is captured in the SNP's 1995 flagship policy document 'Citizens not
Subjects'. In its summary of proposals it is stated that the Scottish parliament will
consist of a single chamber because "The notion of a revising chamber with a
membership present by accident of birth or by political patronage is deeply
repugnant to the Scottish sense of democracy."295
Are these senses of distinctiveness and anti-centralism shared by the activists and the
electors at large? Certainly London and Westminster receive considerable stick
amongst SNP activists, thus : "..the identity of Scotland is entirely different from the
likes of London or Westminster...this forcing the British state, the Empire's dead -
even during the Empire it was pushed on us." or "it sounds a good thing [the EU] but
if it would actually work I don't know...it might be as corrupt as Westminster" and
more generally England is seen as the source of most problems : "Britain to me is
England, I don't think that Britain is, as people maintain, a union of Scotland,
England, Wales and a part of Ireland, it's just England controls." As for evidence
amongst the voters, the oft-cited statistic that three out of four Scots who voted in
1992, voted for some form of decentralisation and diminution of the centre's powers,
provides substantial evidence of a widespread antipathy toward the governing 'state'
centre.
Thus there is substantial evidence for an anti-centralism which seems to stem from
the almost universal feeling of Scottish distinctiveness and the perceived lack of
ability of the central Westminster parliament to contend adequately with the different
needs and aspirations. What of the Northern Italian situation?
295 Scottish National Party (1995) 'Citizens not Subjects - The Parliament and Constitution
of an Independent Scotland' p.2.
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No-one with even a passing knowledge of the League and its history could fail to
sense the vitriol which it directs toward Rome and the central institutions of the
Italian state. Indeed much of the genesis of the various leagues and their coming
together in the umbrella Northern League group can be seen as stemming from the
failures of the centralised state in dealing with the differential demands of Italy's
regions. This anti-centralism pervades much of the League's literature and policy
pronouncements.
One of the League's most famous posters depicted a hen perched atop the Italian
peninsula laying golden eggs which then disappeared down a funnel to be collected
in a basket by a portly woman in stereotypical Southern dress straddling the
peninsula from Rome southward, and the hen is saying Tor you who are ready to
accuse us of racism' with the blurb running:
"The Lombard hen serves up golden eggs for Rome and beyond! All of them
remain frying in their frying-pan and none return to us any more!"296
Other League posters are littered with similar sentiments, such as "A Free North - No
centralised state and No Southern hegemony"297 or "No! To Rome and its Mafias.
The North is already at war! The Northern League is Liberty"298. A central plank in
the argument against Roman centrality is the taxation issue, the League constantly
makes reference to the relative GDP's of the Italian state's different regions, which
taking Italy as 100 in 1994, shows the North-West to be 123.4, the North-East
standing at 119.6, the Centre as 109.1 and the South very far behind on only 68.5.299
The political capital to be made of these figures is helped by the much-resented
redistribution of taxes from North to South through various structural funds, as
L. Costantini (1994) op. cit. p. 192 Fig.l.
297 Ibid, p.193 Fig.3.
29^ Ibid. p.194 Fig.6.
299 'Nord-Est, il 'giallo' del boom' [La Repubblica. 17/7/95] p.3.
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highlighted in another League poster: "The North pays for everything. Enough of
taxes to Rome! Equal taxes - spent in Lombardy!" 300
This anti-Roman attitude among voters was shown by the mass desertion of the
traditional parties at the 1994 elections and the ridicule in which the central
government is generally held. It is a feeling which the League capitalises on in the
North and was one of the most common features in interviews with League activists,
thus :
" I'd like to see a North that is more free in the sense that we don't always
have to ask Rome when we want to do something I'd like to see a federal
state where local autonomy is strong...in which the people could decide if
they remained federated and so the mayor would have power and wouldn't
have to go to Rome for money"
or on similar lines:
"I do not understand the administrative way of Rome -1 believe one centre of
power in an Italy so diverse cannot respond and solve problems in an Italy
that is very different - they either have to go to the North or to the South,
they can't respond to everyone with one central decision-making process,
they can't respond to diversity."
and on giving their reason for joining
"I understood that the attitude of the League was anti-state, which was
inevitably married to anti-centralism...I believe that Rome will never act,
Rome will never suffer, we need to go outside Rome in the North for real
change."
Both parties then infuse their message with a pervasive anti-centralism. Both
rhetorical and substantive attacks are common against Rome and London, which are
used as the symbols of central misgovernment. Moreover both argue that their
societies would be better and richer under their autonomy programmes, freed from
the draining burdens imposed by the reviled centres and so the anti-centralism of
both parties can be said to rest on fundamentally materialist concerns, backing up the
contentions of Chapter Five.




One of the key theoretical elements mentioned in Chapter Two was the context
which the European Union provided to aspiring autonomists in late twentieth century
Western Europe. It was argued that the development of the European Community
into the European Union and the growing integration of the various pillars of
community government (the 'acquis communitaire', foreign and security policy and
home affairs/justice policy), created an environment in which a member-state had
less control over the traditional auspices of government. One can assume that
traditional nationalists would shun the type of supranational accords which would
rob a nascent nation-state of its hard-won autonomies, practically the day after they
had been won, since control and exercise of the various spheres of government was
part of the very definition of that type of nationalism.
Certainly the SNP in the early 1980s held such a view of the then European
Economic Community, as outlined in their 1983 election manifesto :
"Whilst seeking co-operation with our European neighbours, we would not
wish to join the Common Market (EEC), since the EEC has been extremely
damaging to many of Scotland's interests and its centralist thinking from
Brussels is as ill-suited for Scotland as that from London."301
Thus the Scottish National Party very much wanted to go it alone, proposing "a
trading association with the EEC, similar to those of Austria (an EU member since
1995) and Norway"302 and reserving all domestic policy areas to the newly-free
Scottish nation - very much the stance one would expect of a traditional nationalist
party. However only four years later the very same section of the manifesto told a
very different story :
"(The SNP will) recommend membership of the European Economic
Community in a referendum of the Scottish electorate, providing guarantees
of protection for vital Scottish interests, particularly in relation to




agriculture, industry, fishing, oil and steel, can be obtained. Independent
representation in the EEC would allow Scotland to make a greater
contribution to European affairs, by having a seat and a vote at the
negotiating table, a place on the European Commission and greater
representation in the European parliament. As an appendage of London,
Scotland is denied all this." 303
Thus there was clearly a major qualitative change of policy stance toward European
Community membership in the mid-1980s. However, at this stage, the SNP could
still claim to adhere to a very Gaullist conception of a Europe of the nation-states
saying explicitly "We would oppose moves for further centralisation in the EEC to
create a European super-state."304 In nationalist terms one could argue that with the
launch of the Single European Market package in 1985, that a trading association
was no longer enough and rational national self-interest demanded membership of
the Community but in no way were moves to any centralised decision-making to be
supported.
However by 1989 and the European elections, this policy had been mitigated once
more. Under the new slogan 'Independence in Europe', coined by the SNP's star
recruit from the Labour Party, Jim Sillars305, the party's position had softened once
again, thus:
"Europe is now affecting more and more of our lives. The Channel Tunnel
and the Single European Act make it essential that Scotland has a voice at
the top table of Europe defending our interests and taking full advantage of
the opportunities for Scotland within the European Community. Our vision
of the European Community is one of a confederal family of nations
working together to improve the quality of life of its constituent peoples.
We reject the concept of a centralised United States of Europe but accept
that, as the Community develops, there will be a voluntary pooling of
303 Scottish National Party (1987) op. cit. p. 9.
304 Ibid.
305 Sgg the final chapter, entitled 'Scotland Within Europe - The Framework for
Independence', of Sillars' book in which the author makes very clear the type of
independence he envisages "If, however, the SNP makes its target independence within the
European Community and does so without ambiguity, then it is we who are backed by the
solid advantages of political and economic logic, and the unionists who are left flat-footed.
With an independent Scotland within the Community, the charge of separatism disappears.
By definition, one nation or state cannot be separate from others while being a partner in a
customs union." Jim Sillars (1986) "Scotland - The Case for Optimism" It is interesting to
note how this European-ness has outlived its author's active political life within the SNP.
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sovereignty by member states on specific issues."306
As for democracy in Europe, the penultimate part of the manifesto lays out a design
for a greatly strengthened European Parliament, with a much greater control over
finances and significantly the power to initiate policy - a right which is viewed as
anathema by those who want to retain nation-state dominance by keeping the inter¬
governmental Council of Ministers and, by implication, national parliaments as the
key institution in the European matrix.
The areas to be 'voluntarily pooled' were given substance during the period of
intense political debate on the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. In a policy
document prepared by the SNP's Research Department, the strength of the SNP's
conversion to the European ideal is shown in its clear positioning in the debate on
treaty ratification:
"As a party in favour of European co-operation the SNP supports the Treaty -
despite its imperfections. The UK's opt-out from the Social Chapter is one
such defect which an independent Scotland will be able to reverse."307
Furthermore the same document saw the SNP pledge a degree of supranational co¬
operation which few traditional nationalists would ever countenance, in voluntarily
giving up some levers of economic power, thus:
"The SNP recognises the validity of the concept of a single currency,
provided that it is agreed unanimously and that it only develops after
convergence on a range of economic and social indicators. On the same
basis, we also support the creation of a European Central bank - EuroFed -
independent of political institution, all or part of which we have argued
should be in Edinburgh."308
The rhetoric here sounds more like that of the German Christian Democrats or the
French Socialist Party, both Europhiles, rather than a party intent on flexing its own
national muscles.
306 Scottish National Party (1989) 'Scotland's Future - Independence In Europe' SNP
Manifesto, European Elections 15/6/89.
307 Scottish National Party (1992c) 'The Maastricht Treaty - the SNP's View' p.l.
308 ibid. p.2.
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This commitment to economic and social convergence and hence to a lack of
autonomous policy control, is re-affirmed in the SNP's St. Andrew's Day document
of 1995, showing that these positions are no snap reaction to an isolated debate.
Indeed this latter document adds the realm of defence and foreign policy to those
areas in which the SNP is willing to pool resources, thus :
"Scotland will participate fully in the structures of the European Union and
will wish to work with other states to develop a European perspective on
international peace-keeping through the Western European Union (and)...as
a successor state to the United Kingdom, Scotland will inherit a continuing
membership ofNATO and of many other international bodies."309
The SNP is committed to withdrawing an independent Scotland from the NATO
command structure and forbidding the stationing of nuclear weapons on Scottish
soil, thus making it more reliant on co-operation for its 'national' defence. A 1996
report by the Euro-MP, Allan Macartney, and the party's policy vice-convenor, Alex
Neil, to the SNP's national assembly recommended that the end of national vetoes
over foreign and security policy in Europe be endorsed. In the document the SNP is
urged to support the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) into the foreign
and security pillar of community affairs. Such support for QMV represents a position
which can hardly be said to support national sovereignty, which would involve the
preservation of the national veto across as many policy areas as possible. Indeed in
commenting on the current need for unanimity on such issues in the Council of
Ministers, the authors say :
"Although this position protects national sovereignty, it also slows down the
process of foreign policy-making, with the result that the Union is slow to
respond to a crisis. The example of the council's slow and inadequate
response to events in the former Yugoslavia provides a grave illustration of
the problem."310
There is no doubt that the Scottish National Party has moved in under a decade from
being a Europhobic party to being much more of a Europhile. The very fact that the
1992 manifesto was entitled 'Independence in Europe - Make it Happen Now!'
309 Scottish National Party (1995) op. cit. p.15.
'SNP in new pro-Euro move' [The Scotsman. 3/2/96] p.4.
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where previous manifestos had always had some mention of Scotland in their title, is
a sign of the extent of the change. In the context of this thesis the shift is a very
significant one, given its implications for the powers at the disposal of an
autonomous European Union nation-state. How much has this wholesale change at
the party elite level been mirrored amongst their own activists and more broadly in
the electorate?
Amongst activists there is considerable disagreement as to whether or not to
welcome membership of the European Union and its undoubted effects on Scotland's
sovereignty, thus:
"if we're talking about an independent Scotland then yes I think obviously
the nature of the EU basket of powers diminishes the degree of autonomy
that independence represents and even the fact that the SNP is now talking
positively about support for a common monetary policy is a big step away
from the notion that the advantages of full independence were gaining
control of these economic levers to use more effectively in the Scottish
context."
or in a similar vein
"..it's not shackles, it's partnership in Brussels, whereas what we've got in
London is we're the underdog, we don't get that seat at the table, we don't
get proper negotiation rights. It's an entirely different thing, being part of a
team is different from being part of a chain-gang."
Favourable statements which contrast with more sceptical comments such as
"I think that instead of trying to force everybody into the same box and make
us into the same we should be pleased at the differences, ..instead of saying
that because everybody's got a washing machine, Europe over, that means
the whole culture has to be the same...the federal ideal would be a superstate
trying to create an identity for itself, rather than respecting individual
identities that make it up, I believe in a European confederation based on the
nation-state...no subsidiarity because that implies that you're getting
devolved power, that they're the centre and that they're devolving
something...we should see the nations as the centre of Europe, rather than a
federalist centre."
In short there seems to exist at least a healthy scepticism toward anything above
inter-governmental co-operation, the feeling that whilst Scotland should be in the
European variety of Union to have the fabled 'seat at the table', there must be no
rush toward policy convergence. This kind of attitude seems to be reflected in public
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opinion with a fair degree of ambivalence toward Europe as summarised in a January
1995 System Three poll summarised in Table 6.3 below:
Table 6.3311
Attitude Toward Membership of the European Union by Party Supported
Party Supported
Total. Cons Lab. Lib. Dem. SNP
N (Unweighted): 1053 99 510 80 201
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Stay an EU member 53 52 56 63 47
Leave EU 26 31 25 23 33
Undecided/Don't know 21 17 19 14 21
Thus whilst there is a clear majority of over half of the Scots interviewed who
support continued membership of the EU, over a quarter are in favour of immediate
exit, with one-fifth being undecided. It is interesting given the SNP's shift on its
European attitude that its supporters are the only partisan affiliates to display less
than 50% support for continued membership. Indeed one-third of SNP voters support
the option of leaving the European Union, which represents a considerable gap with
Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters with the Conservatives closest to the SNP
on 31%. Clearly the SNP leadership has yet to win the hearts and minds of both
activists and voters over to its European support and it is something of a paradox that
the SNP is the most Europhile party in rhetorical terms but the most sceptical party
when one looks at the bases of its support. One could argue that the change in
attitude at the elite party level has yet to filter down to the bases of the party,
although further research would be necessary to answer whether this stemmed from a
sense of residual traditional nationalism amongst voters which belied the changes
occurring at the leadership level or whether it is simply a process which will take
time to permeate the whole party and the present dichotomy reflects the alacrity with
which the party's stance has changed. The real acid test will come if and when
This table is taken a Herald/System Three poll on Europe conducted in January 1995 -
1,053 adults were interviewed at 40 sampling points across Scotland, (p.3).
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Scotland does face the possibility of joining the EU as a separate entity - the internal
dynamic of the SNP at such a time should provide the answers to these questions.
As for the League they too have a very positive attitude, at the leadership level,
toward Europe, although the way in which the Union is used to attack other parties is
different. The League's use of Europe is constrained by the much more positive
attitudes to be found amongst the Italian populace toward Europe in general and
further integration in particular, as illustrated by the Eurobarometer Trends from
1974-1994312. This context allows the League to play on the fact that whilst the
North of Italy compares favourably in economic terms with any other region of
Europe, Italy as a whole is economically disabled by the albatross of the Southern
economy. This message is vividly illustrated by a League cartoon entitled 'The
Mafia cancer' which depicts the Italian peninsula being ordered out of a door marked
Europe with a bandage tied around its southern half and the words from within the
door "Outside! Either you cure yourself of the infection or you carry out an
amputation."313 The persistent budgetary crisis with its implication that Italy has no
chance of reaching the Maastricht convergence criteria, allows the League to point
out how much better it would be for the North to be free and therefore able to take its
rightful place at the core of Europe, blaming Italy's current economic woes firmly on
the Southern millstone.
That Europe is seen as a good thing is illustrated by posters such as that produced by
the Northern Alliance (1989-1991), the immediate forerunner to the Northern
312 Commission of the European Communities (1994) op. cit - responding to the question
'Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership of the European
Community/European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?', Italian
approval of membership has never dropped below 63% (1976), reached a high of 83% in
1988 and in the most recent survey quoted from 1994 stood at 70%; the UK's 1994 figure was
43%, its high having been 57% in 1991 and its low a mere 21% in 1981.
313 As shown in 'II Calendario' (1994) op. cit. p. 53. For many commentators such a
depiction typifies the League's anti-Southern stance, but they retort that they are
commentating only on economic realities.
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League, which said simply "The Northern Alliance, further from Rome, closer to
Europe"314 This was a theme carried on after the creation of the umbrella Northern
League in 1991 with a poster which cleverly combined four key League messages by
spelling out the letters of LEGA (League) to mean L=Lavoro (Work), E=Europa
(Europe), G=Giustizia (Justice) and A=Autonomia (Autonomy) and then going on to
say:
"Use your vote for a liberal and confederated North. The Northern League
born from the fusion of the Lombard League, the Venetian League, the
Piedmont League, the Ligurian League, the Emilian League, the Romagnan
League, the Tuscan League, the Triestian League, the Friulian League and
the Trentino League. Four hundred seats, seven hundred sections, two
hundred thousand members. A great political organisation built by twelve
years of honest and courageous work."315
More substantive support for the European Union can be found in various League
policy documents, for instance after the launch of the campaign for three macro-
regions, their policy statements saw this a natural stepping-stone toward European
integration, thus : "Economic legislation is the responsibility of the three macro-
regions, the famous three macro-regions. A type of organisation which foreruns
European integration."316. The idea of federal Europe, resting on subsidiarity, is one
of the most constant planks of League policy, resoundingly endorsed thus by the
Venetian League in 1995, which talked of:
"The role of a federal European Union, inspired by the principles of self-
determination of peoples, self-government, liberty, equality,...united
and, in some measure, inspired by the value of solidarity between the states
which make it up, and determined to confront the challenges which face it,
in the maintaining of the quality of life and the level of services offered to
citizens." 317
Crucially the League sees the European Union as a successor to the traditional
nation-state. Their preferred concept is one of strong localities - a Europe of the
314 L. Costantini (1994) op. cit. p.195 Fig.ll.
315 Ibid. p.196 Fig 12.
316 'Ecco come la Lega Nord Vuole Governare l'ltalia - Guida Ragionata al Nostro
Programma' as quoted in 'L'Europeo'. No.46, December 1991
317 Lega Nord (1995a) 'Passagio a Nord-Est - Economia e Societa : Analisi, Progetti e
Proposte' p.16.
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Regions - with the principle of subsidiarity applied and the residual functions carried
out at a pan-European level - the traditional nation-state's powers effectively
squeezed in a sub- and supra national pincer, as Bossi makes clear:
"There is a Europe that we like and a Europe that we don't like. The first is
the Europe of small peoples, of small firms, of protected minorities, of
cultural liberty, of cities and regions; the second is the Europe of strong
nations, of armed centralism which survives federation...It would truly be a
joke if the great dream of federalists - a unified continent - turned out in
reality to reaffirm the principle opposed to that of autonomy : a monstrous
centralism which is even further away and more uncontrollable than that of
the hated capitals."318
This is a theme he continues throughout his writing, invoking the arguments of Carlo
Cattaneo to lend an air of historical depth to League claims on Europe, thus:
"With the onset of the second millennium, the central state will die in Europe.
The splintering of countries which seemed never-ending, the appearance on
the map of new frontiers and the disappearance of old protagonists on the
international scene, from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia, opens the
way to new equilibriums, still to be decided. The European federation is
being born, but its features are hidden. It is well to keep in mind the
prophetic words of Carlo Cattaneo, the dramatic choice between 'Fortress
Europe' and 'The United States of Europe',"319
Thus there is no doubt that the League is a pro-European party which is in favour of
the extension of qualified majority voting into all pillars of the Union's life and
foresees a federal model of an United Europe in which the old-style nation-state will
very much wither away. However like the SNP, the League's activists seem
somewhat less enthusiastic toward the European ideal with some scepticism as to
how the battle against the centralised type of 'Fortress Europe' will be won, thus:
"For me it is absolutely vital that Brussels guarantees the representation of
everyone in the sense that it can't become a large Rome and that they more
or less accept a federal model, Brussels must not substitute Rome, or Paris,
or London, even the smallest communities must be represented."
or on explicit policy choices which would have to be made:
"I am totally opposed to a Europe with monetary union, and political union,
Europe as a free market and that's it, the freedom of trade is a good thing,
but with all these laws, it's a bad thing, it's just an extra layer of laws, free
trade is the maximum."
which complement criticisms of some actions already taken, thus:
"I think that's a very true criticism, I am very afraid of this Europe in which
318 Lega Nord (1993) op. cit. p.54.
319 U. Bossi (1993) op. cit. p.208.
196
there have been certain mistakes, for instance the move to homogenise laws,
Europe is a good example of centralisation."
Thus similarly to the SNP future research should focus on this "European' gap in the
League in the sense of monitoring the differing attitudes of the League elite and the
'rank and file' over time. It would be interesting to pursue the notion of a split in
supranational inclination between the 'above' and 'below' party cadres beyond the
two parties under consideration here.
What though of League voters' attitudes toward Europe? Some clue is given here by
a further question in the 1993 Poster Institute Survey, which has already been used in
looking at attitudes to territorial belonging and institutional reform. The interviewees
were asked whether they had faith in different institutions and the results are
summarised below in Table 6.4 :
Table 6.4320
Level of Trust Afforded to Different Institutions
All 'Leghisti' 'Lombardi' 'Veneti'
European Community 55 50 49 51
Church 45 38 39 36
Legal System 44 39 37 42
Mass Media 29 37 41 32
Local Bodies 19 22 18 27
Parliament 13 8 6 10
Government 10 8 8 7
Political Parties 6 5 3 6
N= 660 145 76 66
Thus it can be seen that Europe is the most trusted institution both by Italians in
general and to a slightly lesser extent by League supporters. The levels of faith
involved stand in stark contrast to those afforded to the three central institutions, and
as shown in the bottom three rows, League sympathisers hold the triad of parliament,
government and political parties in particular contempt.
320 I. Diamanti (1993) op. cit. p. 102 Table.ll.
197
Europe then is portrayed as an escape route out of the mire of Italian or British
domestic politics. Both parties use Europe as a political stick with which to beat the
central nation-states, however the criticism that the consequences of membership
have not been properly thought out may be levelled against them. Both are
committed to policies which would compromise their autonomy and the European
Union context can be seen as a vital factor in the type of nationalism which those
within its auspices can pursue. The contrast between the SNP of the early 1980s and
the mid 1990s provides a particularly sharp illustration of the distance which pro-
European-ness sets between the parties under consideration and traditional
nationalist parties which fought for state power in all policy spheres, providing
further evidence for the contention of this thesis that these contemporary
manifestations of autonomist sentiment represent a very different phenomenon to
their European predecessors. However for both parties there is a question mark over
the extent to which they have brought both their activists and voters with them in
their Euro-enthusiasm and this is an area which could prove very important if either
party were to get the chance to implement its policy promises with much room for
potential conflict.
6.7 Use of Identity
One of the key issues in deciphering late twentieth century autonomy movements is
the extent to which the identity to be mobilised is pervasive across the social setting
of the movement. The crucial divide here is between idealism and pragmatism, that
is to what extent the identity in question is a true reflection of the collective
imaginings of the area and to what extent it is used as a mobilising, politicised tool.
This split is not a new one, for instance the divide between the liberal nationalist,
Giuseppe Mazzini, and the realpolitik unifier, Count Camillo Cavour, in Italy's
Risorgimento can be seen to operate along similar lines. The question to be examined
198
in this section is to what extent the identities which the parties lay claim to can be
said to be long-standing or recently unearthed.
Intuitively the SNP seems on stronger ground here - its longer history, its place
within a broader sense of Scottish nationalism and the poll evidence which suggests
that the majority of Scots feel more Scottish than British all point to the existence of
a Scottish identity which the previous chapters have provided evidence for both in
the historical and the contemporary realm. With the Conservatives conversion to
bringing government closer to the people with their innovation of a touring Scottish
Grand Committee, the four political parties in Scotland are all, to a certain extent,
playing on their Scottishness.
However, if anything the contested nature of Scottish political identity, means that
the SNP seeks to pragmatically use its more explicit Scottishness for electoral
advantage. For instance, one of the undisputed facts about the SNP's vote is that it is
definitely skewed toward young age cohorts, as the data cited in Chapter Five
confirmed. It is hardly surprising then that the party specifically targets young voters.
It has two youth bodies - Young Scottish Nationalists (YSN) for those under twenty-
six and the Federation of Student Nationalists (FSN) for those in further education.
In addition the party has been committed since its 1987 manifesto (reaffirmed in the
1992 manifesto) to lowering the voting age to sixteen - a cynical interpretation of
which would see this as a move to bring more valuable young voters into the
electoral fray. These voters are also specifically targeted by party leaflets, for
instance under the heading 'Let Scotland's Youth Decide! Give Young Scots the
Vote!'. The party line is explained in clear terms :
"While 16 and 17 year olds can pay taxes, which are then spent by the Tories,
they have no say in how their money is spent. The SNP say that this is
wrong - we say give Young Scots the vote. In an independent Scotland that
is exactly what an SNP government would do, because we believe that
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Scotland's Youth is Scotland's Future." 321
The SNP's policies can also be said to centre on specifically Scottish issues; their
chief tactic is one of setting themselves up as the only defender of true Scottish
interests and claiming that under any-one else Scotland will continue to suffer. A
good example is the leaflet on water privatisation, which proclaimed :
"Voting Labour, Liberal Democrat or Militant is like handing water
privatisation to the Tories on a plate. England's Tory MPs - not our people -
are dictating the future of Scotland's water industry. We're not giving
Westminster our water. Stop this madness - join the SNP fight to keep
Scotland's water public. Independence Works - It's Scotland's Water!"322
A similar campaign against VAT on fuel allowed a dual attack focusing on
Scotland's energy-rich status and the Conservatives alleged determination to rob
Scotland of this advantage, thus:
"The UK is killing Scots. In an energy-rich Scotland, pensioners, young
people and the sick will have to pay VAT on domestic fuel. All to make up
for Britain's economic collapse - and Tory mistakes...Our country has vast
energy resources. An independent Scotland would never support VAT on
domestic fuel. Independence works - Britain's finished!"323
The SNP then sees itself as the only true defender of Scotland and its interests - the
other parties may claim to be so, but they are only paying lip service to the Scottish
people, because they are constrained by the logic of Westminster.
What of the wider picture on Scottish identity? The evidence cited in the previous
two chapters suggests that amongst the electorate the overwhelming feeling is one of
the Scottish identity being at least as important, if not more so than its British
counterpart. In the 1992 Scottish Election Survey, there was substantial evidence for
this contention as summarised in Table 6.5 overleaf:
321 Scottish National Party (1993c) 'Scotland's Youth Say - Onward to Independence!'.
322 Scottish National Party (1993d) 'Water Privatisation leaflet'.
323 Scottish National Party (1993e) 'VAT on domestic fuel leaflet'.
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Table 6.5
National Identity from Scottish Election Survey
Identity Percentage (%)
More Scottish than British
Equally Scottish and British
More British than Scottish
British not Scottish
N =






Thus 19% of the respondents saw themselves as Scottish not British, 40% chose
more Scottish than British and 33% saw themselves as equally Scottish and British.
These figures provide a huge contrast with the 3% who saw themselves as more
British than Scottish and the same 3% figure who saw themselves as British not
Scottish.324 However the poll evidence of previous chapters showed that one of the
SNP's largest problems comes in translating strong Scottish identity into votes for
them, a fact confirmed by the 1992 data, for with 59% of the sample seeing
themselves as either exclusively Scottish or more Scottish than British, there is an
obvious shortfall with only 20% of the sample voting SNP. The party then struggles
to fully capitalise on identity because it is so widely held, which helps to explain the
shift leftward and greater emphasis on socio-economic issues under Alex Salmond's
leadership, as the party explicitly targets the Labour Party.
As for the activists the feelings on identity are, as one would expect emphasised:
"I really don't think that there is a British, the English refer to this whole
island as English, make no mistake, wherever they go they say the English
government and they have this great big Union Jack which they think is the
flag of England and refer to the royalty as the Queen of England, so let them
get on with it...I think the central government tends to treat us as regions
which I think is wrong."
or more explicitly aimed at the false edifice of Britishness :
"Britishness is founded on the parliament and once the parliament.., once one
or two of the nations what is Britain go apart then it no longer exists...the
fact that after two hundred years there exists a party in Scotland called the
Scottish National Party shows the strain".
324 Scottish Election Survey Question 64 - see Footnote 280.
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There is then no significant debate on the existence of a Scottish identity, the
pertinent questions involve the extent to which the SNP can be said to exploit what is
a very contested terrain.
What of the Northern League's use of identity? This area has been a source of
considerable comment and criticism of the League, with the accusation that a
Northern Italian or Padanian identity has never really existed as a unitary concept;
rather it has simply been invented by the League. The prt-Risorgimento histories
were very much based around the various communes of the North and at the very
most around regional entities such as the Venetian Republic or Lombardy. This
argument is a strong one and is given weight by the very genesis of the various
leagues, which were very region-centric and indeed saw considerable distinction
drawn between different locales. Thus when Rocchetta calls the Veneto a 'nation' or
when Bossi says "Rome uses our territories as if they were hers, without giving the
chance to Lombards to say what they think in their own country."325, the clear
implication is that the various territories where the different leagues sprung up see
themselves as intrinsically distinct from each other, a sentiment captured for instance
in the Lombard League poster which simply declared "I am Lombard, I vote
Lombard"326.
There is indeed much support for this point-of-view in the interviews with different
League supporters in the Veneto and Lombardy, where phrases such as the following
were used:
"Italy has very little meaning for me, it is a geographical expression, it is
made up of many little states with their own peculiarities and their own
characteristics...it is obvious in our context after a hundred and thirty years
of unity, a unity forced on various states, more or less willing, there is a
certain consciousness of independence and the desire to express difference
in respect to the others has remained...you cannot cancel out a history of
more than a thousand years in the case of the Veneto in just over a hundred
325 'The Devil's Own Kingdom' fThe Guardian. 12/11/93] Section Two, p.19.
326 'II Calendario' (1994) op. cit. p.30.
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years."
However this is not the whole story, for it leaves out the more general split in Italy
between North and South. This division has never had clear geographical lines, but
has been pervasive over many years both before and after unification. Cavour was
not particularly interested in having the poor South as part of Piedmont's enlarged
realm. Instead the unity of the peninsula was really delivered by Garibaldi and his
Thousand who handed over their Southern conquests to King Victor Emmanuel at
Teano. Much of the history of the post-Risorgimento state has revolved around
unsuccessful attempts to modernise the South which have foundered on the rocks of
failed agricultural reform, mafia-influenced clientelism and economic corruption. It
was at least partly on the back of the tax drain from North to South that the League
was able to expand so rapidly through the 1980s as Chapter Five showed. There is
also a concept of a more general Northern-ness, showing Italy like many other
nation-states to possess several overlapping levels of identity. This concept was also
captured by some of the interviewees, thus :
"I'd like to see a North that is more free in the sense that we don't always
have to ask Rome when we want to do something I'd like to see a federal
state where local autonomy is strong...in which the people could decide if
they remained federated and so the mayor would have power and wouldn't
have to go to Rome for money".
The League then has been extremely pragmatic in seizing upon an ill-defined sense
of distinctiveness and turning it into a powerful tool of political currency. The
concepts of the North, Centre and South have become accepted parts of the Italian
political lexicon in a very short period of time.327 The North has replaced Lombardy,
Veneto, Piedmont or Trentino on posters, for instance the same golden egg poster
described earlier was reproduced after the Northern League's creation, with the hen
327 The creation of a sense of Northern-ness is well captured by Gallagher thus: "(it was
a)multi-regional community sharing the same culture...identifying threats to the cultural
authenticity of the north Italian 'community' in order to encourage greater solidarity
between its different parts was a logical development which bears comparison with the way
that fledgling nationalist movements have sought to build a constituency." T. Gallagher
(1992a) op. cit. p.74.
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this time representing the North (rather than just Lombardy) and a new slogan saying
"Southern hegemony means the power to plunder the North."328 The Southern
population are characterised as individualistic with no civic sense and a tendency to
laziness caused by their 'mafiosita' - they provide a stark contrast to hard-working,
law-abiding Northerners. As regards the criticism of cynical invention, this thesis has
argued that all identities are to an extent invented, in Benedict Anderson's sense of
being 'imagined'. Certainly many Northerners 'daily plebiscite' on their 'imagined
community' does now seem to end at Tuscany, most definitely excluding Rome and
its Southern fiefdoms. However as earlier mentioned there are other movements in
existence who interpret the Northern identity in different ways, and there is much
more debate as to what exactly the 'North' comprises in Italy, than there is over
Scotland which has a more clearly defined territory and integrated history.
The League then is more pragmatic in its use of identity the SNP but this stems, at
least partly, from their respective settings. The Northern League has only limited
rivals in identity terms - such as the minuscule Lega Alpina Lombarda 329 - whereas
all the SNP's electoral rivals profess Scottishness to some degree. There are
similarities, however, in the way that both parties' self-perceptions portray
themselves as the true carriers of the identity grail. This was illustrated in Scotland
by the furore which followed the SNP leafleting outside cinemas showing the film
328 Ibid. p.58.
329 This party polled only 0.3% of the national vote taking most of its votes in the Northern
Alpine regions of Lombardy. The League faces similar challenges from both the Lega
Autonomia Veneta and the Lega per il Piemonte which poll similarly small amounts of
preferences. These organisations continued existence after the set-up of the umbrella
Northern League does, however, provide evidence for continued tension about the concept
of the North with their common objection to the subsuming of well-defined Lombard,
Venetian or Piedmontese interests to a vague notion of Northern-ness. A potentially larger
challenge to the League's dominance came in January 1995 which saw Roberto Maroni
breakaway from Bossi and setting-up of rival Federal Northern League which remained
prepared to work with the right after Bossi had pulled the plug on Berlusconi's government.
All told the League lost about 20% of their deputies, and the adverse publicity caused by the
split between Maroni and Bossi had a clear negative effect on the League's ratings in early
1995 and may be seen as a prime cause in the shift toward a more secessionist platform.
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'Braveheart' which purported to depict the life of 'Scotland's Guardian', William
Wallace. The other parties cried foul over the SNP's appropriation of such a major
historical figure, but the SNP countered that Wallace had fought for Scottish
independence and so they were his only true heirs. The League meanwhile combines
its Northern identity with an air of superiority over the other parties both because it
holds itself apart from their machinations and also in its assertion that it holds the
key to fundamental reform which the others are still searching for. Both of these
attitudes can be seen to stem from the way identity is used by the parties.
6.8 Ideological Fluidity
An issue which attracts much attention in analyses of both the Scottish National
Party and the Northern League is the extent to which both parties display ideological
fluidity. It has been argued that especially in the case of the League it is difficult to
situate them at a specific point on the left-right spectrum, and that likewise while the
1990's SNP has self-consciously positioned itself further left in a bid to compete
more effectively with the dominant Labour Party in Scotland, not all adherents and
voters have been persuaded by this move.330 This section will investigate the extent
to which there is evidence for ideological fluidity in the two parties' policy positions
and ask how much of any such fluidity stems from populist flirtation and how much
from a genuine heterogeneity in opinion amongst their support.
Section 6.6 has already shown the extent to which the SNP has embraced a
burgeoning European Union as a gateway to independence. In this context it is
interesting to note the SNP attitude to local government as expounded by their Home
330 whilst 62% of the Scottish Election Survey sample saw the SNP as closer to the Labour
Party, 14% thought it lay closer to the Conservative party and the same figure thought it to
be equidistant from both - see SES, op. cit., Question 77a.
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Affairs spokesperson, Fiona Hyslop, at a Unit for the Study of Government in
Scotland seminar on the re-organisation of Scottish local government, thus :
"The SNP argue that we should define ourselves in a European context on
international criteria. It is a sad if not predictable indictment that the
Conservative Government has consistently refused to sign up to the
European Charter of Local Government which recognises the autonomy of
local government in source of funding and sphere of power...SNP
constitutional policy for an independent parliament would entrench the
powers of local government so they cannot be abused by any one particular
Government."331
This position begs the question of just what competencies would be left at the
traditional nation-state level under an SNP regime and further calls into question any
view which would portray that party as pursuing traditional nationalist ends.
From the 1996 viewpoint, several years after the Scottish Constitutional Convention
has been operative without the participation of either the SNP or the Scottish
Conservatives, the 1987 SNP manifesto makes interesting reading. After the election
the manifesto made clear that:
"The SNP will press for the establishment of a Scottish Constitutional
Convention within the first six months of a Parliament, and the
implementation of the Convention's recommendations within a reasonable
timescale thereafter...In the Scottish Convention, SNP representatives would
argue the case for independence as the most appropriate form of government
to guarantee the future of Scotland."332
Strong words on the issue of the Convention, but words which were quickly side¬
stepped when it became clear that the SNP's independence platform was not shared
by the majority of delegates to a supposedly consensual body. The SNP did a quick
volte-face and became one of the Convention's chief critics, though not with the
whole-hearted support of some of their activists, for instance:
"..that's one of the main questions that's always bothered me actually
because when I was in Scotland United I was one of these people
vociferously arguing that parties should stick together and I was really angry
with members of the SNP who wouldn't talk to Labour...the Constitutional
Convention is a difficult one, I think actually,..yes because publicly it looks
very bad and it just looks almost silly and quite childish."
331 F.Hyslop 'Local Government and a Scottish parliament: An SNP View' in "From
Wheatlev to ...What?" [Report on the First Seminar in a Series on the Re-organisation of
Scottish Local Government, Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland, 1995] p. 48.
332 Scottish National Party (1995) op. cit. pp.5-7.
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On Europe, the Convention and over the longer term on actual constitutional end, the
SNP can be said to have displayed considerable ideological fluidity.
Such inconsistency has been a constant criticism levelled against the Northern
League. As already reported above there has been a move through the original
separatism of the Venetian League and self-determination of the Lombard League to
federalism, confederation with macro-regions, and onward with the launch of the
recall parliament at Mantua and the spectre of independence, raised again in 1996
because autonomy has not been delivered. However perhaps the biggest volte-face
has been the League's position on immigration and more specifically its use of
xenophobic and racist rhetoric. There is no doubt that at its outset, the League
adopted a very confrontational attitude on the issue of immigration with posters such
as one depicting a feminine figure bearing a sash which identifies her as the central
state stirring a cauldron out of which various arms and legs are visible with the
legend "Third World immigration : it breaks up society and carries it toward
fascism"333 The League was an outspoken critic of the Martelli laws which they saw
as an attempt to introduce more immigration into Italy. Furthermore they also
targeted their campaigns against other marginal groups in society, such as the
Ligurian League campaign leaflet which declared "League or gypsies! The Ligurian
Northern League says no to gypsy camps in cities!"334 Such stances led the League
to be daubed as a far-right movement whose key issue was immigration, and brought
simplistic comparisons with the French 'Front National', as discussed earlier in
Chapter Four.
However the expansion of their vote in the early 1990s and the attraction of voters
from all points on the political spectrum is a clear indication that the League did not
333 L. Costantini (1994) op. cit. p.193 Fig. 2.
334 II Calendario(1994) op. cit. p.51.
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remain as a niche party, with only one narrow concern, in the words of one of the
activists interviewed:
"..from the political point of view, we have moved from the image of a racist
party, a party of the right, and that's better for the function we
perform...there are many opinions, there is the more liberal opinion, and
there is the more left-wing opinion, there are so many opinions, in fact it's
difficult sometimes to bring them all together in a party."
Bossi is cynical about the initial use of immigration - for him it was simply a tactic to
gain coverage. The anti-immigration stance was complemented by accusations of
internal racism in the form of anti-Southern sentiment - both for Bossi were shock
tactics, deliberately (and successfully) employed to gain the League some publicity
in a very hostile press, as he says "We decided to exploit the widespread anti-
Southernism in Lombardy, as in other regions of the North, to attract the attention of
both the public and the media."335. Against those who accuse him specifically of
anti-Southern racism he replies "Whenever I meet idiots who raise the question of
Northern hate toward the South, I always tell them : 'You are talking to somebody
who lives with a terrona'"336. The League attitude to immigration is still one of
limiting the numbers allowed in, but the argument is now couched in terms of how
investment must be channelled toward the countries of immigrant origin in an
attempt to solve the root of the problem, whilst concern is also expressed at the
plight of immigrants in Italy, the vast majority of whom are constrained to low-paid
work or street-selling (in fact many are known as lVu comprcC, the Italian for 'Do
you want to buy?'), Bossi again:
"We are tired, just as we were eight centuries ago, of being a land invaded,
first by the South, now by the Third World. There are no jobs, and to open
the doors wide to immigrants and then to leave them in miserable conditions
is a crime. This centralism has provoked more damage than a war."337
335 U. Bossi (1992) "Vento dal Nord - La mia Vita. La Mia Lega" p.42.
33^ "The Guardian'. 12/11/93 op.cit. p.19'Terrona'means'a woman of the South'and
refers to Bossi's marriage to a Sicilian, Manuela Marrone, however this word has derogatory




Like the SNP, the League can be said to have been ideologically promiscuous in a
way that traditional nationalist parties simply were not, tied as they were to their
pursuit of the nation-state. These contemporary parties can thus again be seen to
differ from their historical predecessors in terms of their fluidity of ideology and this
thesis would argue that such fluidity stems from the move away from the idea of
seeking all the traditional levers of power associated with the nation-state.
6.9 Rhetoric and Nature of Campaigning
An important part of both parties' projections is their claim to be somehow different
to the political parties who are their competitors, not only in their constitutional
intent but also in the presentation of their message. The League especially have
stressed their absolute difference from 'i partiti tradizionali' - the traditional parties
- with their associated connotation of clientelism, centralisation and, most
damagingly, corruption. The SNP have also played on their position outside the
governing clique and talk in a similar vein to the League of breaking the existing
political mould. This section will assess to what extent the nature and rhetoric of the
parties is similar in its approach to their political rivals and the propagation of their
own policies.
One common theme for the SNP through the years has been the persistent betrayal of
the Scottish people by the unionist parties - Conservatives, Labour and Liberal alike.
This was highlighted in a party publication to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the
party in 1994, entitled 'Our Changing Scotland'. In this document the history of
Scottish Home Rule is traced from the nineteenth century onwards, thus :
"There had been calls for a National Party in the 1890s and again in
1923/24, but most potential members expected that first Liberalism and then
Labourism would deliver Home rule. By the late 1920s, it was obvious that
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neither would."338
This theme of betrayal is one which has been returned to throughout the SNP's
history - the idea being that the Scottish people will only get real change if they vote
SNP - other parties may promise varying degrees of Home Rule, but they have yet to
deliver and the commitment of an incoming Labour government under Tony Blair to
devolution is constantly questioned.
An interesting development in the last fifteen years has been the manner in which the
Labour Party has been attacked for failing to stand up to the Conservative
governments in power in 1979, as with a leaflet on the Strathclyde water referendum
when 97% voted against proposed government reforms, inspiring the question "Why
have 5 English Tory MPs changed Scotland and 49 Labour MPs haven't? Because
Labour MPs never change anything!"339 This approach explicitly acknowledges
Labour's dominance in Scotland and targets them as the chief SNP rival - a tactic
which as has been discussed has caused the SNP to move its own politics leftward in
direct confrontation. A leaflet from the 1994 European election is typical, under the
header '1979-1994. Fifteen Years of Labour Failure', it declares :
"People in Scotland are full of trust. Every time Scots vote Labour they vote
on trust. But Labour betray that trust every time. In Westminster Labour
wants a quiet life and do back stage deals to let the Tories win. Labour even
lets Tory MPs from England take the democracy out of Scottish Local
Government. Labour Councils in Scotland are slashing public services -
directed by Tory ministers in London. Fifteen years of Tory government has
meant unemployment, factory closures, benefit cuts, homelessness, an
appalling health service. And fifteen years of Labour control in Scotland has
meant nothing. It has to be different. A strong SNP vote means Westminster
takes proper notice of Scotland."340
Thus both the Scottish Labour Party and English Conservatives are portrayed as
partners in the Westminster crimes committed toward the Scottish body politic over
the last decade and a half.
338 Scottish National Party (1994b)'Our Changing Scotland - The Scottish National Party
1934 - 1994' p.2.
339 Scottish National Party (1993f) '97% No leaflet'.
340 Scottish National Party (1994c) 'European Election leaflet'.
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To show how far the SNP leadership sees itself as a party of the left, it has started to
accuse the two major parties of being difficult to distinguish from one another. In an
attempt to turn around the 'Tartan Tory' epithet often levelled against the SNP in the
past by the Labour Party, Alex Salmond declares in his preface to the 1992 election
manifesto :
"At this General Election we are faced with our most important choice for
many generations : a choice to go forward into the mainstream of Europe, or
to be stuck in a backwater of Britain...Alone amongst the political parties in
Scotland, the Scottish National Party is offering a way forward which will
produce social justice, social concern and economic progress. ..The policies
of the Tartan Tories, whether led by Ian Laing (sic) or Donald Dewar, are
the policies of Scotland's past. Kinnock and Major are equally irrelevant to
Scotland's needs. Only the Scottish National Party has a vision ofwhat must
happen in Scotland." 341
The SNP then clearly targets the Labour Party in assigning the blame for the failure
to bring constitutional change (albeit devolution) to Scotland, however in so doing it
is hardly differentiating itself from the other political parties, rather it is participating
in the same sort of electoral politics as its rivals. Indeed a leaflet issued at the time of
the Maastricht ratification process was headlined 'Labour and the Tories - One Big
Party Together'. However the SNP does strive to differentiate its message from that
of other parties. The quotes given above are peppered with references to the control
which London has and which the SNP is seeking to relinquish. To this end its 1983
Manifesto's conclusion drew a comparison with the American Declaration of
Independence, quoting the following passage:
"When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to
assume among the powers of the Earth the separate and equal station to
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect
to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes
which impel them to the separation." 342
Grand words which attempt to position the SNP's goal alongside some of the great
struggles of human history (in contrast to the other Scottish parties). In a different
vein their 1992 manifesto included a very populist message from that most famous of
■343 Scottish National Party (1992a) op. cit. p.l.
'342 Scottish National Party (1983) op. cit. p.24.
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Scots, Sean Connery (he also did the voice over on one of their campaign
broadcasts). In a message entitled 'Go For It....!', he said:
"Everyone can see that nothing will ever change if we don't break with the
old, outdated Union. I can't imagine that anybody who lives in Scotland can
really want not to be independent; can want to turn their back on their own
identity and their own nation. Being a Scot is the most natural thing in the
world to me. But you can't get independence without voting for the SNP.
That's why I joined. The other parties will talk for ever but devolution is
just a mishmash that can only lead to trouble...I have only one message for
my fellow Scots : this is your chance - go for it!" 343
The SNP then tries to differentiate itself from the other parties in the Scottish
political system but often fails to do so and is tarred with same political brush as
other parties, becoming embroiled in bitter constituency battles, for instance with
Labour in Monklands in 1994 or the Conservatives in Perth & Kinross in 1995344. As
a consequence the SNP often fails to bring its bigger constitutional blueprint
properly to the fore of its campaigning.
The Northern League has certainly developed a distinctive style of campaigning
which is built on differences both in venue and language. They have carried on the
long Italian tradition of 'piazza' politics, with Bossi indefatigable in his will to go
out on the streets, as with his summer 1995 tour around Northern cities to talk
directly to the people about the Mantua parliament. The League has extended this
principle of taking the message to the people, thereby cutting the perceived hostile
press out of the equation, by leafleting in bars and setting up information stalls at
large football matches (the Milan derby between Internazionale and AC Milan is
attended by almost 100,000 Northerners). Moreover the League tries to differentiate
its own message from that of other parties by using dialect words, such as Lumbard,
instead of the conventional Italian Lombardo, or by making crude puns and using
slang expressions in its posters and documents.
343 Scottish National Party (1992a) op. cit. p.17.
344 In the Monklands by-election there were widespread accusations of religious bigotry
between the SNP and the Labour Party, whilst Perth & Kinross saw mud-slinging between
the Conservatives and the SNP on the issue of Roseanna Cunningham's attitude to the
monarchy.
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As for the rhetoric of the League, they unashamedly declare they are working for the
popular will, with one of their posters and documents containing the play on the legal
term 'Nel Nome Del Popolo ltaliano' ('In the Name of the Italian Populace') that
the League is working 'Nel Nome Delia Gente' ('In the name of the People')345,
showing clear contempt for the notion of an 'Italian people'. They see themselves in
absolute opposition to all the traditional parties which have shared complicitly in the
corruption which has mired the First Republic, summed up in another poster
"Freedom for institutions and for the economy. No to the statism of the Christian
Democrats, the Communists and the Fascists".346 Elsewhere these parties are
accused of being "friends of Craxi's and Andreotti's", whilst the League holds itself
well above the various kickback scandals which have erupted since 1993.
As for the presentation of the League's dominant policy end, namely the wholesale
reform of the Italian state, it is a task which they see in quasi-revolutionary terms, for
instance their 1994 election posters included such phrases as "It's a revolution which
must be concluded" and "1994 - The dictatorship falls"347 The current state then has
unquestionably failed and the most obvious symptom of this is the inequity of
current taxation, the reform of which is one of the League's key planks. They tried to
organise a non-payment campaign of the extraordinary tax imposed on property in
1992/3 but quickly concluded that the Northerners' ethos could not stomach non¬
payment with its Southern connotations.348 Thus the emphasis was changed to
complete reform of the tax system, with the following types of questions and
demands:
345 II Calendario (1994) op. cit. p.19.
346 See Lega Nord 'LegaNord' the Official Newspaper of the Northern League [Year XII,
No. 6, 28th February 1994] p. 10.
347 Ibid.
348 For an account of this 'imposta straordinaria sugli immobili' - see Miglio (1994) op. cit.
pp.33-36.
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"Where does our money finish up? We ask for respect for those who work
honestly. Enough of the great fiscal robbery! We want autonomy like the
Valle d'Aosta or the Trentine South Tirol so that ninety per cent of our taxes
stay in our region."349
This tax issue has been woven together with the centralism of Rome and the
corruption of the traditional parties to create a clarion call for the League thus, as
Bossi says:
"Lombardy is not the fool that pays other people's debts. Lombardy does not
want to follow Rome passively into bankruptcy because it does not care to
sacrifice at Rome's altar ofmisgovemment the rights of its citizens, the
sweat of its children, the labour and the character of its people."350
A key word for the League is then liberty - they want tax freedom, institutional
freedom, and regional freedom to control education, health, pensions, the legal
system and immigration.
Another strand of the League's rhetoric is the attempt to create a quasi-subcultural
belonging in the first instance to the specific locale, but also more generally to the
concept of the North. In this context the use of symbols such as the League's flag
with the ancient Lombard warrior emblazoned across it have always been recognised
as important, for instance in the first programme of the Lombard League in 1983,
Article 2 says:
"(The League is) for the reaffirmation of our culture, history, the Lombard
language, our social values and morals. Against each of these an outrage has
been committed toward Lombard national identity. Therefore instead of the
tricolour, the historic flag of the Lombard Nation (a red cross on a white
background) should always be displayed."351
This tack has been taken further by the marketing of many objects and gadgets which
were specifically regional, from pens and car stickers, to more unusual objects such
as a Lombard watch, which tells the 'Ura Lumbarda' 352 and all of which have
proved very popular with League supporters.
349 L. Costantini (1994) op. cit. p. 195 Fig. 10.
350 'The Guardian' 12/11/93 op.cit. p.19.
351 Lega Nord (1993) op. cit. p. 24.
352 See the advert for watches cited in T1 Calendario' (1994) op. cit. p. 25. The advert is
written in the Lombard dialect and is scarcely intelligible to a speaker of Italian, such are the
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Like the SNP, the League also uses the broader international context to lend weight
to its own domestic argument for autonomy. For instance in a 1989 European
election leaflet the Venetian League has a long list of territories and the populations
who have the right to them such as "Wales to the Welsh, Quebec to the Quebecois
and Lombardy to the Lombards" (though no mention of the Scots), before
concluding that "the Veneto should belong to the Venetians" and then quoting as
follows from the 1975 Helsinki Declaration of Human Rights:
"All peoples (and therefore even the Venetian people) always have the right
to determine with complete freedom, when and as they wish, their internal
and external status...and their right to self-determination and their own
government."353
The final issue which needs to be discussed is the situation of the League on the left-
right spectrum. As earlier discussed, the League was initially pigeon-holed as a
movement of the far right due to its alleged racism, but the electoral evidence of
Chapters Four and Five points to a conception of the league as outwith the right-left
continuum. The League itself has made this position more its own policy, claiming
that its entry into government with the right-wing parties of Berlusconi and Fini was
necessary to control these recycled agents of the old regime, since for Bossi by the
second half of 1993, "there had already started a sophisticated and transformist
operation to save the centralist system substituting the faces and the names of the
front-line."354
After the League's withdrawal from the government in December 1994 there was a
tentative opening to the left with a handful of local alliances in mayoral and city
elections, but by the regional elections of April 1995, the League had decided very
differences, not only in spellings but also in actual vocabulary, for instance 'ureloc' not
'orologio' for time-piece.
353 Ibid. p.27.
354 U. Bossi (1995) op. cit. p.3.
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much to go it alone, shunning alliance and holding up its autonomy message as very
different, as the Venetian League programme showed:
"Northern League/Venetian League. Neither with the right, nor with the left,
but for the Veneto. A Venetian government for those who live and work in
the Veneto."355
This idea of being above ideological divisions and perhaps creating a new, territorial
cleavage is again highlighted in a very instructive paragraph which comes from the
League's world-wide web site under an entry on future prospects:
"The Northern League must stay outside and above the left-right scheme,
fighting for its well-defined goal, against all the other parties if necessary,
but at the same time trying to catalyse transversal support among them...The
dreams of a revolution leading to the ultimate goal for many of us - full
independence of the North - must not be confused with reality. Yet these
dreams must survive : they may be eventually realised in a European Union
based on a federation of regions, after the dissolution of the nation-states;
after all, the structure of the nation-state is a historical artefact functional to
a given social and economic situation which will soon become obsolete.
Building the future federation, as well as rewriting the Italian Constitution,
will be the future goals of the Northern League and of other federalistic
movements in the Continent."356
Thus the direction in which the League wants to head and the position in which it
sees itself in Italy are manifest. The initial manoeuvres of the 1996 election
campaign saw suggestion of an alliance with the centre-left, PDS, on the proviso that
the League made no explicit reference to secession, but this overture was rejected as
another example of the establishment again trying to control the League, albeit the
leftist establishment rather than its rightist cousin in 1994. Such a flirtation with the
centre-left, having two years ago been part of the Pole of Liberty amply illustrates
the League's ideological fluidity.
Both parties like to see themselves as somehow above the political fray, believing
that their goal represents a finer vision of society which contrasts with the short-
termism and self-interested predilections of the centralist political parties. However,
355 Lega Nord (1995b) Venetian League 'Programma per le elezioni regionali'.
356 Lega Nord (1996) 'Prospects for the Future - The European Union of Regions' [Lega
Nord, World -Wide Web Site, http://www.agora.stm.it/politic/z.nord.htm, accessed
2/2/96],
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the reality for both is quite different - they have to compete for votes within the
existing system and often resort to intra-partisan attacks. Both, moreover, participate
in the central legislatures and aim to broker reform from the centre, a tactic which is
in stark contrast to that adopted, for instance, by Sinn Fein in the aftermath of the
1916 Easter Rising, when they set up the Dail (Irish parliament). To an extent then
both the SNP and the League can be seen to be acting like traditional parties, albeit
whose agenda has one over-riding reform within it. They cannot escape this
condition and it dictates some of the nature of their aggressive campaigning which is
used against them by their opponents to claim politics as usual, where the parties say
they are different. To the extent that they do behave like such traditional parties the
argument that the League and the SNP can be seen as new paradigms of autonomist
parties is diminished, although some of their behaviour is determined by the electoral
systems in which both are situated. Their playing of the political game in electoral
terms does not diminish the differences from traditional parties in other areas which
the other sections of this chapter have described.
6.10 Summary
This chapter has used three different data sources in an attempt to put flesh on the
contention that the Scottish National Party and the Italian Northern League have
several similarities which can be usefully compared. These are internal party areas,
such as the tensions over constitutional means and ends, the tendency to use anti-
centralism versus London and Rome, a pro-European attitude which creates
considerable questions over the degree of autonomy to be obtained and also more
systemic considerations, such as the manner in which identity is used, the accusation
of ideological fluidity with its connotation of shallow populism and the nature of the
party's campaigns and attacks on opponents which can mean the parties ending up
looking like these opponents. It is hoped that through the triangulation of party
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literature, activist interviews and secondary data that the claim of comparison of
what can initially be seen as very diverse movements has been substantiated. The
task for the next chapter is one ofmarrying the theories and the practice in that it will
seek to answer to the extent to which the two parties can be said to be different
versions of a single phenomenon, having been shown to be different from traditional
nationalist movements.
This chapter would contend that the two parties are united in the belief that
government in general needs to be accountable to people within specific geographic
localities and to this end, both seek greater autonomy for their defined spheres.
Chapters Three, Four and Five showed similarities in context, genesis and voter
appeal whilst this current chapter has added similarities in many veins of policy and
rhetoric. Having established the basis for comparison, this thesis will now examine
the extent to which either or both of the parties under consideration can be said to




THE PARADOX OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY AND THE
NORTHERN EEAGUE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
7.1 Questions to be Answered
This penultimate chapter seeks to draw together the various strands of argument and
evidence which have been discussed up to this point. It will start to draw conclusions
about the Scottish National Party and the Northern League which will be made
explicit in the final chapter. As the title suggests the dominant theme of this closing
analysis is the European Union and the extent to which autonomists within this
organisation face different parameters - not just from similar movements outwith the
Union's auspices - but also from predecessors in their own locales. The European
Union, notwithstanding its development in fits and spurts at the behest of nation-
states, is an organisation unprecedented in political history in terms of the explicit
sharing of sovereignty which its members agree to when they sign their treaties of
accession.357 It is the argument of this thesis that it has not so much changed the
goalposts of autonomism, as created a wholly new ballgame, with new rules and
referees.
This chapter will attempt to assess any decline in the powers and abilities of nation-
states within the European Union. It does not argue that the nation-state has died, nor
that state-nationalism can no longer be found in the EU, with the 1996 beef crisis
serving up powerful evidence that certainly British nationalism is alive and well. The
arguments of those such as Alan Milward who maintain that Europe's pooling of
357 Although the five members of the Andean Pact - Peru, Bolivia, Columbia, Venezuela
and Ecuador - announced in March 1996 the changing of their 27-year-old customs union
into an 'Andean Community' modelled on European integration which the Bolivian
President said had a 'desire for genuine integration' [Financial Times, 12/3/96].p.3.
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sovereignty has helped its nation-states survive will be discussed and debated,
however the potential historical import of the changes which are being wrought by
the EU will not be shirked or toned down simply because they are contemporary.
One of the paradoxes of continuing integration is the polarisation of debate between
those who want the nation-state to reassert itself and those who see continued
integration into monetary and security spheres as the beginning of the Inter-
Governmental Conference in Turin in March 1996 has brought into sharp focus.
What can be said though is that never since the concept of nationalism was first
coined in the aftermath of the French Revolution has it faced such a substantive
challenge from a non-state organisation. In the globalised, integrated, modern
context the nation-state has to fight with other levels of institutions, it no longer has
automatic primacy, as Keating and Jones make clear in the preface to their book
looking at regions in the EU:
"The nation-state, while it showed no sign of fading away in favour of a
Europe of the Regions, was increasingly penetrated by supranational
influences...there is a common dynamic towards increasing regional
assertion and a challenging of the decisional monopoly of the nation-state."
358
It is this contested decisional scenario which provides the contemporary context for
the Scottish National Party and the Northern League.
The previous chapters have made clear that grounds for comparison do exist, in
terms of history, voters, party make-up and policies. The questions which this
chapter will seek to answer concern the ramifications of the European Union on the
content of the parties' demands and the ways to a theoretical understanding of the
League and the SNP. In general terms the specific strictures imposed by membership
of the European Union, either as an independent member-state or as a strong,
autonomous region will be examined whilst looking at the blurring of boundaries
between the terms 'nation' and 'region'. The parties will then be placed within the
358 B. Jones & M. Keating (1995) "The European Union and the Regions" Preface pp.v-vi.
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general theories of political parties and social movements and the question will be
posed of where best in the literature they can be situated, whether they are clearly
parties or movements, or whether both facets need to be combined to understand
them properly. The similarity or difference of the parties' goals will then be assessed
within the wider question of how much the experience of these parties can be
generalised. In what ways the two parties under consideration are different from the
past, why they have emerged in the late twentieth century in particular and whether
there is a need for a different terminology to properly capture the content of these
movements will be analysed and assessed.
This chapter then hopes to clarify the extent to which the Scottish National Party and
the Italian Northern League can be seen as different variants of a single phenomenon
and pose questions concerning the limited degree of understanding which can be
reached if the traditional definitions of nationalism and regionalism are not altered to
take account of the European Union's impact.
7.2 The Impact of European Union
Much has already be said about the impact of the European Union upon the member-
states which are signatories to its various treaties. In section 6.6 of the last chapter
the attitudes of the parties toward Europe was shown to be very favourable, and
moreover this was found to be in marked contrast to negative attitudes in the near
past for the SNP (which can still be found amongst some of the activists as Chapter
Six showed and was recognised to an extent by the commitment to a referendum on
monetary union at a special party conference in Dundee at the end of April, although
the party leadership remained very much committed to the idea). In this change of
attitude the SNP has not been alone, as Keating captures:
"Autonomist and separatist movements, which in the past often saw the
Community as one step more remote, and therefore more objectionable,
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than national governments, have increasingly come to frame their demands
in European terms. Free trade potentially lowers the economic costs of
separation considerably, a factor which, in Catalonia, as in Quebec and
Scotland, has led nationalist movements to abandon protectionism in favour
of autonomy within the free-trade regime. In some cases, this takes the form
of a policy of independence in Europe, the Community providing an
external support system for a move which otherwise appears fraught with
danger uncertainty and cost. Elsewhere, Europe is evoked more vaguely, as
providing an arena in which the regional personality can be projected as an
alternative frame of reference to the State." 359
Europe then is used as a stick with which to beat entrenched 'nation-state'
governments and is increasingly being portrayed as a means by which smaller
geographical units can wage power at an international level - as can be clearly seen
by the SNP's persistent use of the concept of the 'seat at the table', as the means by
which the Scotland could regain its European and world voice.
However several questions remain, such as what the differences are for a nation or
region within an integrating Europe in terms of control over their own destiny;
whether the European Union can ever replace nations in terms of meeting identity
needs and the extent to which the EU will further pool sovereignty in the future.
In any discussion of nations and regions it is important to bear in mind that 'nation-
states' and nationalism are relatively new concepts in the whole span of human
history. They have been used only for two centuries and prior to decolonisation after
the Second World War (when the number of internationally-recognised states grew
more then threefold in twenty or so years, from around fifty to over one hundred and
fifty360), most of the peoples of the world had experienced only feudalism or
colonialism. Western Europe is the historical exception rather than the rule and is
seen, along with its American offshoot, as the home of the nation-state. However
Michael Mann wisely cautions "..lest we get too obsessed with picking winning and
losing nations...the nation itself is not natural, but a particular and developing
35° Ibid. Keating chapter on 'Europeanism & Regionalism' pp.7-8.
360 See E. Hobsbawm (1995) op. cit. pp.344-345.
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historical construct."361 This is an important rider in any discussion of sub and supra
national challenges to the nation-state. Whilst it has been the dominant unit of
politics, nowhere is it set in stone that it must always remain so, the conditions of the
late twentieth century may demand different territorial units of organisation. As for
the difference between nations and regions, often played on, by those critical of any
diminishing of the powers of the nation-states, David Marquand sees both as having
similar historic roots, re-affirming that there is no necessity in the nation and state
coinciding, rather:
"Nations are regions which made it, which succeeded in establishing a claim
to nationhood, sometimes conquering other regions in the process. National
cultures are regional cultures which were successfully imposed on other
regional cultures...When territorial aspirations are described as 'regional',
particularly when they are then contrasted with other aspirations described
as 'national', it is usually with bad faith, the intention being to suggest that
the first set of aspirations are somehow less serious and therefore deserve
less consideration, than the second."362
Both Britain and Italy could certainly be seen in this light with Piedmont and
England being the regions which 'made it' and then sought to impose dominant
political systems and cultures on other contiguous regions which became part of a
greater 'nation' (although the dominant culture in Italy was Tuscan rather than the
Francophone Piedmontese culture).
The point then is that the concept of the European Union and the regions within it are
best approached with an open mind, in that they may be a precursor to future forms
of organisation. What can be said unequivocally is that no European nation-state has
absolute independence of action in the late twentieth century, for as Chapter Two
showed economic and political globalisation has meant that sovereignty is very much
negotiated depending on the sphere of government. Future debate on European
integration will focus on the extent to which the process of joint decision-making
will be extended onward from the current competences of the 'acquis communitaire'.
361 M. Mann (ed.) (1990) "The Rise & Decline of the Nation-State" p.9.
362 D. Marquand (1991) 'Nations, Regions and Europe' in B. Crick (ed.) "National
Identities" p. 33.
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The contemporary debates in European polities centre on the attitudes to deeper
integration through monetary union and security integration, along with integrated
home affairs and justice policies. No matter the outcome of current debates, there is a
definite trend which may be observed in the post-war period, captured thus by Barry
Jones:
"..the European nation-state is not what it used to be...the Welfare State
associated with post-war social democracy and based on 'national' norms is
being replaced by the Competition State which has to operate within an ever
more interdependent world. This trend is particularly apparent within the
member-states of the EC. The continuing integrative process and the
increasingly qualified concept of national sovereignty poses profound
questions for national political institutions."363
Whilst issue could be taken with the idea that only recently have states become
competitors with reference to the intense military and colonial competition of the
Great Power era, it is the trend which is highlighted by Jones which is more
significant than his terminology used in describing international players. The key
reference here is to the concept of qualified majority voting (QMV) institutionalised
within the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and now the centre of debate about
the Union's future. The more spheres of policy that QMV is extended into, the more
the traditional policy sovereignty of the nation-state will be reduced.
What then are the actual constraints imposed by membership of the European
Union? For a member-state, signature of the different treaties which form the legal
basis of the Union marks out a very different type of international organisation from
the others which have grown rapidly in the post-war era. Beyond simple co¬
operation, the legal basis of the Community from the 1957 Treaty of Rome to the
February 1992 signature of the Treaty on European Union, pledges the members to
common laws on a variety of areas and commits them to seek uniformity and
harmonisation in a single, rather than just a common market. Moreover European
law is unprecedented in the supremacy which it enjoys over nation-state law within
363 B. Jones & M. Keating (1995) op. cit. - Jones 'Conclusion' pp.289-290.
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the treaty-agreed auspices and in the provision of legal institutions capable of
reviewing national enforcement records and penalising defaulting states, as Neill
Nugent sums up :
"The claim to legal supremacy in the interpretation, application and
adjudication of these laws constitutes a central element of the supranational
character of the EU. This has necessarily involved the members states in
surrendering some of their sovereignty since they are obliged to submit to a
legal system over which they have only partial control and, as a corollary,
their governments are sometimes prevented from introducing national laws
they themselves desire."364
However, after the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, national governments took
comfort in the power of the national veto to block extensions of community law and
hence obligations into areas in which they didn't wish extension to occur. This
followed General De Gaulle's opposition to the phasing-in of majority voting, with
the key phrase from the 1966 Accords de Luxembourg, coming in Point II of the
communique which read: "..the French delegation considers that where important
interests are at stake the discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is
reached."365 Against this backdrop we can understand why the 1986 Single
European Act and the 1992 Treaty on European Union are so anathemic to the
proponents of a Gaullist Europe of the nation-states, for after twenty years of 'Euro-
sclerosis' these two moves re-invoked the principle of majority voting (unanimity
having never been legally established) and crucially extended the number of policy
areas in which majority voting was constitutionally permissible, which has been
illustrated by the limited remit which the UK has in opposing the workings of the EU
over the ban on British beef, as Nugent makes clear:
"The Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
have greatly reduced the circumstances in which the unanimity principle
364 N. Nugent (1994) "The Government and Politics of the European Union"p.234.
365 Ibid, quoted on p.144 - Nugent goes on to say that "Although it had no constitutional
status, the Luxembourg compromise came to profoundly affect decision-making in the
Council at all levels. It did so because point II of the communique came to be interpreted as
meaning that any state had the right to exercise a veto on questions which affected its vital
national interests - and the states themselves determined when such interests were at
stake.".
225
applies and it is now largely confined to the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) of the TEU (though
even here some implementing decisions may be taken by qualified majority
vote)...Qualified majority voting now applies to most types of decisions in
most policy areas." 366
The pillar structure formalised by the Maastricht Treaty is now the focus of the key
debates on the Union's future - if Qualified Majority Voting is extended across all
three pillars (ie. into the CFSP and JHA pillars) then almost all aspects of the
traditional nation-state's basket of powers will be subject to some degree of pooling
of sovereignty.
This context of the European Union has profound implications for the policies of
both the Scottish National Party and the Italian Northern League, both of which
Chapter Six showed to be keen Europhiles, in their attempts to break the vice-like
grip of their centralised states. The SNP is aiming for full-scale independence in the
EU whilst the League did envisage a substantially increased role for strong regions,
building on the creation of the consultative Committee of the Regions by the TEU
and if anything in 1996 has moved much closer to the SNP position. However,
neither aspiration can be said to be for full autonomy in the sense that many power
competences would be controlled at the macro, European level. Membership of the
EU, either as a region or a nation entails immediate surrender of powers which were
until not long ago, integral to the design of all European nationalists and regionalists
alike, such as legal, fiscal, and security competences. The degree to which the
European Union is unique in this context is well captured by Nugent:
"The three aspects of EU uniqueness - the complex institutional structure, the
range of policy responsibilities, and the combination of intergovernmental
and supranational characteristics - have combined, and are combining, to
produce a system which is quite unique in the extent to which it involves
states engaging in joint action to formulate common policies and to make
binding decisions. As the words 'joint', 'common', and 'binding' imply, the
process of working together is resulting in the EU becoming ever more
intermeshed and interdependent. This is no more clearly seen than in the
ratchet-like effect ofmany aspects of their relationships and their shared
366 ibid. p.143.
226
activities : ratchet-like in the sense that it will not be possible for them to be
reversed without creating major constitutional, legal, political and economic
difficulties at both EU and national levels." 367
This view certainly attracts dissent, for instance in Alan Milward's collection of
essays where any moves toward the surrender of sovereignty are portrayed as
understandable only in terms of nation-states advancing their own selfish interests. It
is argued that they recognise that these interests can best be realised by collective
action and so are content to pool a limited amount of sovereignty to maximise their
overall power and influence. Thus Milward memorably describes the moves toward
European integration as "part of that post-war rescue of the European nation-
state"368. For instance Milward asserts that the SEA and the TEU simply recognise
new national priorities and even includes EMU within this line of analysis, claiming
that:
"The reality was that not only did virtually all power remain with the nation-
state and its bureaucracy, with only limited surrenders of national
sovereignty being made to integrationist institutions and only for narrowly
defined purposes, but that states were also able to assert the priority of a
national interest within the integrationist framework."369
However it is interesting that Milward's discussion of 'the frontier of national
sovereignty' encompasses 1945 until 1992 - the very year in which Maastricht was
signed. Nugent and Milward both recognise the same phenomenon and simply
interpret them from different angles - the former seeing a pooling of sovereignty to
maximise the utility of all, the latter placing it much more in the prism of existing
national interests which in the global age demand inter-state co-operation. The fact
remains that there is no substantive dispute as to the process of integration, rather it
revolves around the motives for co-operation and pooling of sovereignty. However,
the more that Europe integrates and such symbolic powers as monetary and
exchange-rate policy pass to the European level, the more difficult it will become to
367 Ibid, pp.433-434.
368 A. Milward (1994) "The European Rescue of the Nation-State" p.4.
369 A. Milward (1993) op. cit. p.4.
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sustain Milward's argument without reducing it to the absurd level of the nation-state
having to give away all its powers to survive.
A more substantial criticism of the EU can be found in the analysis conducted by
Ernst Haas into the potential for a European identity which he explores by looking at
the Eurobarometer surveys over time. His research clearly identifies a decline in
affinities for nation-states but as to its successor, there is no clear picture, thus:
"None of the data at our disposal can clearly tell us whether a European
identity is replacing the nation-state as the focus of individual loyalty...there
seems to be a weakened sense of nationhood, but it has not been translated
into a strengthened sense of Europeaness."370
Haas identifies four options for the future - the status quo of liberal nationalism with
inherent contradictions, a federal European state, a decentralisation of government
within existing national units or a return to inter-war national closure in which
interdependent ties are cut and protectionism returns. He argues that the chosen route
will depend upon the manner in which the Dahrendorf problem is resolved, a
dilemma which he defines thus:
"Life chances consist of options and bonds. Modern Europeans want options-
for personal growth, for improvement of their status and income - but they
also want to preserve communal bonds with their fellows, with a historical
tradition, with an accepted moral code. Options without such bonds lead to
anomie; bonds without options imply tyranny."371
In this Haas provides the potential to reconcile the sub-national and supra-national
challenges identified in contemporary European states. The evidence gathered here
suggests that whilst many contemporary 'options' are bound up in the European
Union, 'bonds' are being rediscovered and reinvoked in sub-national units. As such
the conversion of autonomist movements to support of an integrated Europe outlined
earlier becomes much more comprehensible. Not only does the EU provide an arena
for attack on nation-states, it allows the potential existence of much smaller units of
370 E.B. Haas (1990) op. cit. p.343.
371 Ibid. p. 313.
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governance without an actual or perceived decrease in the 'options' available and so
helps to foster the identities exploited by the SNP and the League.
The European Union then is the key factor in the environment facing these two
parties, both in explaining the partial breakdown of the nation-states within which
they operate and also helping to legitimise their claims to political and economic
viability, notwithstanding the large schism between their proposals and those which
traditional nationalists would advance. It seems that the concurrent trends to sub- and
supra-national pressure on traditional states need not be portrayed as contradictory,
but rather can be seen as linked to each other as new territorial units become viable
arenas of government in the globalised age. The next section will seek to clarify how
such territoriality has been politicised in the Scottish and Northern Italian contexts
and highlight the degree of continuity or change from previous forms of
politicisation.
7.3 Parties or Movements?
One of the questions which this thesis has sought to resolve is the extent to which the
two parties under consideration resemble traditional political parties or are better
understood as wider movements which have assumed a political form. This section
will seek to draw together the strings of this discussion and reach a conclusion after
summing up what is understood by the concepts 'political party' and 'social
movement'.
Alan Ware identifies the blurred boundary between different types of political
organisations in his book 'Political Parties and Party Systems', thus:
"..attempting a 'definition' of a party is rather like attempting to define an
elephant - anyone who has seen one knows what it looks like, but providing
a definition for a person who happens never to have come across one is
rather difficult. The problem is that of identifying precisely the boundaries
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between parties and other kinds of social and political institutions."372
Ware then attempts to provide clarity by identifying five key features of political
parties. These are :
i) the bringing together of people with the aim of exercising power in a given state;
ii) the use of legitimate means in pursuing their ends (in contrast to terrorist means);
iii) the contesting of elections in the state, where and when they are held;
iv) the representation of more than a single, narrow interest within the society;
v) the grouping of people with similar beliefs, attitudes and values.
He recognises that these criteria can be disputed but synthesises them into the
following definition:
"A political party is an institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by
attempting to occupy positions in government, and (b) usually consists of
more than a single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to
'aggregate interests'." 373
The insertion of the qualifying 'to some degree' in this definition is Ware's
acknowledgement of the partial breakdown of his fourth condition listed above, for
over the last two decades Western Europe has witnessed the emergence of several
types of political party which have one core issue as their raison d'etre. This stands
in stark contrast to the idea most associated with post-war West European party
systems of the 'catch-all party' which was defined by Otto Kirchkeimer as :
"Abandoning attempts at the intellectual or moral encadrement of the masses,
it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange
effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral
success. The narrower political task and the immediate electoral goal differ
sharply from the former all-embracing concerns; today the later are seen as
counter-productive since they deter segments of a potential nation-wide
clientele."374
This concept from 1966 can be seen as very much a part of uncontested nation-states,
with the 'catch-all' party striving for a 'nation-wide' vote. Of course very few parties
managed to achieve anything even approaching half of the electorate's votes in West
372 A. Ware (1996) "Political Parties and Party Systems" p.2.
373 Ibid. p.5.
374 O. Kircheimer 'The Catch-All Party' in P. Mair (ed.) (1990) "The West European Party
System" p.52.
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European democracies and at best one could normally only talk in terms of 'catch-
quite-a-lot' parties. However the demise of such parties with the unfreezing of Lipset
& Rokkan's observed stability375 is significant, especially when one considers the
type of parties to which the previously 'caught' voters have migrated to and the
degree to which new cleavages seem to have opened up. Thus had Lipset & Rokkan
waited two decades before conducting their comparison, their findings would have
been very different.
The most widespread example given of such 'new' parties here are the various West
European Green parties, others include the far-right, immigration based parties, the
pensioners' party in Italy and more recently the referendum parties of Sir James
Goldsmith in France and Britain. These parties are certainly not seeking centrist
'catch-all' ground and most have little historical precedent. To what extent can
autonomist parties be said to be single-issue, new parties of this kind?
Ware provides at least a partial answer to this question in his identification of
different party families (taken from von Beyme's families spirituelles) in European
politics. In order of their historic emergence these families are liberal and radical
parties, conservative parties, socialist and social-democratic parties, Christian
Democratic parties, communist parties, agrarian parties, regional and ethnic parties,
right-wing extremist parties and ecology parties. The last three or four of these
groups can be argued to represent single interests in the sense that their politics are
dominated by one overwhelming topic of concern, and so the fourth of Ware's
conditions is under attack from contemporary developments. This, of course, is by no
375 S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (ed.) (1967) "Party Systems and Voter Alignments : Cross-
National Perspectives" In their opening article of this collection Lipset & Rokkan develop
what has come to be known as their 'freezing hypothesis' which postulated that the party
systems of the observed European democracies were largely the same as those which had
existed before the Second WorldWar which were themselves determined by fundamental
cleavages - hence contemporary cleavages were 'frozen' from previous decades.
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means a clean division and one could cite the example of the British Labour Party,
which whilst being a 'mass party'376 revolving around the economic cleavage, could
be argued, as could any such 'socialist' party, to represent the single issue of labour.
The real difference lies in the degree to which the last three or four party families
seem to represent something different from the 'mass' or 'catch-all' parties of the
recent European past.
However regional and ethnic parties can be said to be qualitatively different from
far-right or ecology parties in the vital sense that they do not seek programmatic
change; rather they want systemic change. Thus instead of seeking major policy
alterations within the present system, the Scottish National Party and the Northern
League want to change the system altogether, a fact admitted by Ware when he says
"Regional parties can become anti-system in their pursuit of some form of territorial
independence."377 This implies that the first of Ware's conditions is in danger of
falling when one considers the type of party which this thesis is concerned with, for
they bring people together not to exercise power within the state but rather to
categorically change that state, and, in some cases, to end it. They may then seek to
wield power in a new state, but by no means assume this role to be pre-destined, with
both being at pains to stress the electoral choices which would be available after
institutional reform. The League's disastrous period in the ill-fated Berlusconi
government seems to have hardened their resolve to change the whole system of
government through secession rather than seek reform from within existing state
structures. Both parties' prime aim then can be said to consist of not exercising
power within the state, but rather fundamentally altering that state's make-up,
although this picture is greatly complicated by the participation of both within
national 'party systems' in which they try to extricate as many concessions as
376 M. Duverger 'Caucus and Branch, Cadre and Mass Parties' in P. Mair (1990) op. cit.
pp.37-49.
377 A.Ware (1996) op. cit. p.153.
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possible. There is then a two-tier political game occurring in which both the League
and the SNP participate and it leads to each party having two different sides which
can lead to interpretative confusion and also makes any claim about their
fundamental beliefs or ends contestable.
The fact that the parties listed by Ware under the regional and ethnic family range
widely from left to right on issues of public ownership and social policy, both when
compared with each other and also with themselves over time,378 reinforces the
evidence of Chapters Four and Six which claimed that both the SNP and the League
were difficult to pigeon-hole on the left-right ideological spectrum. They rather seem
to represent diverse individuals and interests held together by the belief in greater
autonomy through institutional reform and vitally have no guarantee of staying
together on the day after reform is achieved. It is this tendency to straddle the
political spectrum which leads to opponents allegations of ideological diversity.
Notwithstanding the SNP's leftward shift to compete more directly with Labour, the
latter still uses the jibe of Tartan Tories. In this sense the SNP and the League can be
seen to have difficulty in meeting the fifth of Ware's requirements, namely that of
representing people with similar beliefs and attitudes - they have one dominant
similar belief based on their political identity, but beneath this level may differ
markedly on social and economic prescriptions. How do they measure up on the
remaining two conditions?
On these two conditions both the Scottish National Party and the Northern League
can be said to meet the requirements laid down by Ware in his definition of political
parties. Both use legitimate, democratic means in pursuing their reformist ends,
actively deploring non-democratic means, and both contest elections at all levels of
the state, notwithstanding their desire to reform the state organisation. Indeed both
378 Ibid. p. 40 Figure 1.8.
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parties play on electoral successes to suggest the tide is turning toward them, such as
the League's winning of the mayorship ofMilan with Marco Formentini in 1993 or
the SNP's by-election success in Perth and Kinross in 1995.
Overall the question of how best to understand the SNP and the Northern League in
partisan terms is debatable. Clearly both the Scottish National Party and the Northern
League are political parties in the physical sense of participating in electoral politics
and viewing the means of change as coming from the ballot box rather than the
barrel of a gun. However in terms of political party models, there are clear problems
in comparing them with other mainstream parties which accept the constitutional
status quo. They do seek to exercise power and represent people with similar beliefs
drawn from different societal interests, and in this sense they can be said to be
operating in a 'catch-all' fashion, but it is in a very particularist way in that they are
seeking to 'catch' a consensus based on one dominant belief and underlying any
capture is a radical system shift. How different this is from traditional mainstream
parties depends on how one judges the question of identity as opposed to economics,
religion or some other such cleavage. Both the SNP and the League are
heterogeneous in those they attract and at the extreme their members may have only
one belief in common, namely that of fundamentally altering the dominant state's
institutions and policy competences. The question of how much territory represents a
new schism or political cleavage is one which demands further comparative research.
How much aid then are the theories of social movements in understanding the two
parties? Herbert Blumer provides a starting point with the following general
definition of social movements :
"Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises to establish a new
order of life. They have their inception in a condition of unrest, and derive
their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form
of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme or
system of living. The career of a social movement depicts the emergence of
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a new order of life."379
Certainly both the SNP and the League could be said to fit this description - both
have at their heart the aim of introducing a new order driven by dissatisfaction.
Blumer goes on to differentiate between general social movements such as the
women's or peace movement, specific social movements which are in the main
reform or revolutionary movements and expressive social movements such as
religious or fashion movements. He identifies nationalistic movements as not falling
clearly into any one prong of this trichotomy, rather, in a conception reminiscent of
the different facets highlighted by Melucci and discussed in Chapter Two :
"..nationalistic movements are particularly likely to have (a) mixed
character., most nationalistic movements have a strong revivalist character
in which the past of the people is glorified...In such a movement there is not
only the creation of an objective, such as the gaining of national autonomy
but usually also an idealisation of some past epoch in the lives of the
people."380
Again both the SNP and the League look to fit this description with both playing on
the past as an important part of their rhetoric - the League's symbol depicts the
mediaeval warrior, Alberto da Guissano, who fought the Emperor Barbarossa's
imperial moves against Lombard cities in the thirteenth century, whilst the SNP
sought to make political capital by leafleting outside cinemas showing 'Braveheart',
an Oscar-winning film about the life of the fourteenth century Scottish Guardian,
WilliamWallace.
It seems then that conceptions of social movements have something to add to our
understanding of late twentieth century autonomism. Already mention has been
made of the broad concept of the 'Scottish National Movement' (as opposed to
Party) used to capture the broad acceptance of Scottish distinctiveness, regardless of
political disposition. Likewise the League, although operating in a shorter time-scale,
can be seen to have invoked a broad sense of Northern identity as the basis for its
379 H. Blumer 'Social Movements' in S.M. Lyman (ed.) (1995) "Social Movements. Critiques.
Concepts. Case-Studies" p. 60.
380 Ibid. pp.82-83.
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reforming project, as Schmidtke makes clear: "..the Lega was able to effectively
refer to a diffuse idea of Northern culture rather than to a virtually non-existent
narrower regional identity."381 It is possible to portray the electoral variants of the
SNP and League as the most militant versions of broader movements, those who
attempt to activate more latent feelings of distinctiveness. Indeed one of the
problems for the parties can be differences within a given identity, as Lynch outlines
in the Scottish case :
"Since the Scottish National Movement suffers from a weak movement
infrastructure, as its individual and organisational supporters have
overlapping and conflicting memberships and loyalties, conflict has the
potential to fragment and destroy organisations and damage the Scottish
National Movement." 382
Thus it seems that the concept of social movements can instruct our understanding of
autonomous groups in the European Union, at least to an extent. Of course the
Scottish National Party and Northern League have crossed their respective electoral
Rubicons and so, de facto, participate in their state politics as political parties rather
than social movements exerting pressure. However in the broader context of identity
needs in modern, complex, intertwined societies in which this thesis has placed both
of them, the concept of a movement has explanatory power as Melucci sums up thus:
"The ethno-national movements offer a response to these processes (vacuum
of identification). They both continue and break with historical nationalism.
They are the final outcome of nation-building and represent one of the most
striking cases of persistent exclusion from citizenship."383
This theme of the relationship between contemporary and historical nationalism will
be examined in the remainder of this chapter. It will be informed by the conclusion
that neither the SNP nor the League represent paradigmatic examples of political
parties or social movements, rather they are best seen as hybrids, dominated by the
singular pressing concern and broad social base of a movement but manifesting
381 O. Schmidtke (1993) "The Lega Nord : A Territorial Movement Beyond Regionalism'
p.14.
382 P. Lynch (1994a) op. cit. p.12.
383 A. Melucci (1989) op. cit. p.92.
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politically as parties and often becoming mired in 'politics as usual' as an inevitable
consequence of partisan participation.
7.4 Caledonia and Padania - Different Means to an End
A key question in looking at Scotland and Northern Italy is the degree to which the
end goals of the two groups under consideration are comparable. The central
dilemma here concerns the comparability of federalism and nationalism - whether
they can be said to represent different sides of the same phenomenon. This question
was raised in this thesis before the League's moves toward secession, and the
argument being developed of greater similarity than difference can only be
strengthened by such a move. The last chapter showed how neither the purported
nationalism of the SNP, nor the federalism of the Northern League, is as clearly
discernible as one might think from the simple terms themselves, both in the degree
to which the goals could be said to shift over time and also the closing width of the
gap between the two in terms of powers devolved to the autonomous level within the
EU.
The SNP has to be placed in the wider context of the 'Scottish National Movement'
to be properly understood, otherwise one risks missing the differing shades of
opinion and policy options for Scotland. In its initial years there was no clear
commitment to full-scale independence, operating as it was in the protectionist,
colonial context of the 1930s. Rather the party's creation in 1934 is best placed in the
continuing genesis of the Scottish Home Rule movement from the 1880s through to
the 1920s as Richard Finlay sums up :
"The newly created Scottish National Party encompassed elements from all
shades of political opinion and it was believed that the existence of such a
body vindicated the idea that Home Rule could act as a cohesive force,
relying simply on its own momentum to achieve constitutional change."384
384 R. Finlay (1994) op. cit. p.252.
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'Home Rule' is the crucial phrase here building on the National Party of Scotland's
1928 commitment to 'self-government for Scotland'385. The contemporary debate
within the SNP between gradualists and fundamentalists illustrates a continued
tension over the route to constitutional change which Finlay traces back to the 1940s,
although the end result is now much more agreed upon in the shape of independence.
The commitment to full-scale independence is portrayed by Finlay as stemming from
the SNP's experience in its early decades which taught it that if the other parties
were to be brought along even some of the way, it had to take a hard-line position - it
can be thought of as a movement forced into partisanship as the best means of
applying pressure on other parties more likely to deliver some kind of constitutional
reform. Crucially, however, this thesis has shown that with the late 1980's move to
the flagship policy of 'Independence in Europe', the SNP has softened its scope
considerably; its commitment to the Social Chapter, to joint security policy and
potentially to economic and monetary union, mean that an independent Scotland
would be far more circumscribed in its powers than the SNP were proposing only a
decade ago.
The most obvious difference between the Northern League and the SNP is simply the
length of time the respective parties have been around. However even in its far
shorter political history, the League has experienced enough internal debate and
policy shift to indicate that its federalist stance is far from set in stone. The
developments since the League left the Berlusconi government in December 1994
have seen a considerable hardening in stance from the League, culminating in 1996's
secessionist platform. This shift was graphically illustrated by the June 1995
establishment of a recall parliament at Mantua at which Bossi called for :
"A Constituent Assembly with strongly represented local interests to
redraw the Constitution. This is the last chance history will give us to
change the country democratically in a federal sense and to break the chains
385 Scottish National Party, (1994b) op. cit. p. 2.
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of centralism."386
Bossi explicitly acknowledged that unless the exhausted central state can deliver
federalism quickly and so free the North, then "we would have to pursue
separation"387 This type of line harks back to the quasi-secessionist early years of the
league phenomenon before the umbrella Northern League was formed and the policy
of three macro-regions pursued.
However even in this explicitly federalist phase of the early 1990s the type of
devolution sought by the League was a very strong form, with very few residual
powers remaining at the level of central government. Instead the locality, the region
and Europe were seen as the key levels of government.388 The architect of the
macro-regions idea was Gianfranco Miglio and he made clear his association of
federalism with European integration, thus:
"In place of the old ideal of 'independence' we had to substitute the most
modem model of a 'federal' integration, based above all on the free
determination of populations and on a consensus continually renewed."389
Thus the federalism sought by the League was of a very strong variety, and
moreover, recourse to full separation was the next step if it was not delivered. The
1996 general election saw the League present itself on its own pursuing this 'deliver
or else' line of argument and Bossi has proposed a referendum in the Northern
regions on self-determination, whilst talking of secession.390 The big problem for the
League, as with the SNP, is that they may be out of line with majority opinion, and
386 Lega Nord Newspaper op. cit. [No.25, Year XIII, 4th July 1995]p.l.
387 Ibid. p.2 'Free the North! Federalism or Separation'.
388 As shown in such documents as Lega Nord (1994b) 'Lega Milano : La Citta vola in
Europa' - a pre-election leaflet which saw the League in Milan specifically target the city's
growing importance in Europe under the League mayor, Marco Formentini.
389 Miglio (1994) op. cit. - Miglio was a very important policy figure in the League and was
portrayed as the intellectual guru of federalism before his acrimonious departure in 1994.
390 Bossi made the suggestion during the League's annual rally at Pontida site of Alberto da
Guissano's battle with the Emperor Barbarossa. Bossi also used the occasion to proclaim the
"birth of the nation of the north" again illustrating the complexity of terminology involved
[Financial Times, 25/3/96, p.3].
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the secessionist move may prove to be best interpreted as a negotiating tactic which
will allow Bossi to compromise back to federalism.
This section has sought to illustrate the complexity of both party's goals. Neither has
a completely static policy position on constitutional end, rather both are shifting in
response to political opportunities and opinion. The League's debate is a much
younger one than that of the SNP and it faces less explicit competition in terms of
other parties committed to devolution, however, given Italy's fractious party politics
it is possible to discern quite easily a future scenario in which both separatist and
federalist sentiment co-exist in different parties in the North of Italy. Vitally the
context of the European Union and the powers it is subsuming to itself and away
from the traditional nation-state auspice, means that the difference between a
potential federal macro-region of Northern Italy and independent nation-state of
Scotland is becoming less real and more rhetorical. Depending on the future
direction of integration, the sought after areas of Caledonia and Padania, whether
independent or devolved, may both possess similar powers and differ only in the
symbolic aspects of independence, if at all.
7.5 The Past vs. The Future
The final issue to be dealt with in this penultimate chapter is the key question of how
best to describe and understand the two exponents of late twentieth century
autonomism with which this thesis has dealt. The crucial questions here are to what
extent they represent a phenomenon from which some general precepts may be
drawn, why these movements have garnered such strength at this particular epoch,
how they compare with historical theories about separatism and whether there is a
need for a new terminology to capture any shifts in the content of their political
message, if only for the sake of analytical clarity.
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The general question of comparability of both different nations and different terms is
central to answering all of these questions. Donald Horowitz provides instructive
comment when dealing with the question of separatism and secession:
"Should the terms separatism and secession be confined to movements
aiming explicitly at an independent state or extended to movements seeking
any territorially defined political change intended to accord an ethnic group
autonomous control over the region in which it resides? Conceived in the
latter way, separatism would include ethnic demands for the creation of
separate states within existing states or for a broad measure of regional
autonomy, short of independence....The often tactical nature of demands,
their elasticity, even fickleness, the willingness of independence movements
to settle for much less than statehood, and the occasional interest of
secessionists in capturing the whole state if that proves possible - all of
these argue for an inclusive conception of separatism and secession, terms I
shall therefore use interchangeably. Such a conception should embrace
movements seeking a separate region within an existing state, as well as
those seeking a separate and independent state."391
This is a sentiment with which this thesis concurs - it has sought to illustrate the
shifting parameters of separatism and secession in the British and Italian contexts. As
for the degree to which any conclusions reached may be generalised, the necessary
limitation of this thesis to two case studies of autonomist sentiment in the European
Union means that at most they can only be treated as starting points for further
research. Obvious examples for further comparison include the Spanish regions of
Catalonia and Euskadi and the areas on either side of the Belgian language divide -
Flanders and Wallonia. The addition of more case-studies in a comparative context
would help to balance Sartori's rider that:
"Case studies sacrifice generality to depth and thickness of understanding
..comparative studies sacrifice understanding - in context and of context - to
inclusiveness : one knows less about more." 392
Scotland and Northern Italy are not identical cases. Differences can be discerned in
their system's degree of political stability, the number of parties competing on
similar electoral ground, the ability to influence the legislative centre of the political
391 D. Horowitz (1994) op. cit. pp.262-263.
392 G. Sartori (1994) 'CompareWhy & How - Comparing, Miscomparing and the
Comparative Method' in M.Dogan & A.Kazancigil (ed.) "Comparing Nations" p.24.
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system, the widespread nature of an identity and indeed, for much of this thesis'
lifespan, in the headline goals of the movements in question. However despite these
differences, this thesis has argued that the genesis, content and goal of the SNP and
the Northern League are a suitable topic for comparison and indeed it can be argued
that precisely because of initial differences, the eventual comparison and conclusions
drawn are more resilient, and with the rider expressed above concerning the need for
greater comparative studies, tentative general conclusions may be drawn.
Why then have these two movements come to the fore in a substantive electoral
sense in the late twentieth century and not before? At least part of the answer here
lies in the successes of the British and Italian nation-states outlined in Chapter Three.
Certainly in the age before mass democracy both of these were amply supported by
the relevant elites and as the franchise was extended the considerable welfare states
put in place by both helped to maintain an approving daily plebiscite. Lindsay
Paterson's book shows quite clearly that for much of its history Scotland has enjoyed
considerable autonomy within the Union and so had little material motive to question
the 'national' settlement involved:
"The politics that affected the daily lives of people in Scotland remained
thoroughly Scottish because (they were) emphatically local. The significant
conflicts were within Scotland, not against England. Civil society was
autonomous from the state, in Scotland as throughout Britain...The Scots
could believe that they had won a great bargain because their culture could
flourish and their economy could grow, this was their conception of liberty.
It is not ours, nor that of nationalism : there was no mass franchise, nor even
the nineteenth-century icon, a national parliament. But that does not mean
that there was no national independence, nor even that people in general did
not endorse the constitutional situation. By European standards, Scottish
autonomy was at worst normal, at best actually quite privileged."393
The most important point here is that of judging by the standards of the time and
Paterson uses this concept to portray the creation of the Scottish Office and its
burgeoning role in Scottish civil society as important in maintaining contentment
with the Scottish constitutional settlement into the twentieth century with its vastly
393 L. Paterson (1994) op. cit p.45.
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expanded role for the state in the private sphere through the provision of welfare. It is
not that nationalism was not present, rather that concessions were wrought:
"The evolution of the Scottish Office between 1945 and the mid-1970s
continued to be conditioned by nationalism...each significant extension of
the powers of the Scottish Office was in response to current nationalist
campaigning - usually spreading across the political spectrum - whatever
the official rhetoric about administrative rationalisation may claim. And,
although the campaigns did not achieve their overt goal of a parliament,
these changes to the Scottish Office were actual victories."394
It is only in the last few decades that these positive aspects of Union and concessions
have come to be seen by increasing numbers to be insufficient to meet the needs of
Scotland's distinctive identity, a shift examined in depth in Chapter Three.
Likewise in Italy there was an immediate concern in the aftermath of Unification
with ensuring the nascent nation-state take hold across the whole peninsula - that
Italians were 'made'. The motivation here was within a different context from the
partners in British Union, and the principle of granting de facto autonomy was buried
for a century in favour of strong centralism, as Mack Smith makes clear :
"Setting myth and rhetoric aside, the mass of people had been indifferent to
the Risorgimento, if not actively hostile, and it was possible for
contemporaries to say that no other modem nation had fewer efforts and
fewer sacrifices in the cause of patriotism. Hence arose the assumption that
a strong and centralised government was required if the nation were to
survive." 395
Again the lack of previous agitation in the North before the last two decades can be
seen to be partially the result of the created nation-state providing a beneficial
structure for those in the North, until the Christian Democrat post-war occupation of
the state, skewed the state's interests and much of Italy's resources towards the
South, a process which was fuelled by the now uncovered government corruption to
become self-sustaining, as Duggan sums up:
"In the 1860s the Piedmontese had tried...to introduce a sense that the law
stood above private interests and ought to be respected and obeyed for the
sake of the 'nation' or the 'national' good. Unfortunately, this 'nation' had
turned out to be made up of a narrow elite, and seemed to cater primarily to
the North. This severely limited the moral authority of the state in the South.
394 Ibidp.112.
393 D. Mack Smith (1971) op.cit. p.273.
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After 1945 the DC did nothing to alter this situation; if anything they made
it worse. In their concern to keep the Communists at bay and entrench
themselves in power, they had turned clientelism into a self-sustaining
method of government and thereby reinforced many of the most corrupting
and debilitating features of Southern society."396
It is against the backdrop of this corruption and the drain on Northern economic
resources which it created that the rise of the Northern League is best set.
The fact that both the parties emerged out of broken down bargains and changes in
favourable circumstances was analysed in the context of changing values in Chapter
Five. The key question is whether these parties or movements are motivated
primarily by material motives or not? For some, such as Ronald Inglehart the decline
of the traditional nation-states and their established roles and powers is inextricably
linked to the unprecedented economic changes which the developed world have
undergone in the last fifty years since the end of the last world war, thus:
"..the decline of nationalism and patriotism among West European
publics...can be traced to some of the same factors that give rise to
Postmaterialism : the emergence of a public that has become accustomed to
economic and physical security, and is less likely to feel threatened by
neighbouring peoples. Indeed, the rise of Postmaterialism contributes to this
tendency. But the decline of patriotism and nationalism goes beyond the
Postmaterialist syndrome, for it also reflects an historical change in West
European publics' orientations toward war - a change that seems linked with
the experience ofWorld War II...Finally, the emergence of the European
Community institutions has contributed to making the perspective of the
nation-state seem outmoded, giving rise to a faint but growing sense of
European citizenship."397
However Chapter Five highlighted limitations of simply applying concepts such as
'post-materialism' with a broad brush to the movements in question, because there
was considerable evidence of the importance of economic, material concerns.
Perhaps the best we can say is that contemporary autonomist movements represent
unfulfilled Postmaterialists in the sense that once autonomy is achieved and the
perceived material disparities are righted then they may come to the fore. However,
396 C. Duggan (1994) op. cit. p. 269.
397 R. Inglehart (1990) op. cit. pp. 408-409.
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this is very much a speculative conditional and is further complicated by the context
of the European Union whose projects for Economic and Monetary Union are very
material in motivation. The complexity and overlap of this problem was captured by
Inglehart in his initial book, writing about the Flemish nationalists, but with clear
parallels for our current subject matter :
"The raison d'etre of the nation-state had been to maintain order and defend
its people and property against outsiders, such considerations weigh less
heavily among the priorities of Post-Materialists. Hence, Post-Materialists
are relatively open to a supra-national orientation, but it is possible that their
attention may turn inward toward smaller, more cohesive centres of loyalty.
In the case of the Flemish nationalists, as we have seen, the Post-
Materialists move in both directions, simultaneously emphasizing greater
autonomy for their ethnic group and supporting European integration."398
Whilst we can say that both the SNP and the League benefited from dealigned voters
as the traditional, hegemonic parties declined, and that such dealignment has been
linked to the rising material living standards ofWest European democracies, there is
no evidence that the parties are post-material and indeed, if anything, they have been
shown to play on the economic concerns of voters within their given territorial units.
Whether post-material concerns come to the fore will depend on the conditions under
which either party wins their demands and must await further research at that time.
Thus parties such as the SNP and the League cannot be grouped with movements
like the Green parties through a bland assertion of the panacea-like theory of post-
materialism. They are complex and heterogeneous phenomena which look back as
well as forward and they need to be recognised and studied as such.
How are the SNP and the Northern League then to be understood in terms of the
general literature on nationalism? It is the contention of this thesis that several of the
dominant theories of nationalism have tended to treat it as too much of a monolithic
force. The term 'nationalism' has been stretched to accommodate so many different
phenomena that there is very little substantive left within it. Some recent writing has
started to see a recognition of its limitations, as Alter makes clear:
398 R. Inglehart (1977) op. cit p.334.
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"It is clear that nationalism, so convenient a label and justification for many
developments, conceals within itself extreme opposites and contradictions.
It can mean emancipation, and it can mean oppression : nationalism, it
seems is a repository of dangers and opportunities...it is more appropriate to
speak of nationalisms in the plural than of nationalism in the singular."399
Whilst there are still theorists who seek a more hegemonic line, they tend to
recognise the diversity of content beyond the conceptual similarities, such as Liah
Greenfeld:
"National identity in its distinctive modern sense is, therefore, an identity
which derives from membership in a 'people', the fundamental character of
which is that it is defined as a 'nation'...(it) is perceived as essentially
homogeneous, and the lines of status and class as superficial. This principle
lies at the basis of all nationalisms and justifies viewing them as expressions
of the same general phenomenon. Apart from it, different nationalisms share
little."400
The question which this thesis must answer is to what extent the SNP and the
Northern League fit into these changing conceptions. The crux of the issue is the use
and active seeking of an identity without the necessary connection with the powers
of a nation-state. Whereas the be-all and end-all of nationalists from the iconic fall of
the Bastille in 1789 through to the post-war period of colonial liberation was
obtaining the control of all powers of a state, both internal and external,
contemporary nationalists in Western Europe portray themselves as quite happy to
gain partial control, with other functions of government being conducted at a supra¬
national level. The seeking of autonomy is far from being just a symbolic matter -
there would be substantial policy areas won back from the discredited centres,
especially in the private and social sphere, but the level of expected control as
members of the European Union is much less than at any previous time in the history
of nationalism. It is this breakdown in the traditional nexus of 'nation' and 'state'
which begs the question of terminological shift. It is confusing to use the same term
'nationalism' to represent historically tangential phenomena - namely, both the
manner in which industrialising states came to form nation-states and empires and
399 P. Alter (1989) op. cit. p.5.
400 L. Greenfeld (1992) "Nationalism - Five Roads to Modernity" p.7.
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how in the last few decades these formations have started to splinter and break-up.
Touraine suggests a possible solution to this confusion:
"The political process in which we are participating is much less the
construction of a European state than the partial de-nationalisation of
European countries or their entry into a post-national era."401
Whether post-nationalism is the best term to capture the very different processes at
work in contemporary Western Europe is a matter of much debate. It is not proffered
as a simple way out of a conceptual muddle but rather as a contribution to the
process of classifying and understanding nationalism, for as John Hall makes clear
"..no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible. As the historical record is
diverse, so too must be our concepts."402 This thesis will conclude with an espousal
of the ways in which modern nationalism within the EU is specifically different.
7.6 Summary
This chapter has sought to bring together the theory and the practice of contemporary
autonomism in Scotland and Northern Italy and to move toward conclusions which
will be made specific in the next chapter. It has sought to show that the Scottish
National Party and the Italian Northern League provide valid and fruitful objects of
comparison building on the internal analyses of Chapter Six to place them in the
wider theoretical context.
It has been argued that the context of the European Union provides a vital difference
both in comparing with autonomist parties not within its remit and also when one
compares the movements within the Union across time to nationalist predecessors.
Against the supranational backdrop a blurring of means and ends can be discerned
with the lines between nationalism, regionalism and federalism within an integrated
401 A. Touraine (1994) op. cit. p.13.
402 J. Hall (1993) op. cit. p.l.
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Europe becoming increasing murky. This chapter has also sought to show that the
SNP and the League need to be understood as part political party and part social
movement. At the very least they are not traditional political parties with their over¬
riding anti-system goals, but nor through their electoral participation can they be said
to be classic social movements. They are best understood as hybrids then, both in
their form and their content, and much of this hybrid nature can be related to their
location within the European Union project and the heterogeneous motives which
they capture. The conclusion of this thesis will now try to sum up the exact manner
in which this organisation has changed the landscape of autonomism and has
effectively made many potential units of territory into autonomous eunuchs before




8.1 More Similar than Different?
At the outset of this thesis it was stated that the two parties in this study could not be
neatly compartmentalized under the labels 'nationalist' and 'federalist'. The
intervening chapters have attempted to provide evidence for the development of this
claimed complexity when considering autonomist movements in the contemporary
European Union. The constitutional goals of the Scottish National Party and Italian
Northern League respectively have been shown not to be fixed, immutable planks of
policy. Rather they are part of the weaponry of partisan conflict which shift over
time in response to the external political opportunities presented and also in reaction
to internal party pressures. Evidence of this has been provided by Alex Salmond's
gradualist-orientated leadership of the SNP and, more spectacularly, by Umberto
Bossi's conversion during the 1996 Italian election campaign to support of secession
for the self-proclaimed 'nation of the North'.403 Neither of these positions can be
taken as definitive policy statements because they are likely to ebb and flow in the
future, just as they have done in the recent past. What they do illustrate is exactly
how blurred the divisions between devolution, federalism, secession and nationalism
have come to be for their prime practitioners in late twentieth century Europe. These
labels have to be used very carefully in describing West European autonomist
parties, such is the fluidity of their ideologies and overlap between them.
403 Bossi has taken to quoting the Scottish rebel, William Wallace, inspired by the film
'Braveheart' about him which has been an international hit and openly compares the
League's struggle with that of the Scots "..the great nation of the North (Nordnazione) should
fight for self-determination from Rome which has been the colonial power for thousands of
years (and which treats the Northern Italians) just like those English pigs treat the Welsh
and Scots." ['The MacBossi, laird of Lombardy', The Economist. 30th March 1996] p.49.
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This is not to argue that the Scottish National Party and Italian Northern League are
identical parties; far from it. The largest difference between them is the electoral
marketplace in which they both compete. Whilst the SNP faces constitutional policy
competition from the devolutionist Labour Party and the federalist Liberal
Democrats and the unionist Conservatives, the Northern League faces much less
explicit competition on the constitutional question, although the aftermath to the
1996 election has seen Romano Prodi's centre-left government talk of some degree
of fiscal devolution to ease the North's concerns. This stems partly from the
umbrella nature of the league organisation through which it encompasses the
majority of autonomous groupings of the different Northern regions, though small
rival parties do continue to exist in Lombardy and the Veneto. On the other hand,
where the SNP faces an established four-way electoral competition within a
majoritarian system, the League faces myriad competitors in a hybrid system. It
exploited this system in 1994 through its stand-down candidacy agreement with
Forza Italia, but in 1996 it decided to adopt a stand-alone tactic which was predicted
to mean that it would pay a heavy electoral price.404 In fact the League emerged
from the election having increased its vote in the proportional part of the ballot to
10.1% with a respectable 59 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 10.4% and 27
seats in the Senate.405 This represented a rise of almost 2% from 1994 under the
same electoral system and the League's share of the seats, whilst down on 1994, was
far higher than expected largely because of its 39 seats won on the single ballot
where it was predicted to struggle between the centre-right and centre-left. In the
event it seems that Forza voters in the north chose the League over the National
Alliance(AN), providing further evidence for the existence of a distinct Northern
404 The Financial Times Italian columnist predicted a large decrease in League
representation while describing Bossi as "playing the secessionist card, hoping to be the
power broker in a hung parliament". [Financial Times, 18/4/96] p.3.
405 These figures from La Repubblica, 23/4/96, pp.1-23 - in the proportional ballot in the
North (see map in Appendix II for regions included in 'the North') the League became the
largest party with 20.5% of the vote to Forza Italia's 20.1% and the PDS's 18.6%. These
figures rose to between 25% and 30% when looking solely at Lombardy and the Veneto.
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identity, since the AN are inextricably linked with images of the South and its fascist
heritage, a stark contrast to the resistance myth of the northern part of the peninsula.
Bossi, though, was disappointed because the Olive Tree coalition had won enough
seats to control both houses, albeit relying on the support of the Refounded
Communists in the lower house, and so denied the League the potential to broker a
deal. The fact that the League won 39 chamber seats in the first-past-the-post part of
the ballot confirmed its presence as a major political force and will ensure its
proposals remain part of the reform agenda and indeed the constitutional question
has dominated political debate since the April 1996 election.
The League then can be seen to differ markedly from the SNP on the question of
electoral success and vitally carries more weight at the 'nation-state' level because of
the demographics of the Italian north compared with Scotland's substantial under-
population relative to its physical size within the UK. The SNP at its peak after 1974,
had 11 members in Westminster and less than 3% of the UK national vote. However,
within their own electoral ambits both parties can broadly be said to be around the
20% mark, though with significant regional variations within the areas in which they
compete (the League has struggled to reproduce the type of vote it gains in the
peripheral areas of the North in the major cities such as Milan, whilst the SNP
struggles to overhaul the established Labour dominance across the Central Belt of
Scotland). Beyond the obvious differences then, imposed by differing political
histories and electoral competition, the thesis has sought to show that the parties
under consideration have much in common. Chapter Six used various data sources to
argue that similarities could be drawn between the parties in terms of constitutional
end, anti-centralism, ideological fluidity, attitudes toward Europe, the use of identity
and the rhetoric of campaigning. To a lesser extent Chapter Five drew similarities in
the profile of voters who support each party. It is important that these two parties
which have been associated with different party family groups and their related
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attributes, have been shown to share many similarities. This thesis argues that many
of the differences between the two are nominal only dictated largely by the political
systems in which they compete. Much of the substance is comparable and provides
instruction in beginning to understand the complexity of contemporary autonomist
movements in the European Union and the changing content of labels such as
nationalism or regionalism within that organisation's auspices.
The difficulties highlighted by the thesis in pinning down either party at a particular
point on the ideological spectrum were well captured in the 1996 Italian election.
Data collected by the Italian magazine 'Panorama' on electoral flows between 1994
and 1996 showed the league to have the equal highest voter loyalty between the two
elections of 75% along with the centre-left PDS and the right-wing National
Alliance. More significantly, when it came to the remaining 25% of 1996 League
voters, 4% came from Berlusconi's Forza Italia exactly the same figure as defected
from the left-wing Greens, only 1% came from the National Alliance, the same
figure as moved to the League from the Refounded Communists, whilst 8% came
from the parties of the centre.406 Such figures, when allied to the data reported in
Chapter Five suggest that it is hard to sustain any picture of the League as right-wing
organisation. However, this image remains both in Italy and abroad, buoyed by such
simplistic equivocations of the League with Mussolini as offered in The Scotsman's
leader column in reaction to Bossi's calls for an independent Padania in the election's
aftermath:
"A much more constructive way forward (not only for Italy) is to make
progress towards regional structures and the decentralisation of power by
means which do not require the establishment of groups like the Northern
League's own green shirted security force - an ominous reminder of the
black shirts."40'
406 These figures are based on research by Paolo Natale and Nando Pagnocelli who used
interviews conducted with 2,500 voters by the Abacus Survey group on the 20th & 21st of
April [Panorama, 2/5/96] p.27.
407 The Scotsman 'Secession is not an option for Italy' [13th May 1996] p.12.
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The reaction in Italy to Bossi's post-election manoeuvres has seen both the Church
and the armed forces condemning his setting-up of the Committee for the Liberation
of Padania and President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro has openly questioned the
constitutional validity of any project which questions Italian national unity.408 Bossi
has also launched a 'shadow government' which has ten members under Giancarlo
Pagliarini and will meet at and be accountable to the recall parliament in Mantua409.
He has invoked the peaceful divorce of Czechoslovakia in 1993 as the model for
Padania leaving Italy and repeatedly pointed out that the League's secessionist stance
gained the largest electoral endorsement in northern Italy in the 1996 election. This
position can be interpreted in pragmatic terms with Bossi refusing to rule out a
federal compromise at the same meeting at which the Padanian government was
announced 410 The point here is that on both the question of the left-right partisan
spectrum and the question of constitutional change within or outwith existing
boundaries, the League can be said to exhibit chameleon-like properties. It has
shifted its constitutional stance markedly in the course of the 1990s and in this can be
said to mirror many features of the SNP albeit over a longer period of time. As
Chapter Four showed a comparison of the SNP in the first three decades of its history
and the following three decades from the mid-1960s shows two very different
organisations both in terms of what was being sought and electoral success; likewise
the SNP was certainly not seen as the type of left-wing party which it now portrays
itself as up until the mid-1980s. The changes may be more spread out in
chronological terms but they are definitely similar trends worth comparing
substantively. Thus beyond the systemic and political culture differences highlighted
earlier, this thesis has sought to show that there are several parallels between the
Scottish National Party and the Northern League worthy of the specific examination
408 See Corriere Delia Sera special on 'La Questione del Nord' [7/5/96] pp.4-5.
409 See La Repubblica 'Padania, governo-bis' [13/5/96] p.l.
440 Ibid. 'Bossi si fa il suo governo' pp.2-3.
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undertaken herein and it contends that these parties, both situated within the late
twentieth century European Union are indeed more similar than different.
8.2 The European Bonfire of the Autonomies
A vital theme of this thesis has been the context provided by the European Union.
This organisation represents a pooling of sovereignty unprecedented in the history of
nation-states. The argument that current controversies over the direction of
integration may see a diminution of Europe's powers cuts little ice when placed
against the history of the Community and Union. The organisation has proved itself
able to weather previous disputes and vitally has been able to outlive obstructionist
national leaders, from General Charles De Gaulle through to Margaret Thatcher and
most recently the beef-inspired John Major. At the very least the current policy
competences of the Union can be expected to endure, and thirteen of the fifteen
current members favour further integration in spheres such as monetary policy and
defence, previously reserved as monopolies of power for the nation-state (only
Denmark and the UK have opt-out clauses). The United Kingdom is the current
exception to this group, but if the Major administration is ousted at the next general
election, the attitude of an incoming Labour government would seem likely to be
markedly different on social policy and more open to debate on issues of security
and monetary integration.
In this sphere both the Scottish National Party and the Northern League are
noteworthy for their pro-European stance. In the former's case Chapter Six showed
this to be a large policy reversal from a previously very hostile attitude, and the
special conference held in Perth at the end of April 1996 at which EMU was
discussed showed how deep the commitment to Europe runs with Alex Salmond
reaffirming the SNP as 'an unashamedly pro-European party (who) are sympathetic
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to the idea of a single currency but (who) want to judge at the time when all the facts
are known."411, albeit with the emergence of some grass-roots doubts over
membership of the potential European single currency.412 The League has had a less
chequered history, due to the much wider acceptance in Italy of the pooling of
sovereignty associated with the European project. The League is as committed as the
SNP to European integration and the extension of joint decision-making, as Bossi
makes clear:
"..the new Europe must be united and federal, because the socio-economic
destiny of the continent is moving in that direction. History teaches us that
the economic structure has always guided the institutional infrastructure
towards the most rational solution...those who talk of new frontiers have
understood nothing, because the League sees the future of Europe as one of
increasing integration."413
The League's explicit and immediate worry over the Italian South preventing the
prosperous North from being a part of the central core of Europe was made clear in
the manifesto for the 1996 elections:
"The Northern League considers Europe as the important cornerstone of its
political action. The unitary 'nation-state' constitutes a relic which is more
at home in the past. It is, on the one hand, too small to respond to the
demands of regulating the economy or the environment and too large to
reply to the demands of accountability...it is vital to avoid the exclusion of
Padania from the institutionalisation of an 'inner core' which become
intimately linked ..any 'Europe of variable geometry' must not be rigidly
based on member states."414
The worry of Northern Italy being excluded from Europe's inner integrating core has
been seen to be a powerful motivating factor for the League and its support. An
integrated Europe does not aim to abolish the member-states' governments but it
does want to create more areas of collective decision-making. The vital consideration
in this matter is the possible extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) across
411 [Scotland on Sunday, 28/4/96] p.2.
412 The former SNP leader Gordon Wilson and Alex Neil's call for the SNP to commit to a
referendum on Scottish participation in a single currency by amending the motion proposed
by Allan Macartney MEP which "would place the SNP in the position of backing more
qualified majority voting in Europe with Scotland only retaining a veto over treaty
amendments." [The Scotsman, 5/4/96 p.6] was accepted at the special national conference in
Dundee.
413 Lega Nord (1993) op. cit. pp.55-56.
414 Lega Nord (1996) 'Programma Elettorale per la Padania - Elezioni Politiche Del 21
Aprile 1996' [Lega Nord OfficialWorld Wide Web site, accessed 1/5/96].
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all three policy pillars defined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), namely
extending its remit from the community affairs pillar across the security and defence
policy one and into the justice and home affairs pillar. If this occurs it effectively
removes the residual right of national veto, so zealously guarded by the Council of
Ministers between the 1960s and the 1980s as the ultimate guarantor of national
sovereignty. It is interesting to note that these Accords de Luxembourg never had
constitutional status; rather it was through habit that the second point of the
communique came to be interpreted as providing a national veto with its concession
that where 'very important interests' are in question unanimity would be sought. It is
important that the national veto was not part of the founding treaty and it was for this
reason that the Single European Act could extend qualified majority voting across
many new policy areas. Any formal extension of majority voting would extend into
new policy spheres the EU's collective remit with the European Court as final
arbiter, which would have large implications for national jurisdiction given the
accepted supremacy of European law, highlighted by Steiner:
"....in a relatively short space of time the courts ofmember States, despite
their different constitutional rules and traditions, have adapted to the
principle of supremacy of EEC law. Credit for their accepting this principle
must go to the European Court, which has supplied persuasive reason for
doing so."415
What are the implications of such integration for autonomist movements within the
Union? This thesis has shown how both the Scottish National Party and the Northern
League especially with its commitment to secession from the end of March 1996416,
aim to create autonomous governing units within the European Union. However
there is an inherent paradox in this aim, for given the policy competences which both
parties are pledged to give up to Brussels, the question must be asked - what exact
spheres of policy will remain for the newly autonomous Scottish or Padanian
415 J. Steiner (1992) "Textbook on EEC Law" p.53.
446 Bossi proclaimed the birth of the nation of the North at the traditional rally of Pontida
claiming "A nation is being born, the Padanian nation, and when we vote for its constitution
there will be no turning back" [La Repubblica, 25/3/96] p.l.
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parliaments? They may be 'nation-states' in name but judging by current policy
commitments they would bear little resemblance to any historical or traditional
model of nation-statehood.
The scenario suggested in Chapter Seven of autonomous eunuchs provides a very
stark contrast with the grand aspirations of nineteenth and early twentieth century
nationalists. The scope of powers to be gained is very much more limited due to
international obligations and constraints. Both the SNP and the League place much
faith in the notion of subsidiarity, which as the first chapter observed is very much a
contested concept, and in institutions such as the Committee of the Regions
(although this body has purely consultative powers as yet, it is seen as a forum for
pressing regional matters). However it is difficult to avert the criticism that to a
certain extent both parties are replacing the rule of London or Rome with that of
Brussels and interviews with activists of both parties revealed considerable concerns
over their respective parties' Europhile stance as Chapter Six made clear. The
autonomists may well have their own 'seat at the table', but this counts for less in the
absence of an active national policy veto and as the Union expands to the east 'the
table' is becoming bigger, making it more difficult for any individual voice to be
heard.
The difference in this stance with that of traditional nationalism and the consequent
need to differentiate between types of nationalism is captured by Michael Keating:
"..the peripheral nationalisms of developed western societies represent
attempts to come to terms with the changing constellation of power and to
reconstitute politics on a territorial basis which is legitimated historically
but which can be used to confront contemporary political and economic
realities. One aspect of this...is the acceptance of continental integration.
Large state nationalists have been hostile to this, fearing the loss of
sovereignty and domestic control over policy. The new minority
nationalisms have a view of sovereignty which is highly attenuated by the
recognition of interdependence and the limitations of the nation-state. The
question is how to insert themselves into the new continental and global
order...Some represent classic forms of nationalism, aiming at the creation
of new nation-states. Others, those of interest here, are post-nation-state in
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inspiration, addressing a world in which sovereignty has ceased to be
absolute and power is dispersed...This gives a new meaning both to the idea
of the nation and to the nationalist project. Nationalist discourse is
modernist and concerned with development and adaptation rather than
antiquarianism and looking to the past. It accepts the limits of sovereignty
and searches for ways in which self- government may be made effective and
a project for national self-assertion mounted, in the absence of the classical
nation-state."417
There is then a clearly discernible contrast between the defensive nationalism of the
traditional 'nation-staters' as one could term the Conservative Euro-sceptics and
those seeking some form of autonomy below this established state level, such as the
Scottish National Party or Northern League, who view Europe in a much more
favourable and opportunistic way. A large question, which it must be left to further
research to determine if and when the parties under consideration achieve their goal,
is to what extent they then change their attitude toward a more defensive outlook.
Such an analysis would help form a clearer picture of the extent to which fulfilled
nationalism was motivated by different concerns and impeti in contrast to unfulfilled
nationalists whose rhetoric and arguments have been examined so far, for it could be
argued to be far easier to give up theoretical powers which one doesn't possess, than
tangible powers which are actually possessed.
8.3 Sub & Supra-Nationalism
The new conditions imposed by the European Union create a vastly different context
for contemporary nationalist, federalist and regionalist movements. The content of
the different terms have been changed irrevocably by the globalising developments
of the last few decades. Gone are the days of the nation-state holding the key to
international power and prestige. A vital change in modern nationalism lies in the
question of exactly what form of state is being sought - the definite connection
417 M. Keating (1996) "Nations Against the State - The New Politics of Nationalism in
Quebec. Catalonia and Scotland" [MacMillan, 1996] p. 53.
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between 'nation' and 'state' has become contested and within the European Union
can be said to have changed aspirations and goals, as Kellas makes clear:
"All types of nationalism seek a political expression for the nation, most
strongly in independent statehood. Nationalists may settle for less, however.
They may be content for the nation to be a unit in a federal state or to have
devolution in a unitary state."418
This idea of different gradations of nationalism co-existing, rather than there being
one absolute and monolithic paradigm is supported by the evidence marshalled in
this thesis concerning the fluid nature of both parties stated aims and the overlapping
identities and constitutional desires unearthed in the secondary data. There is no
definitive answer to the question of any identity - rather both Scotland and Northern
Italy show a complex layering of different identities of which different strands may
be given salience at different times. The data and research conducted do suggest that
anyone who talks of either a 'British' or 'Italian' identity as dominant is on very
slippery terrain with clear problems for either of these in mounting any claim to
hegemony. This should not come as a surprise after the analysis of Chapter Three
which showed that neither 'nation-state' was ever as hegemonic as supposed. Rather
for much of their unitary histories bargains were struck which 'absorbed' sub-state
differences, but vitally did not preclude their continued existence. It is with the
breakdown of these bargains and compromises that the politicisation of these sub-
national identities can be explained over the last few decades. This thesis argues that
this change is inextricably linked to the growing globalisation and concomitant
integration of sovereign states which has been witnessed since the Second World
War and which was expounded in Chapter Two.
The sub and supra-national developments outlined in previous chapters cannot be
understood if they are treated simply as hermetically sealed events; rather they are
intertwined and betray a common theme of greater dependence. It is a dependence
418 J. G. Kellas (1991) op. cit. p.3.
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which has seen many traditional states unable to fulfil their gelling function in a
manner as of old and a dependence which has seen the horizons of the new
autonomists significantly alter from their nation-state building predecessors. This
decline of state power has occurred in many different fields of government activity.
There has been a globalisation of culture which has served to complement the
concurrent moves to a more global economic market. Thus state-run media is on the
retreat, in the same way as protectionism and economic closure have become
outdated in the context of free-trade areas and global moves to freer trade through the
World Trade Organisation (the successor to the GATT) have developed, albeit in fits
and spurts, with the League and the SNP's commitment to free trade being one of the
most obvious differences from previous nationalists. Concurrently the period since
the Second World War has seen security issues become much more collective under
organisations such as NATO and the WEU. In Western Europe all of these changes
have been supplemented by the incremental integration of the European Union to
create a situation in which an inward-looking autarkic state would be very unlikely to
prosper (even the likes of Norway and Switzerland have close free-trading links with
their European neighbours, notwithstanding their adherence to neutrality and lack of
institutional link). The overall environment is one that is hugely altered from the
conditions facing nationalist and regionalist parties a matter of decades ago. It is
important to stress the separate notions of 'nation' and 'state' in this process - just as
they were conjoined by historical circumstance, they can now be said to be
unravelling and this process can be seen as offering new opportunities, as Keating
says:
"In the late twentieth century... the state is retreating in some spheres and has
lost its monopoly in others. This has serious consequences for the nation-
state but differing impacts on the idea of the nation itself. In so far as the
nation is identified with the state, then any weakening of the latter entails a
weakening of the former. If national identity is rooted in civil society, on the
other hand, the retreat of the state may not prejudice it. It may, however,
permit the reassertion of other forms of national identity and mobilisation
not associated with the existing states and the assertion of claims of dual or
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multiple identity."419
This last point is one which was examined in relation to opinion poll data and activist
interviews in previous chapters. It is again evidence of the linkage to what one can
term the 'localisation' of nationalist politics. The power auspices sought by
contemporary autonomist parties for themselves largely concern social issues such as
education, health, housing and the key battleground of welfare with issues such as
trade, and to a growing extent monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy devolved
upwards to the supranational level, along with issues such as security, immigration
and borders. In other words the policy spheres of the traditional state are becoming
increasingly impinged upon or at least contested. The resolution of this conflict will
differ depending on interpretations of the notion of subsidiarity but the fact that
many of the conflicts are replicated in different 'national' arenas shows the degree of
conflict which can be highlighted within the European Union and the linkage
between trends at the sub- and supra-national level.
A central argument of this thesis has concerned the blurring of boundaries between
the previously more segmented spheres of 'regionalism' and 'nationalism', the
former operating within state boundaries and the latter seeking to overturn these
frontiers. The use by the League of a secessionist platform in the 1996 Italian general
election can be seen as clear confirmation of the confused demarcations between the
concepts of regionalism and nationalism which exist if one tries to define them as
mutually exclusive. Bossi's moves may well be tactical but they nonetheless are
indicative of the thinning line between the two. The approach of this thesis is to
employ a broader definition of nationalism which recognises and encompasses the
changes which have occurred over the last quarter of a century. This definition no
longer demands of nationalism that it must necessarily seek a 'nation-state'; instead
419 M. Keating (1996) op. cit. p.24.
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its proponents may be happy within existing territorial bounds if there is a
substantive redistribution of policy competences. The fact that the League attracted
one in ten votes amongst all Italians in the 1996 election whilst proposing a break-up
of the unitary Italian state, through the establishment of an independent state of
Padania, is significant. It flies in the face of those commentators who predicted the
demise of the League at this election, squeezed between the competing centre-left
and centre-right blocs borne of the unitary Italian state's new hybrid electoral
system. The League cannot be lightly dismissed as a flash, protest party which
benefited from the collapse of the old order; it has endured and has grown into the
most preferred party of Northern electors. Indeed for Uvo Diamanti, commentating
on the 1996 election in La Repubblica :
"The League has gained advantage from the fact that, whilst the other
political forces have been modernising themselves and shedding their
ideologies, it has remained the last of the old mass parties, with its
ideological base, its hard-core support and its ability to mobilise itself...the
wind of secession may well become unstoppable."420
This raises the question of whether or not the current crop of autonomist parties
should be viewed as subcultural in the sense of specifically creating a political
belonging through a new cleavage or whether they are simply instrumental means
toward a particular constitutional end? This is a question which undoubtedly requires
further research. What can be said is that it is surely no coincidence that many areas
are witnessing similar conflicts based on similar renascent or reactivated identities. A
wide comparison of Scotland, Padania, Catalonia, Euskadi, Wallonia and beyond to
Quebec would be instructive in starting to answer these questions. This section has
argued that there is a link between the macro and micro pictures and to some extent
the same processes which have led to burgeoning international links can be argued to
have raised the import of territory in previously, at least superficially, settled polities.
The desire to answer the questions and demands of populations in different ways can
420 La Repubblica, 23/4/96, p.11.
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be seen to contribute to the rise of autonomist politics, though it is not all
idealistically motivated by notions of democracy and accountability. As Chapter Five
argued much of the impetus must be seen through the prism of the potential wealth
of the area in question. The ability of the traditional nation-states to meet the new
demands does seem to have been dissipated and a key question in the ongoing
genesis of autonomism is the degree to which they can adjust and answer this failing.
That this question takes place within the parameters of the supra-national European
Union will very much effect the responses of the old states and as has been seen
greatly influences the approach of the sub-national actors.
8.4 Summary
The key theme of this thesis then has been the degree to which old certainties and
established theories need considerable revision in the light of developments in a
European Union now approaching its fortieth birthday. The degree to which
definitions of nationalism, federalism, regionalism and the like can be sustained as
rigidly exclusive has been challenged by the blurring of old 'nation-state'
demarcations. This blurring is reflected in the fluidity captured in the two parties
under explicit consideration. Thus whilst the internal differences between the SNP's
old anti-Europe autarky and its late 1980's 'Independence in Europe' platform or the
League's shift from three federal macro-regions within Italy to an independent
Padania are central to the domestic political debates, the very ease of flow from one
position to another and the substantial overlap between the different stances in terms
of relations with the European Union mean a very different conception of
nationalism needs to be embraced if we are to understand the trends at work.
The old nation-state is not dead but it has been severely buffeted by the many factors
outlined in this thesis. It has been stressed that the conjoining of 'nation' and 'state'
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to create the paradigmatic sovereign entity of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
is by no means a 'natural' unit of government. It has come to be the norm over the
last two hundred years, but itself may come to be supplanted. Nowhere is this trend
more evident than in Europe and it can be argued that the ire of those who oppose
European integration stems from a recognition of the potential historical weight of
the project. The shifts are captured well by Malcolm Anderson in discussing the
most symbolic of nation-state divides - the question of frontiers:
"In recent history, the international frontier has delimited the sovereign state,
a political form which originated in western Europe and spread to all
inhabited regions. The clarity of the state frontier is now fading because the
exercise of sovereign authority in certain domains is becoming either very
difficult or impossible. The increased permeability of international frontiers
is both a symptom and a cause of radical change in the characteristics and
environment of the state. This change is most evident in Europe...European
integration lacks genuine historical antecedents. It is quite unlike state-
building in early modem Europe and the drive towards national self-
determination in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."421
It is this conceptual and empirical novelty which this thesis has tried to capture
through the study of two variants of contemporary autonomism within the EU. It has
been argued that these movements share many notable features despite their different
historical and political contexts. Both can be shown to illustrate the paradox thrown
up by their existence within Europe, namely the degree to which their long-sought
autonomy from their respective nation-states, if and when it is achieved will be
replaced by integration within a Europe with aspirations to play a role in almost all
areas of policy traditionally reserved for the nation-state and it is this potential
encroachment which the term European Unionists seeks to capture. The question
which the analysis contained herein begs is the extent to which this shift needs to be
recognised terminologically by the embracing of a concept such as 'post-
nationalism', which simply signifies the substantial changes which are currently
happening to nationalism in Western Europe. This question is for future research and
421 M. Anderson (1996) "Frontiers - Territory and State Formation in the Modern World"
p.178.
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most importantly actual developments to decide. It is, however, important to note the
trends and events of change which have challenged many parts of the received
political wisdom on nationalism and if this term itself is retained to describe
movements such as the Scottish National Party and the Italian Northern League, then
it is imperative that the different content of nationalism in the contemporary EU
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APPENDIX T ; INTERVIEW COMMENTARY & QUESTIONS
COMMENTARY
Conducting twenty-eight interviews with activists in the Scottish National Party and
the Italian Northern League proved a very instructive process, both from an
academic and personal point of view. Intellectually I was pleased to gather data
which helped me argue that despite the obvious differences between the two
movements, many of those convinced enough of their arguments to get actively
involved, had large similarities in motive and goal. Personally the whole process
taught me how patient one must be in awaiting replies from potential interviewees
and how careful one must be in the wording of questions, a couple of misplaced
words can lose the whole intended effect of a question.
In general the interviews lasted about thirty minutes although one of the older SNP
activists used up a whole sixty minute tape, whilst a monosyllabic League supporter
produced less than twenty minutes. Two pilot interviews were conducted in
December 1994 in Scotland which led to a few questions being dropped as they were
obviously going to be answered as part of other questions. The bulk of the fieldwork
was then carried out in Scotland in Glasgow in March and Edinburgh in May and in
Italy in July and August of 1995 in Vicenza, Verona and Brescia. In addition two
top-up interviews with women were held in Edinburgh in October of 1995 to right a
gender imbalance - I had to actively seek out SNP women. The most time-
consuming process by far was the transcription of the interviews which I did myself
in the late summer of 1995. However I believe that the long hours spent listening and
typing were some of the most crucial in formulating the thesis because the stream of
thoughts and ideas which I had during transcription was unequalled at any other
stage of the research.
One of the most frustrating aspects of the whole interview process was the degree of
self-selection involved. At the outset I wrote to SNP branches in Glasgow Govan,
Aberdeen North, Peterhead and Perth & Kinross but only the first of these offered
their co-operation and so I then used a contact in Edinburgh to arrange more
interviews. The Northern League were much friendlier - I think I benefited from the
'flattering factor' of a foreign student being interested enough to come to Italy and
talk to them and the only place I didn't get a reply from was Milan. I conducted
seven interviews in the Veneto and seven in Lombardy to try and get a flavour of the
diversity between these two regions within the Northern League's umbrella.
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Obviously a total of twenty-eight interviews is nowhere near enough to found any
major theories upon, but this was never the intention of the interviews. They were an
important part of an integrated research design and my intention was to use them to
illustrate points made based on literature and other data sources such as opinion polls
or party literature. I see them comprising a snapshot of party sentiment during a
particular year, any comments and comparisons made on specific questions will be
intended not as definitive statements but rather as exploratory routes which may be
followed up or left to be disproved by further research. The major resource which I
could have used was simply assistance, the time involved in organising, conducting,
transcribing and reacting to a body of twenty-eight interviews certainly came as a
surprise to me. There were some dark days of transcription when it seemed a never
ending process and one wished that people didn't ramble on so much but overall I
would say I found the whole process very invigorating, it is very much my piece of
research from start to finish and there is a great buzz to hearing people say what one
anticipated they might say.
Before doing them the biggest problem apparent in the proposed interviews was the
degree of consistency which could be obtained when using two different languages. I
decided that to maximise the reliability of interviews conducted in English and
Italian it was salient to use highly structured interviews in which the questions were
virtually straight translations. I was aware that too structured an approach could
create artificial answers simply from the expectations created by my questions. Thus
in the end the interviews were fairly highly structured, I had a list of questions which
were identical in both languages and these formed the core of the process, but if the
interviewee said something which was worth pursuing I was prepared to follow this
line and then return to the structured interview - an approach which I believe has
provided for comparison between the two sets of data without constraining its
content to an unacceptable degree.
The activists of the SNP and the League provide the link between the above and
below between their parties and the electorate. Of course one expects them to be
committed and to hold stringent viewpoints because otherwise they may no longer be
active members. However their opinions are still valid since they represent people
that the parties have convinced of their message and in turn want to convince others,
they are the most committed voters and most frequently targeted group for interview,
since it would be very difficult to target say particular voter groups without the
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backing of a big polling organisation. It is my opinion that interviews with such
activists can provide a very fruitful terrain for research. The process is time-
consuming but for me it ultimately proved to be time well spent and certainly
provided me with one of the most enjoyable parts of the research undertaken.
QUESTIONS
Basic Information /Dati Essenziali
How old are you?
Quanti anni ha Lei?
Where were you born?
Dove e nato Lei?
Where were you brought up?
Dove si e cresciuto?
Where were your parents and grand-parents born and brought up?
Dove sono nati e si sono cresciuti i Suoi genitori e i Suoi nonni?
What is your current occupation? Have you had different jobs before?
Che lavorofa Lei a questo punto? Lei aveva i lavori dijferenti nel passato?
When did you join the SNP?
Quando si e iscritto alia Lega?
When did you become involved as an activist?
Quando ha cominciato il Suo coinvolgimento come un attivista?
Why did you become involved as an activist?
Perche ha cominciato il Suo coinvolgimento come un attivista?
Have you ever, in the past, been a member of other political parties? Your parents?
Nel passato si e mai iscritto in altri partiti politici? I Suoi genitori?
Motives /Motivi
Why did you join the party when you did?
Perche si e iscritto quando I'hafatto?
Have you ever questioned this decision? Are your reasons for membership still the
same?
Lei ha mai dubitato di questa scelta? Le Sue ragioni sono ancora le stesse?
Have you been pleased in , disappointed with or indifferent to the tangible changes
achieved by your party since you have been a member?
I cambiamenti tangibili che il Suo partito ha realizzato da quando si e iscritto , gleili
sono piaciuti, non glieli sono piaciuti o e rimasto indifferente?
Had London been more accommodating to the demands of Scotland, do you think
you would have still joined the party? Would you be involved to the same degree?
Se Roma avrebbe accolto piu le domande del Nord, Lei sarebbe ancora iscrittto in
partito? E il Suo coinvolgimento sarebbe il stesso?
277
How much has the experience of other autonomist movements influenced your
activism? Which models of autonomy do you look to as a prototype?
Quanto I'esperienza degli altri movimenti autonomisti ha influenzata il Suo
attivismo? Che sono i modeli d'autonomia che servono bene come prototipo?
Do you see your party's demands as primarily economic?
Le richieste del Suo partito, secondo Lei, sono sopratutto quelle economiche?
Would Scotland be richer with the type of autonomy proposed by your party?
II Nord sarebbe piu ricco con I'autonomia che il Suo partito ha proposto?
Myths IMiti
Do you see yourself as Scottish, not British; more Scottish than British; equally
Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; British, not Scottish?
Lei si sente come settentrionale solo, non italiano; piu settentrionale che italiano;
sia settentrionale che italiano; piu italiano che settentrionale; o italiano solo, non
settentrionale?
Do you see Scotland as different from the rest of Britain?
Lei vede il Nord come differente delle altre regioni dell'Italia?
If so, in what specific ways?
Se ha detto si, in quali modi specifici?
Would you say these differences derive from a different identity?
Per Lei, queste differenze direvano da un'identita dijferente?
Do you see this Scottish identity as an unique entity?
Lei vede questa identita settentrionale come un'entita unica?
How long has this distinctiveness existed?
Per quanto tempo e esistata questa caratteristica ?
Does the distinctiveness outlined have any ethnic base?
Questa caratteristica ha una base etnica?
Methods IMetodi
What kind of Scotland would you like to see?
Che tipo di Nord vorrebbe vedere?
What do you see as the most effective way to achieve tangible autonomy for
Scotland?
Quale pensa che sia il modo piu ejficace per ottenire un'autonomia tangibile per il
Nord d'Italia?
What form would this autonomy take? Is it and end or a means to a further end)
Che forma avrebbe quest'autonomia? C'e un fine o un mezzo per un'altro fine?
How do you react to the prospect/reality of alliance with other parties who are also
competitors?
Come Lei reagisce aliaprospettiva/alia realta di un'alleanza con altripartiti che
sono anche avversari?
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What do you think of SettlerWatch/ScotlandWatch?
Do you feel you have an influence/input on SNP policies and direction?
Le sembra che Lei abbia un 'influenza sulla linea politica e sulla direzione della
Lega?
Has the SNP shifted its stance over time?
La Lega ha cambiato posizione nella sua storia?
Why were these changes made?
Perche sono fatti questi cambiamenti?
Did you agree with them?
Lei e stato d'accordo con questi?
Would you consider a devolved/federal settlement as a reason to lessen or heighten
your activism in the party?
Considerebbe un 'assetto federate come una ragione per aumentare o diminuire il
Suo attivismo nel partito?
Others / Altri
How unified or divided would you say the party currently is? And in the past?
A questo punto, secondo Lei, il partito e unito o diviso? E nel passato?
Do the different factions within the party each get an equal hearing?
Le differenti tendenze nel partito hanno un peso uguale ?
What of the criticism that your party's policy will simply replace the shackles of
London with those of Brussels?
Come Lei risponde alia critica che con la linea politica del Suo partito il centralismo
di Brusselle semplicemente sostituira quello di Roma?
Quanta importanza hanno avuto le riforme regionali degli anni settanta?
Where do you see yourself situated on the following linear scale?
Perche Lei ha scelto questo luogo?
Do you think that the characteristics of nationalism have changed over the last few
years?
Secondo Lei le caratteristiche del nazionalismo hanno cambiato negli ultimi anni?
Is the international environment a help or a hindrance to your party?
La comunita internazionale aiuta o ostacola il Suo partito a questo punto ?
Have you heard of the Northern League? What is your opinion of them?
Ha sentito parlare del partito nazionale scozzese? Che ne pensa?
Do you have any further comments or questions?
Lei ha altri commend o altre domande?
I
Scottish
Why did you choose this position?








APPENDIX n ; MAP OF ITALY'S REGIONS
(Source : EUMap ofMember States, Regions and Administrative Units, 1995)
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